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You know your situation much, much better than I do as far as rating conditions, etc. So, using your knowledge you can apply your situation to the following to see what you come up with, as I just dont have any idea if your ratings involve seperate and distinct anatomical segments or not:

I thank all for the responses. I can't figure out what they think is missing from the DBQ as the doc covered everything very in-depth, neither can lawyer, but I'm going thru with it. Was scheduled for Tuesday but the location wasn't good and the doc they assigned it too is an xxxxxxx according to all reports from vets and civilians. Lawyer set up a 3-way call with QTC so I could have it put in their paperwork that he has full POA for this and can speak for me. Been rescheduled and made a video appointment-and with a different doc. One that has a better rep, too. Having a lawyer handle this is good, he laid it out and they did not argue at all. It will be 3 weeks from now and that will give him time to argue the issue with the VA to either cancel or at least limit the scope. Years of VA records supporting my claim and a C&P few months ago with in-depth DBQ, there is no reason to put me thru it again. Fishing? Probably, but can't prove it even if is. Well, for what its worth, that is the latest. Anyone needs a solid lawyer who will fight for them, a vet himself, this is the guy you want.

Morning folks, long time no post. I just got a call from my C&P examiner, and she had a few questions which I answered. After answering her questions, she did tell me the way she did my DBQ, I should be rated at 100% for Meniere's Syndrome. So, right now I'm 100% P&T BEFORE this latest DBQ is sent to the VA. I'm also SMC-L1. I also have A&A. So given this information, what will a 100% for the Meniere's Syndrome do? Will it possibly bump me up to SMC-O? Thanks. 2-2-0 HOOAH!

If you disagree with the VA's initial decision on your claim and decide to appeal the decision to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board), you have a few different options to choose how your appeal proceeds. But many people don't know what to expect, which could cloud their ability to choose the best option for them. In the video below, Judge Tanya Smith, a Veterans Law Judge, explains to Veterans what to expect, what to prepare, and what happens after a hearing. As the video above explains, one option is to have a hearing with a Veterans Law Judge (VLJ). Hearings are optional and aren't necessary to receive a decision from the Board. (Some veterans make a potentially quicker decision, and, to save time, they can choose one of the other options the Board offers. Instead of a hearing, the VLJ will review any evidence/statements you have submitted before deciding your appeal.) If you decide you want a hearing, consider choosing a virtual tele-hearing. Virtual tele-hearings are safe and secure, allowing you to have your hearing from the comfort of your home instead of traveling to a VA facility. Virtual tele-hearings are a great option, especially during a pandemic. They do not negatively affect your appeal, so don't postpone your hearing and delay your decision – choose a virtual tele-hearing. What can you expect during a Board Hearing? At the start of the hearing, the judge will ask you to raise your right hand, if possible, and swear you in. The judge will ask you to take an oath or affirm that you'll tell the truth during the hearing. During the hearing, you, your representative – if you have one, and the judge will discuss the issues on appeal. These hearings allow you to tell your story, and you should be comfortable doing so. The judge will listen to your testimony and may ask you a few questions to understand your appeal better. What should you do during the hearing? Tell the judge why you think you qualify for the VA benefits in your appeal. Answer any questions the judge has about your appeal. Share any new evidence with the judge: You can add new and relevant evidence either at the hearing or within 90 days after the hearing. Adding evidence is optional. What happens after your hearing? Please understand that the judge will not decide on your appeal the moment the hearing ends. When the 90 days for submitting new evidence after your hearing has ended, your appeal will be placed on the docket for a decision by a judge. You will receive your decision in the mail, and your representative will also receive a copy. You can track the status of your appeal by signing in at www.VA.gov. The video above has additional information. Cheryl L. Mason is the chairman of the Board of Veterans' Appeals. Source VA.gov Jan 25, 2021 View full record

Godsey v. Wilkie On June 13, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) certified its first class action. The case, styled Godsey v. Wilkie, was a petition for extraordinary relief brought by Covington & Burling LLP and the National Veterans Legal Services Program (NVLSP). The petition was filed on behalf of veterans James A. Godsey, Jr., Jeffery S. Henke, Thomas J. Marshall, Pamela Whitfield. It sought relief for all similarly situated VA benefits claimants who have filed an appeal to VA’s highest tribunal, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board), and since have suffered extended delays waiting for VA to begin moving their appeals forward in a process called “certification.” The CAVC partially granted the petition in the same order that it certified the class action, concluding that 18-month or longer VA delays to begin that process are “per se unreasonable.” “Such delays are particularly intolerable,” the Court stated, “because they consist of nothing but waiting in line: ... no action whatsoever on the part of VA” while the veterans have continued to wait. The National Veterans Legal Services Program (NVLSP) represents some of the veterans whose VA appeals have been delayed for a long time in the recently certified Godsey Class Action. In order to help us determine if you are covered by this Class Action, please complete this form. Source NVLSP UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS NO. 17-4361 James A. Godsey, Jr., Et al., Petitioners, V. Robert L. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent. Before PIETSCH, BARTLEY, and ALLEN, Judges. O R D E R1 Before February 19, 2019, a claimant dissatisfied with a VA benefits decision could appeal that decision to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) by filing a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) and, ultimately, a Substantive Appeal.2 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a) (2018); see Murphy v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 510, 514 (2014). Once a claimant filed a Substantive Appeal, VA would certify the case and transfer the appellate record to the Board. See 38 C.F.R. § 19.35 (2018). In 2017, when the instant petition was filed, it took VA, on average, 773 days to certify a case to the Board after receiving a Substantive Appeal and an additional 321 days after that to transfer the appellate record. BOARD CHAIRMAN'S FISCAL YEAR 2017 ANNUAL REPORT (2017 BOARD ANNUAL REPORT) at 25, available at https://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2018AR.pdf. The petitioners argue that taking nearly three years to complete these tasks is unreasonable and deprives them of their constitutional right to due process. They request, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated claimants, that the Court compel the Secretary to expedite the appeals certification and transfer process. Petition (Pet.) at 1-2. The Court agrees that judicial intervention is necessary and, for the reasons that follow, will modify and certify the class proposed by the petitioners and grant the petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus. 1 The Court held oral argument in this case at Liberty University School of Law in Lynchburg, Virginia, on February 21, 2019. The Court extends its appreciation to the law school for its hospitality. 2 The Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (VAIMA) overhauled the process for appealing VA benefits decisions, including by creating different types of agency review and allowing claimants to select among those options. See Pub. L. No. 115-55, 131 Stat. 1105, § 2 (Aug. 23, 2017). Although VAIMA was enacted on August 23, 2017, the Secretary's regulations implementing VAIMA did not become effective until February 19, 2019. See VA Claims and Appeals Modernization, 84 Fed. Reg. 138 (final rule) (Jan. 18, 2019); VA Claims and Appeals Modernization, 84 Fed. Reg. 2,449 (notification of effective date) (Feb. 7, 2019). One of those regulations, 38 C.F.R. § 3.2400, specifies that VAIMA does not apply to claims decided before February 19, 2019, unless the claimant elects to have the decision reviewed under the modernized system. 38 C.F.R. § 3.2400(b) (2018). Claims decided before that effective date are called "legacy claims" and appeals under the pre-VAIMA system are called "legacy appeals." Id. PRELIMINARY MATTER As an initial matter, the Court wants to be clear that, by deciding class certification and the merits of the underlying petition in a single order, it is not adopting a general policy or framework for deciding such matters concurrently in future cases. However, given the unique circumstances surrounding this case, particularly the nature of the alleged injury and the need for rapid remedial action, the Court has concluded that resolving both matters in a single order is appropriate here. See Quinault Allottee Ass'n & Individual Allottees v. United States, 453 F.2d 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cl. 1972) (deciding requests for class certification on a case-by-case basis, "gaining and evaluating experience" on an ad hoc basis before adopting general class certification rules). BACKGROUND The Petition On November 15, 2017, veterans James A. Godsey, Jr., Jeffery S. Henke, Thomas J. Marshall, and Pamela Whitfield filed through counsel a petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus. The petitioners stated that they had each filed a Substantive Appeal at least three years earlier and that, as of the date of the petition, VA had not yet certified any of their cases to the Board. Pet. at 5-6. The petitioners alleged that the Secretary's failure to timely certify their cases to the Board violated their right to procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, constituted agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed within the meaning of 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2) and 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), and violated their statutory right under 38 U.S.C. § 7107(a)(1) to have their appeals "considered and decided [by the Board] in regular order according to its place upon the docket." Pet. at 1-2, 7-13. The petitioners also asserted that such "extreme" certification delays are typical of the legacy appeals system and are likely encountered by hundreds, if not thousands, of claimants across the country. Id. at 6. Accordingly, the petitioners requested, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated individuals, that the Court issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary, within 60 days, to certify and transfer to the Board all cases that have been waiting two years or more for certification following the timely filing of a Substantive Appeal. Id. at 1-2. Certification and Transfer of the Appellate Record Before turning to the merits of the petitioners' arguments, it is necessary to outline the specific VA processes at the heart of this dispute: certification of a case and the transfer of the appellate record to the Board. Pre-Certification Review Per the VA Adjudication Procedures Manual (M21-1), after a claimant files a Substantive Appeal, his or her case is to be sent to a higher level employee at the VA regional office (RO), such as a decision review officer (DRO), who is to review the case to determine whether it is ready to be certified and sent to the Board. M21-1, pt. 1, ch. 5, § F.3.f. This determination is called "initial review of evidence," id., §§ F.3.b-d, but for purposes of this order the Court refers to it as pre-certification review. Pre-certification review is to entail verifying that all entries in the electronic Veterans Appeals Control and Locator System (VACOLS) are correct and up-to-date, identifying whether relevant evidence has been obtained and that the duty to assist has otherwise been met, checking whether all relevant claims processing documents have been issued and included in the file, and ensuring that the necessary appeal documents are in the electronic Veterans Benefits Management System (VBMS). Id., §§ F.3.g-h. If, as a result of pre-certification review, the RO assesses that no further development or adjudication is necessary, the case is certified as explained below. Id., §§ F.3.c, h. Additional Development and Adjudication After Pre-Certification Review If as a result of pre-certification review the RO assesses that further development and adjudication is necessary, that is, if it identifies outstanding evidence that has not yet been obtained, evidence received from the claimant that has not yet been reviewed along with a written request that the RO review that evidence in the first instance, an issue or argument that has not yet been developed or adjudicated, or a claimant request for further development, the RO is to take additional steps after pre-certification review to conduct the necessary development or adjudication activities and, only after such steps have been taken, certify the case to the Board. Id., §§ F.3.c-d; see also 38 C.F.R. § 19.37 (2018). Actual Certification Once pre-certification review is complete and once any necessary development or adjudication has taken place after completion of pre-certification review, the RO is to generate a VA Form 8, Certification of Appeal, the completion of which signifies that the case is ready to be transferred to the Board. Id.; see 38 C.F.R. § 19.35 (2018) (indicating that "[c]ertification is accomplished by the completion of VA Form 8," which "is used for administrative purposes and does not serve to either confer or deprive the Board[]of jurisdiction over an issue"); see generally M21-1, pt. 1, ch. 5, § F.9.a (VA's appeal certification worksheet). VA's Table of Work-Rate Standards for Adjudication Activities indicates that certification of a case to the Board, apparently including pre-certification review but excluding additional development and readjudication, should take 1.59 hours for non-rating cases, 2.6 hours for rating cases, and 4.19 hours for cases that involve both types of issues. VA MANPOWER CONTROL AND UTILIZATION IN ADJUDICATION DIVISIONS MANUALS (M21-4), Appx. B, § III. Nevertheless, in 2017, a claimant waited, on average, 773 days from the filing of a Substantive Appeal for the RO to complete the certification process. See 2017 BOARD ANNUAL REPORT at 25. Transfer of File to the Board "Once the RO completes all steps of the certification process, the appellate record must be immediately transferred to [the Board]." M21-1, pt. 1, ch. 5, § F.4.a. However, before transferring the record, the RO is supposed to conduct one more review of VACOLS to ensure that all information has been updated and, if necessary, prepares the paper claims folder to be sent to the scanning vendor. Id., §§ F.4.c-e. After that, the RO will transfer the case to the Board. Id., § F.4.e; see generally id., § F.10 (VA's checklist for transferring certified cases to the Board). In 2017, claimants waited, on average, 321 additional days for the RO to transfer the appellate record to the Board. See 2017 BOARD ANNUAL REPORT at 25. Receipt & Docketing at the Board Upon receipt at the Board, the case is "screened" and formally docketed, at which point a docket number is assigned based on the date of filing of the Substantive Appeal. THE PURPLE BOOK 72 (version 1.0.2, Sept. 2018). Summary In sum, the post-Substantive Appeal process can be broken down into the following stages: (1) pre-certification review; (2) if necessary, any additional development and/or readjudication identified during pre-certification review; (3) certification; (4) transfer to the Board; and (5) receipt and docketing at the Board. The petitioners do not differentiate between these stages; instead, they argue that the entire certification and transfer process—from the filing of a Substantive Appeal to docketing at the Board—takes too long. But these different stages matter when assessing whether aggregate relief is appropriate in this case. We address that issue in part IV, below. However, before doing so, we must satisfy ourselves that the petition has not become moot by virtue of the Secretary's actions since the filing of the petition. MOOTNESS The Petitioners' Underlying Claims In May 2018, six months after the petition was filed, the Secretary notified the Court that each of the petitioners had either had their case certified to the Board or their requested benefits granted in full by the RO. See Secretary's Solze Notice. The pleadings filed by both parties reveal the following relevant facts: Mr. Godsey attempted, in January 2014, to perfect an appeal of various claims denied by the Indianapolis RO by filing a statement in support of claim (SCC) in lieu of a Substantive Appeal. Pet. at Exhibits (Exs.) D-2, D-3. However, the RO failed to recognize the SCC as a Substantive Appeal and closed the case in March 2014. Secretary's Amended Response to the Petition (Resp.) at Ex. A. The RO realized this mistake one year later when reviewing Mr. Godsey's claims file in connection with another claim and reinstated the previously closed appeal. Id. In July 2017, while preparing to certify the case to the Board, a DRO determined that an addendum to a January 2010 VA medical examination was necessary, which it obtained in September 2017. Id. After speaking with Mr. Godsey in November 2017, the RO attempted to obtain updated VA treatment records, which were received in January 2018. Id. The RO, however, issued a Supplemental Statement of the Case (SSOC) in January 2018 before it had received those records; as a result, in March 2018 the RO contacted Mr. Godsey to see if he would waive RO consideration of those records in order to move the appeal to the Board. Id. Mr. Godsey submitted a waiver later that month and the appeal was ultimately certified to the Board on March 30, 2018. Id.; see also Secretary's Solze Notice at 1. Mr. Henke perfected his appeal of a respiratory claim denied by the Indianapolis RO by filing a Substantive Appeal in November 2012. Pet. at Ex. D-7. In January 2013, before the case was certified to the Board, he requested an RO hearing, which was held in December 2016. Secretary's Amended Resp. at Ex. B. A new VA respiratory examination was requested later that month and was provided in March 2017; however, the examination was determined to be inadequate due to lack of an etiology opinion. Id. After numerous attempts to obtain a non- speculative opinion from the examiner and additional treatment records, the RO, on November 30, 2017, issued a rating decision granting his claim for service connection, which the RO characterized as fully resolving the issue on appeal. Id.; see also Secretary's Solze Notice at 1. Mr. Marshall filed a Substantive Appeal in May 2014 as to claims denied by the Columbia RO. Pet. at Ex. D-11. Later that month, before his case was certified to the Board, his veterans service organization (VSO) representative requested that a VA examination that the veteran missed because he was hospitalized be rescheduled. Secretary's Amended Resp. at Ex. C. The examination was rescheduled for December 2015, but Mr. Marshall missed it and asked for it to be rescheduled again. Id. In February 2016, the RO requested and received additional private treatment records. Id. The RO submitted another examination request in May 2016. Id. It is unclear if that examination was ever conducted because, on November 28, 2017, the RO issued a DRO decision granting the appealed claims, which it characterized as a complete grant of the benefits sought on appeal. Id.; see also Secretary's Solze Notice at 2. Ms. Whitfield filed her Substantive Appeal in November 2011, challenging the Roanoke RO's denial of a claim for an increased evaluation in excess of 10% for status post Morton's neuroma removal with residual scar. Pet. at Ex. D-15. Over the next six years, Ms. Whitfield filed various other claims that were processed by the RO. Secretary's Amended Resp. at Ex. D. In November 2017, the RO issued an SSOC, but it is unclear from the evidence before the Court whether the SSOC addressed the Morton's neuroma claim or the other claims. Id. However, on February 13, 2018, the RO certified the Morton's neuroma claim to the Board. Id.; see also Secretary's Solze Notice at 2. The Petition Is Not Moot In his June 2018 response to the petition, the Secretary argued, inter alia, that the petition was moot, and that the request for class certification should therefore fail, because the petitioners had been granted the relief sought and no longer had a continuing stake in the outcome of the litigation. Secretary's Amended Resp. at 11-12. The petitioners countered that the case was live when they filed their petition and urged the Court to deem the petition justiciable due to the inherently transitory nature of the complained of conduct—namely, the Secretary's failure to timely certify their cases to the Board. Petitioners' Reply at 6-7. The Court agrees with the petitioners that, although they ultimately received the relief they requested before the Court ruled on their petition, the case is not moot and can be decided on the merits. This Court adheres to the case-or-controversy jurisdictional requirements imposed by Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Cardona v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 472, 474 (2014) (per curiam order); Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 12, 13 (1990). A case or controversy ceases to exist, and a case becomes moot, "'when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.'" Los Angeles Cty. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). When a case becomes moot during the course of litigation, the proper outcome is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, unless an exception to mootness applies. See Browder v. Shulkin, 29 Vet.App. 179, 172 (2017) (per curiam); Fabio v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 404, 405 (2013). The U.S. Supreme Court faced a mootness argument similar to the one presented in this case in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). In McLaughlin, plaintiffs brought a class action suit against the County of Riverside, California, alleging that its policy of waiting until arraignment to determine whether there was probable cause to arrest individuals without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment requirement that States provide prompt probable cause determinations to warrantless arrestees. 500 U.S. at 47. Before the Supreme Court, the County argued that the case was moot because the named plaintiffs had all received probable cause determinations years earlier and, due to the "time-limited" nature of the complained-of violation, they could not now receive the prompt probable cause hearing that they were allegedly denied. Id. at 50-51. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, highlighting that, at the time the plaintiffs filed their complaint, they had been arrested without warrants and were being held in custody without having received a probable cause determination, they were suffering a direct and current injury as a result of that detention that would continue until they received the probable cause determination to which they were entitled, and their injury was, at that moment, capable of being redressed through injunctive relief. Id. at 51. The Supreme Court stated: It is true, of course, that the claims of the named plaintiffs have since been rendered moot; eventually, they either received probable cause determinations or were released. Our cases leave no doubt, however, that by obtaining class certification, plaintiffs preserved the merits of the controversy for our review. In factually similar cases we have held that "the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class." That the class was not certified until after the named plaintiffs' claims had become moot does not deprive us of jurisdiction. We recognized in Gerstein [v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975),] that "[s]ome claims are so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative's individual interest expires." In such cases, the "relation back" doctrine is properly invoked to preserve the merits of the case for judicial resolution. Id. at 51-52 (quoting United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 399 (1980)) (internal citations omitted); see generally Demery v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 430, 443 (2019) (discussing the "relation back" doctrine). As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) explained in Monk v. Shulkin, "A 'class-action claim is not necessarily moot upon the termination of the named plaintiff's claim' in circumstances in which 'other persons similarly situated will continue to be subject to the challenged conduct,' but 'the challenged conduct was effectively unreviewable, because no plaintiff possessed a personal stake in the suit long enough for litigation to run its course.'" 855 F.3d 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 589 U.S. 66, 67 (2013)); see Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 653 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2011) ("An inherently transitory claim will certainly repeat as to the class, either because '[t]he individual could nonetheless suffer repeated [harm]' or because 'it is certain that other persons similarly situated' will have the same complaint." (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n. 11)). That line of reasoning applies with equal force here. When the petitioners filed their petition in November 2017, they had all been waiting over two years since the filing of their Substantive Appeals for VA to certify their respective cases to the Board. Pet. at 5-6. They would continue to be harmed by that delay until VA either granted benefits or certified their cases to the Board, and the injury they were suffering at that time was redressable by the injunctive relief they requested in their petition. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 51. Most importantly, the delay the petitioners were experiencing when they filed their petition was inherently transitory because VA could, and did, extinguish their individual interests in the outcome of the class action petition before this Court had the opportunity to rule on their request for class certification. See id. at 52; Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 399. Although the period at issue in this case is considerably longer than the one in McLaughlin, the inherently transitory exception to mootness may nevertheless be applied here because the petitioners' claims are not only unavoidably time-sensitive, but are also "acutely susceptible to mootness" due to the Secretary's history of mooting petitions before judicial resolution. Pitts, 653 F.3d at 1091 (applying the inherently transitory exception where plaintiffs' claims were likely to be mooted by the defendant's tactic of "picking off" lead plaintiffs with an offer of settlement to avoid a class action because "[t]he end result is the same: a claim transitory by its very nature and one transitory by virtue of the defendant's litigation strategy share the reality that both claims would evade review"); see Monk, 855 F.3d at 1321 (noting the Secretary's practice of mooting cases scheduled for precedential decision). Indeed, the Federal Circuit has indicated that this is precisely the situation where aggregate action is most appropriate to avoid such mootness concerns. See Ebanks v. Shulkin, 877 F.3d 1037, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that complaints of systemic delay in VA claims processing are "best addressed in the class-action context" to avoid mootness and provide class-wide relief). Accordingly, the Court concludes that, although the petitioners have now each had their cases resolved or certified to the Board, their petition is not moot because they presented a live case-or-controversy at the time that they filed their petition and the Secretary's conduct that they challenged in the petition was so inherently transitory that it was capable of evading review. Having resolved the mootness dispute, we now move to the class certification issue. CLASS CERTIFICATION In Monk, the Federal Circuit held that this Court has the "authority to certify a class for class action or similar aggregate resolution procedure." 855 F.3d at 1321. The Federal Circuit declined to prescribe a specific framework for the Court to use to determine whether class certification is appropriate, id. at 1321-22, and, to date, the Court has not devised its own rules for certifying a class. However, in Monk v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 167, 170 (2018), the Court determined that we would use Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 23) as a guide for deciding requests for class certification until we issue our own aggregate action rules. See Thompson v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 345, 346 (2018) (applying Rule 23 to petitioner's request for class certification). We therefore proceed to consider the instant request for class certification under that framework. Under Rule 23(a), the party seeking class certification must demonstrate that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; there are questions of law or fact common to the class; the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011). The party must also demonstrate that the action is maintainable as a class under Rule 23(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); see Amchem Products, Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997). To do so here, the petitioners must establish that the Secretary "has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). Commonality We begin our Rule 23(a) analysis with commonality, a requirement that has proven problematic for prior class action petitioners at this Court. See Monk, 30 Vet.App. at 175-81. In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court held that Rule 23(a)(2) requires a "common contention . . . of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." 564 U.S. at 350. The Supreme Court emphasized that "'[w]hat matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common 'questions'—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.'" Id. (quoting Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132 (2009)). The existence of even one such question is sufficient to satisfy the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement. Id. at 359. In Monk, a plurality of the en banc Court found that a petition that alleged that the total time it took for VA to decide a veteran's benefits appeal—from the filing of an NOD with an RO decision to the issuing of a Board decision—was unconstitutionally or unreasonably long lacked commonality because it did not identify a "common question for the petitioners' and putative class's cause of delay." 30 Vet.App. at 181. Although that position was not adopted by a majority of the en banc Court, see id. at 184-205, the plurality indicated that "a class proceeding may be an appropriate vehicle to challenge systemic deficiencies . . . when the putative class targets specific polices or practices that allegedly violate the law." Id. at 181 (citing Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014)). The petitioners in this case have sought certification of a class of all VA benefits claimants who have waited more than two years from the filing of their Substantive Appeals for VA to certify and transfer their cases to the Board. Included in that class would be not only claimants who are standing in line simply waiting for pre-certification review, but also those receiving additional development and readjudication resulting from pre-certification review. See supra pt. II.B. Factual and legal differences among class members' claims will prove fatal to commonality when those differences "'have the potential to impede the generation of common answers'" to the questions proposed by the class. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 (quoting Nagareda, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 132)). The petitioners here have identified legal and factual questions that they believe are common to this putative class; namely, whether a two-year delay to certify and transfer cases to the Board constitutes a per se violation of class members' due process rights or is per se unreasonable under Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (TRAC), and Martin v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2018). See Pet. at 17; Petitioner's Reply at 2-4. The question whether differences such as those here would impede the generation of common answers divided the Court in Monk. To the extent that the Monk plurality decision would affect the commonality analysis in this case, we will sua sponte modify the class definition to reflect our ultimate merit determination. See Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 937 (2d Cir. 1993) ("A court is not bound by the class definition proposed in the complaint and should not dismiss the action simply because the complaint seeks to define the class too broadly."); see also Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Def. Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592, 619 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding the district court's modifications of the proposed class because "district courts have broad discretion to modify class definitions" and observing that "the district court's multiple amendments merely showed that the court took seriously its obligation to make appropriate adjustments to the class definition as the litigation progressed"); Schorsch v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 417 F.3d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that "[l]itigants and judges regularly modify class definitions"). Our concurrent resolution of the petitioners' request for class certification and the merits of their underlying petition counsels in favor of modification, particularly given our conclusion in part V.A.2 below that delays associated with a portion of pre-certification review are unreasonable. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 351 (noting that a court's "rigorous analysis" of the Rule 23(a) requirements frequently entails "some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim" because "'class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action'" (quoting General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982))). Accordingly, we narrow the class to include only those claimants who have been standing in line waiting more than 18 months since filing their Substantive Appeals.3 As the Secretary conceded at oral argument, such a modified class satisfies the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement. Oral Argument at 58:00-:40. But even without that concession, we would hold that the modified class presents common questions of law or fact sufficient to establish commonality under any standard. 3 We do not fault petitioners for zealously advocating for what they perceived to be the broadest viable class. It makes little sense to mandate, as our dissenting colleague suggests, that petitioners request a narrower class before knowing how the Court would rule on the original class they requested. Numerosity, Typicality, and Adequacy of Representation The modified class also satisfies each of the remaining Rule 23(a) requirements. The Secretary initially conceded in his response to the petition that the proposed class was sufficiently numerous to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1), Secretary's Amended Resp. at 4, and he confirmed at oral argument that the modified class would likewise meet that requirement, Oral Argument at 1:01:38- :57. The Secretary also conceded at oral argument that the modified class met the typicality requirement, as there were no longer any unique defenses among class members that would prevent aggregate resolution of the petition. Id. at 1:00:24-:44; see Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 984 (9th Cir. 2011) ("The test of typicality is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct. Typicality refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the class representative, and not to the specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought." (internal quotations omitted)); Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 936-38 (explaining that the "typicality requirement is satisfied when each class member's claim arises from the same course of events and each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant's liability," despite "minor variations in the fact patterns underlying individual claims," and finding that "the typicality requirement plainly was met with respect to persons suffering delays with respect to the applications for benefits" under two state assistance programs because the alleged delay "stems from the same cause"). And, the Secretary conceded that petitioners Godsey and Whitfield would be adequate representatives of the class because they did not have any interests adverse to the putative members of the modified class. Oral Argument at 1:01:38-:57; see Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625-26 ("The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent. '[A] class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.'" (quoting East Tex. Motor Freight System, Inc., v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977))). With these concessions, the modified class meets the Rule 23(a) requirements for class certification. Rule 23(b)(2) In addition to the Rule 23(a) requirements, a party seeking class certification must also demonstrate that the proposed class is maintainable under Rule 23(b). See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 345. The petitioners have sought to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2), which "permits a court to certify a case for class-action treatment if 'the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.'" Monk, 30 Vet.App. at 181 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2)). As the Supreme Court explained in Wal-Mart, "[t]he key to the (b)(2) class is 'the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.'" 564 U.S. at 360 (quoting Nagareda, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 132)). "Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant." Id. at 360-61. The relief that the petitioners request in this case—a single injunction requiring the Secretary to certify and transfer all class members' cases to the Board within a time certain, see Pet. at 2—"perforce affect[s] the entire class at once" and is, therefore, precisely the type of relief contemplated by Rule 23(b)(2). Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 361-62. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the petitioners have met their burden of demonstrating that class certification is appropriate in this case.4 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613-14; Monk, 30 Vet.App. at 174. Before certifying the class, however, the Court must address whether the petitioners' counsel will adequately represent the class. Adequacy of Class Counsel Under Rule 23(g) "Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court that certifies a class must appoint class counsel." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1). "When one applicant seeks appointment as class counsel, the court may appoint that applicant only if the applicant is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1) and (4)." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(2). "The court may not appoint class counsel by default." ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S NOTES to FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Rule 23(g)(1) provides, in relevant part, that, in appointing class counsel, the court: must consider: the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action; counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; and the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class; [and] may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class[.] FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(A)-(B). Rule 23(g)(4) mandates that "[c]lass counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4). The Court is satisfied that petitioners' counsel will adequately represent the class. Counsel has heretofore zealously represented the petitioners by diligently and competently identifying, 4 We do not share our dissenting colleague's view that the Court should categorically decline to certify classes because class or aggregate actions may be more difficult to manage than cases involving individual petitions. Post at 19. Manageability is generally not a concern in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions. See Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010). Even in actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3) where manageability is a mandatory consideration, potential difficulty managing a class action "will rarely, if ever, be in itself sufficient to prevent certification of a class." Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004). In any event, we see no reason to deny class certification in this case on manageability grounds—this case is highly manageable, particularly compared to the massive multistate litigations routinely certified as class actions by district courts. See, e.g., In re Qualcomm Antitrust Litigation, 328 F.R.D. 280, 294 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2018) (certifying a nationwide class with between 232.8 and 250 million potential members). investigating, presenting, and defending claims for relief, including in various pleadings and at oral argument. Counsel has submitted affidavits reflecting considerable experience in handling class action cases and other complex litigation, as well as veterans law cases in general. See Pet. at Exs. L-M. Those affidavits also reflect that counsel is able and willing to commit whatever resources are necessary to adequately represent the class in this petition, and counsel's actions thus far confirm those assertions. Id. Given the foregoing, the Court concludes that the petitioners' counsel is adequate to represent the class and will appoint said counsel as counsel for the class. Other Matters Two final notes are necessary before we certify the modified class. First, although Rule 23(b)(2) does not require that the party seeking class certification demonstrate that "a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy" like Rule 23(b)(3) does, we nevertheless address that issue and conclude that in this case a class action decision is superior to a precedential decision as to a single petitioner. As the Federal Circuit made clear in Ebanks, petitions alleging systemic delay are "best addressed in the class-action context, where the court could consider class-wide relief" that would inure to all similarly situated claimants. 877 F.3d at 1039-40 (questioning "the appropriateness of granting individual relief to veterans who claim unreasonable delays in VA's first-come-first-served queue" because "[g]ranting a mandamus petition [for an individual] may result in no more than line-jumping without resolving the underlying problem of overall delay"). Moreover, deciding this petition as a class empowers the Court to monitor and enforce its order more easily and efficiently than would be possible through the filing of individual petitions seeking compliance in each claimant's case. See Monk, 855 F.3d at 1321 (emphasizing that class actions "could be used to compel correction of systemic error and to ensure that like veterans are treated alike"). In short, a class action decision is a more efficient and effective vehicle for resolving this case than a precedential decision focused on an individual veteran's case. Second, given our concurrent resolution of the class certification request and the merits of the underlying petition, there is no need to provide notice of certification to the affected class members in this case. This conclusion, however, is based on the unique circumstances of this case and should not be construed as a holding that class certification notice is not necessary in future cases. Whatever the Court ultimately decides about the necessity of notice in future class actions before our Court, we are satisfied that notice of class certification is not necessary here. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S NOTES TO FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (emphasizing that courts have discretion to decide whether to direct notice of certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class). Certification of the Modified Class For the reasons outlined above, the Court modifies the class proposed by the petitioners and, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1), certifies the following modified class for purposes of this petition: All VA benefits claimants who filed a Substantive Appeal at least 18 months prior to the date of this order and who are waiting for VA to initiate pre-certification review of their cases. Having decided the request for class certification, the Court now proceeds to the merits of the class members' petition.5 MERITS OF THE CLASS PETITION This Court has authority to issue extraordinary writs in aid of its jurisdiction pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). See Cox v. West, 149 F.3d 1360, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Kelley v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 183, 185 (2013). However, "[t]he remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations." Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Three conditions must be met before the Court can issue a writ: (1) The petitioner must demonstrate the lack of adequate alternative means to obtain the desired relief, thus ensuring that the writ is not used as a substitute for an appeal; (2) the petitioner must demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to the writ; and (3) the Court must be convinced, given the circumstances, that issuance of the writ is warranted. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004); Kelley, 26 Vet.App. at 186-92. The petitioners have argued that a writ of mandamus is necessary to compel the Secretary to expedite the process of certifying and transferring cases to the Board after the filing of a Substantive Appeal. Pet. at 1-2. The petitioners have asserted that they, and all similarly situated members of the class, have no adequate alternative means to obtain relief from the Secretary's substantial certification delays because there is "no established procedures through which claimants can force the Secretary to certify their appeals," and the Secretary, in any event, routinely fails to respond to individual requests for certification. Id. at 14. The petitioners contend that the class has a clear and indisputable right to a writ of mandamus because the Secretary's failure to timely certify cases to the Board deprives class members of their Fifth Amendment right to due process of law, constitutes agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed within the meaning of 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2) and 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), and prevents them from having their cases "considered and decided [by the Board] in regular order according to its place upon the docket" in violation of 38 U.S.C. § 7107(a)(1). Id. at 1-2, 7-13. Although the Secretary conceded that the petitioners have no adequate alternative means to obtain their requested relief, Secretary's Amended Resp. at 31-32, he asserted that the petitioners failed to carry their burden of demonstrating entitlement to a writ under any of their theories of the case, id. at 16-35. Because "a claim that a plaintiff has been denied due process because of delayed agency action is essentially no different than an unreasonable delay claim," and because "if there is any difference at all, it is that an unreasonable delay claim would likely be triggered prior to a delay becoming so prolonged that it qualifies as a constitutional deprivation of property," Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2010), we begin our analysis with the petitioners' argument that the time that it takes the Secretary to timely certify and transfer cases to the Board is unreasonable. See also Martin, 891 F.3d at 1348-49 ("If the Veterans Court . . . , finds a delay unreasonable (or not unreasonable), it need not separately analyze the due process claim based on that same delay."). 5 In certifying the modified class, the Court is not expressing an opinion as to whether those excluded from the class have been subject to unconstitutional or unreasonable delay in the appeal certification process. Unreasonable Delay Martin v. O'Rourke Congress empowered this Court to "compel action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2); see Monk, 855 F.3d at 1319. In Martin, the Federal Circuit stated that the Court may use its mandamus authority to compel such Secretarial action, 891 F.3d at 1343-44, holding that the factors outlined in TRAC provide an appropriate framework for analyzing claims of unreasonable agency delay, id. at 1338. Those factors include: (1) The time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a "rule of reason"; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not "find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed." TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80 (citations omitted). Martin was a consolidated case involving nine petitions for writs of mandamus that alleged that the time that VA takes to decide appeals after the filing of an NOD is unreasonable. 891 F.3d at 1342. Although the Federal Circuit did not reach the merits of the petitions, it provided extensive guidance to the Court on how to analyze each of the TRAC factors when deciding petitions based on unreasonable agency delay. The Federal Circuit began by explaining that the first TRAC factor—whether VA's decisionmaking process is governed by a rule of reason—"is considered to be the most important factor in some circuits." Martin, 891 F.3d at 1345. To analyze this factor, along with the "relate[d]" second factor, the absence of a specific congressional timetable for action, the Court must look to the particular agency action delayed because it "is reasonable that more complex and substantive agency actions take longer than purely ministerial ones." Id. at 1345-46. The Court "may also consider whether the delays complained of are based on complete inaction by the VA, or whether the delays are due in part to the VA's statutory duty to assist a claimant in developing his or her case." Id. at 1346. In noting this consideration, the Federal Circuit specifically directed the Court to "consider whether delays are due to the agency's failure to perform certain ministerial tasks such as filling out the form certifying the appeal to the [Board] and docketing by the [Board]." Id. The Federal Circuit opined, in a footnote, that they could conceive of "no reasonable explanation for the historic delays that have occurred during appeal certification . . . and during transfer to the [Board]," ultimately calling those delays "inexplicable." Id. at 1346 n.9. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit indicated that, due to the highly factual nature of the rule-of- reason inquiry, there was "no reason to articulate a hard and fast rule with respect to the point in time at which a delay becomes unreasonable," reserving that case-specific determination for this Court. Id. at 1346. Regarding the other TRAC factors, the Federal Circuit observed that the third factor would likely always weigh in a VA benefits claimant's favor because "[v]eterans' disability claims always involve human health and welfare." Id. Considerations relevant to the fourth factor—the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority—include VA's limited resources, the fact that the agency is in a better position than the courts to evaluate how to use those resources, and the effect of expediting action on other claimants, including any undesirable line-jumping. Id. at 1347. The Federal Circuit further explained that the fifth TRAC factor— the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay—"incorporates an analysis of the effect of a delay on a particular veteran," meaning that the factor may weigh more heavily in favor of unreasonableness when "a particular veteran is wholly dependent on the requested disability benefits," as opposed to a veteran who "has a sustainable source of income outside of the VA benefits system." Id. And the Federal Circuit declared that the final TRAC factor may weigh in favor of issuing a writ "even where there is no evidence of bad faith" on the part of VA. Id. at 1348. With these principles in mind, we turn to the petitioners' allegations in this case. Application to the Instant Class Petition The petitioners have argued that the time that it takes the Secretary to certify and transfer cases to the Board after the filing of a Substantive Appeal is so egregious under TRAC and Martin as to warrant issuance of a writ. See Pet. at 10-13; Petitioners' Reply at 9-13. Although the class certified by the Court narrowed the relevant period to the time it takes for the Secretary to initiate pre-certification review, see supra pts. III.A, E, the petitioners' initial arguments remain relevant to the Court's reasonableness inquiry. Specifically, the petitioners asserted that there is no rule of reason that would support a multi-year adjudication delay following the filing of a Substantive Appeal; the Secretary's failure to timely act on Substantive Appeals conflicts with VA's statutory mandate to decide appeals in docket order; that delay harms the health and human welfare of veterans and their dependents, who are a protected class of individuals; and there is no higher or competing agency priority that justifies such delay. Pet. at 11-13. The petitioners further argued that nothing in VAIMA would remedy the current delays in processing legacy appeals and that the Court, therefore, should not factor the modernized appeal system into its TRAC and Martin analysis. Petitioners' Reply at 14-15. The Secretary initially argued that, although the third and fifth TRAC factors weighed in the petitioners' favor, the remaining TRAC factors counseled against finding unreasonableness in this case. See Secretary's Amended Resp. at 24-31. However, when the Court asked him at oral argument which TRAC factors would be in VA's favor if the relevant period was narrowed to just the time that claimants waited for pre-certification review, the Secretary conceded that all the TRAC factors except factors two and four would weigh in the petitioners' favor. Oral Argument at 1:10:48-:12:00. We agree with the petitioners that the current time that it takes the Secretary to initiate pre- certification review after the filing of a Substantive Appeal is per se unreasonable under TRAC and Martin. Although the Court is cognizant of the number of Substantive Appeals filed each year and the myriad other tasks that the ROs perform, there is simply no rule of reason that can justify a multiyear wait before an RO even looks at an appealed case to determine whether further development and/or adjudication is warranted before certifying and transferring a case to the Board. Such delays are particularly intolerable because they consist of nothing but waiting in line: no development, no adjudication, no action whatsoever on the part of VA. See Martin, 891 F.3d at 1346 (explaining that the "rule of reason" analysis may take into account whether a delay is "based on complete inaction," as opposed to compliance with statutory duties). The first and "most important" TRAC factor, id. at 1345, therefore weighs heavily in the petitioners' favor. The third, fourth, and fifth TRAC factors also support a finding of unreasonableness. As the Federal Circuit noted about the third TRAC factor in Martin, 891 F.3d at 1346, and the Secretary conceded in this case, Secretary's Amended Resp. at 29, the adjudication of veterans benefits claims inherently involves health and human welfare, making the alleged delay in conducting pre-certification review "less tolerable," TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. See Erspamer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 3, 10 (1990) ("Claims for benefits due to military service clearly implicate human health and welfare concerns as distinguished from economic regulation."). Regarding the fourth TRAC factor, even though the Secretary contended at oral argument that expediting pre-certification review would have an adverse impact on agency activities of a higher or competing priority, Oral Argument at 1:11:14-12:00, he admitted at several points during the argument that VAIMA gives primacy to processing legacy appeals and that he has recently targeted for expedited processing precisely the types of cases involved in this class action, id. at 35:07-36:03, 45:48-46:35, 1:10:34-:44. By allocating additional resources to legacy appeals processing to try to reach his goal of having no legacy appeals pending at ROs by June 2020, id. at 35:27-:35, the Secretary has already unequivocally indicated that the class members' cases are of the utmost priority. And any concern that granting the instant petition would require the Secretary to allocate additional resources away from other RO activities is mitigated by the fact that the classwide relief requested in this petition would inure to the claimants who had already waited the longest for pre-certification review, without the undesirable consequence of line- jumping associated with individual petitions alleging delay. See Ebanks, 877 F.3d at 1040 (advocating for aggregate resolution of systemic delay claims to avoid line-jumping); Monk, 855 F.3d at 1321 (emphasizing that class actions "could be used to compel correction of systemic error and to ensure that like veterans are treated alike"). In short, the fourth TRAC factor does not support the Secretary's position. As for the fifth TRAC factor, although the aggregate nature of this case prevents the Court from looking at the individual circumstances of each class member's case to assess the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by the delay, see Martin, 891 F.3d at 1347 (noting that the "fifth factor incorporates an analysis of the effect of a delay on a particular veteran"), we believe it is sufficient to observe, as the Federal Circuit did in Martin, that many VA beneficiaries—likely many of the class members in this case—"depend on [VA] disability benefits for basic necessities, such as food, clothing, housing, and medical care." Id. Moreover, as this Court recognized in Erspamer, the interests prejudiced by systemic delay may "transcend" those of a single petitioner because "'excessive delay saps the public confidence in an agency's ability to discharge its responsibilities and creates uncertainty for the parties, who must incorporate the potential effect of possible agency decisionmaking into future plans.'" 1 Vet.App. at 10 (quoting Potomac Electric Power Company v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Indeed, the Secretary conceded at oral argument that the fifth TRAC factor weighed in favor of the petitioners and the class in this case. Oral Argument at 1:10:45-:46. The remaining TRAC factors do not tip the scales towards a finding of reasonableness. Specifically, the sixth TRAC factor does not appear to weigh substantially in either party's favor: The pleadings do not reflect and the petitioners do not allege bad faith on the part of the Secretary in taking so long to conduct pre-certification review, but "[a] writ may be appropriate under the TRAC analysis even where there is no evidence of bad faith." Martin, 891 F.3d at 1348 (explaining that "the Veterans Court need not find 'any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude' to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed" (quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80)). The lack of bad faith by the Secretary is, at most, de minimis support for his position. And, although the second TRAC factor weighs in the Secretary's favor because Congress has previously declined to impose an appeal certification timeline on VA, see, e.g., American Heroes COLA Act of 2015, H.R. 677, 114th Cong. § 13 (proposing a one-year certification deadline after the filing of a Substantive Appeal); VA Appeals Backlog Relief Act of 2015, H.R. 1302, 114th Cong. § 2 (same); VA Appeals Backlog Relief Act of 2015, H.R. 5349, 113th Cong. § 2 (same); Veterans' Claims Administrative Equity Act of 1991, H.R. 141, 102d Cong. § 2 (proposing a grant of interim benefits when VA did not certify a denied claim to the Board within 180 days of the filing of a Substantive Appeal), that fact is not sufficient to overcome the aforementioned factors that emphatically demonstrate that the time the class members have waited for pre-certification review is unreasonable. See In re A Cmty. Voice, 878 F.3d 779, 787 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Even assuming that EPA has numerous competing priorities under the fourth factor and has acted in good faith under the sixth factor, the clear balance of the TRAC factors favors issuance of the writ."). Thus, the petitioners have demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to a writ of mandamus. See Freeman v. Shinseki, 24 Vet.App. 404, 417 (2011). Unlike our dissenting colleague, see post at 21, we are not content to wait for the Secretary to remedy these unreasonable delays on his own. The Secretary has had many years to act and initiate pre-certification review of class members' cases, and he has failed to do so. Ms. Whitfield, for example, was forced to wait over six years for the Secretary to act on her Substantive Appeal based on no fault of her own. Simply put: the time has come for judicial intervention. Given the foregoing, and given the Secretary's earlier concession that the petitioners have no adequate alternative means to obtain the relief they seek, Secretary's Amended Resp. at 31-32, the Court is convinced that issuance of a writ is warranted in this case to ensure that the class members receive timely pre-certification review of their appealed cases so that any necessary further development may occur or certification may proceed. See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81; Kelley, 26 Vet.App. at 186-92. Remedy Having determined that the delays experienced by the class awaiting pre-certification review are unreasonable, the Court must now determine what relief is appropriate to remedy that classwide harm. Although the petitioners initially asked the Court to order the Secretary to certify all class members' cases to the Board within 60 days of granting their petition, Pet. at 2, that prayer for relief is somewhat inconsistent with the modified class that the Court ultimately certified. See supra pt. IV.F. The Court will order the Secretary to conduct pre-certification review of all cases that fit within the class definition, and for each class member, within 120 days after the date of this order, either (1) certify his or her case, or (2) affirmatively initiate any development or adjudication activities necessary for certification or resolution at the RO. We believe that this remedy properly balances the class members' interest in having their Substantive Appeals expeditiously processed with VA's statutory duty to assist the class members in substantiating their appealed claims. We recognize that the Secretary will likely have to reorganize his adjudication priorities and allocate additional resources to the ROs to comply with this Court order. Ordinarily, the Court affords the Secretary great deference in how he chooses to run the day-to-day operations of the agency. But extraordinary circumstances call for extraordinary measures, and the Secretary's longstanding failure to remedy the unreasonable delays in accomplishing pre-certification review, resulting in claimants waiting in line for years with no action being taken by VA, has compelled the Court's intervention in this case. See United States v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 48 (1888) (explaining that a court should "not interfere by mandamus with the executive officers of the government in the exercise of their ordinary official duties, even where those duties require an interpretation of the law, the court having no appellate power for that purpose," but holding that, "when [executive officers of the government] refuse to act in a case at all, . . . a mandamus may be issued to compel them"). The Petitioners' Other Arguments Given this disposition, the Court need not address the petitioners' argument that the class was denied due process of law under the Fifth Amendment by being subjected to the aforementioned delays while awaiting pre-certification review. See Martin, 891 F.3d at 1349-50. Nor are we required to address the petitioners' alternative statutory argument that such delays violated section 7107(a)(1) because that argument could not result in a greater remedy for the class. See Mahl v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 37, 38 (2001). CONCLUSION Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the class proposed by the petitioners is modified consistent with this decision. It is further ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1), the following class is certified for purposes of this petition: All VA benefits claimants who filed a Substantive Appeal at least 18 months or more prior to the date of this order and who are waiting for VA to initiate pre-certification review of their cases. It is further ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 23(g), petitioners' counsel is appointed as class counsel. It is further ORDERED that the petition is granted in part. The Secretary shall conduct pre- certification review of all cases that fit within the class definition, and for each class member, within 120 days after the date of this order, either (1) certify his or her case, or (2) affirmatively initiate development or adjudication activities necessary for certification or resolution at the RO. It is further ORDERED that, within 60 days of the date of this order, the Secretary file with the Court a status update, which includes (1) the names and VA claims numbers for all members of the class; (2) the number of cases in the class that are still awaiting pre-certification review; (3) the number of cases in the class that have been processed in compliance with this order—i.e., certified or afforded additional development and/or adjudication by the RO following pre-certification review; and (3) any other information the Secretary deems relevant to his compliance with the Court order. The Court may subsequently order further status updates as necessary. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d). DATED: June 13, 2019 PER CURIAM. PIETSCH, Judge, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion pertaining to both class certification and granting the petition on the merits. Although the Federal Circuit held that this Court has the authority to certify a class or otherwise aggregate claims, I still question whether we should exercise that authority. Monk, 855 F.3d at 1320-21. In refusing to entertain class actions, the Court previously noted that a class action would be "highly unmanageable" and, in the context of appeals, unnecessary given the binding effect of the Court's precedential decisions. See Harrison v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 438, 438-39 (1991) (en banc order). I remain convinced that certifying and managing a class at an appellate Court will be troublesome. I am particularly concerned about trying to manage a class action where the Court has still not adopted any rules to govern how a class, once certified, will proceed or be administered at the Court. Although the Court has stated we will use Rule 23 as a guide for deciding requests for class certification, the Court has not determined how a class will be overseen. Without some procedures in place, I am deeply concerned with the majority's decision to certify a class. As to the commonality of the class being certified, the majority noted that in Monk, a plurality of this Court held that the proposed class in that case lacked commonality where there was not a "common question for the petitioners' and putative class members' cause of the delay." 30 Vet.App. at 181. The majority here simply modifies the class to avoid the commonality problems that derailed class certification in Monk. In doing so, the majority focuses on the outcome of the case, modifying the class so it will be successful on the merits. Indeed, the majority states the concurrent resolution of the request for class certification and the underlying merits of the petition favors modification. While I agree with the majority that a class certification analysis under Rule 23(a) involves overlap with the merits, I do not agree with the notion that the class should be modified so that it will be successful on the merits. I see no reason why the class certification analysis under Rule 23(a) should be different simply because the Court is also deciding the merits of the petition. It seems to me that the majority has unnecessarily created a "chicken or egg" situation; in other words, it is difficult to tell whether the class certification decision or the merits determination comes first. Absent a request for modification of the class by the petitioners, in my view, it appears the majority made a determination on the merits and certified a class based on that determination. I note that, at oral argument, petitioners were strongly against modification. When faced with several opportunities to modify the class, petitioners' counsel refused. Oral Argument at 5:30, 14:34. Although counsel ultimately acquiesced when asked whether petitioners would rather lose their case than modify the class, on rebuttal, counsel again argued against modification. Compare id. at 15:30 to 20:36 with 1:14:56. The proposed class in this case suffers many of the same commonality flaws that were present in Monk. 30 Vet.App. at 178-79. As described by the majority, the process of certifying an appeal to the Board is not as simple as filing out a form. Many times, including in the cases of some of the named petitioners, additional development must be completed before an appeal may be certified to the Board. The myriad of reasons for the delays involved in cases pending more than two years from the time of filing a Substantive Appeal to the case being certified to the Board counsels against commonality. See Monk, 30 Vet.App. at 178 (finding it is impossible to determine whether VA's delay in adjudicating claims is reasonable without knowing the reason for the delay). By modifying the class, the majority seems to skip the commonality analysis, instead modifying the class so that commonality exists. In doing so, the majority conducts almost no analysis, noting the Secretary's concession that a modified class would meet the commonality requirement and stating that, even without that concession, the majority would find commonality, but not explaining why. As to the merits of the petition, I agree with most of the majority's analysis concerning the reasonableness of the time the Secretary takes to begin the pre-certification review after a claimant has filed a Substantive Appeal. The delay involved in the cases of the modified class members for VA to even pick up a claimant's file to begin pre-certification review is inexcusable. Where I differ from the majority is with respect to TRAC factors two and four. See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. Those factors consider where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute and the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a competing priority. As the majority states, Congress has chosen not to impose a timeline on VA for certifying appeals to the Board. My disagreement with the majority is only as to how much weight this factor deserves. As to the fourth TRAC factor, the Secretary has recognized the delays associated with legacy appeals and is taking action to resolve these delays. To me, this factor, along with the second TRAC factor, are the deciding factors in this case. At oral argument, the Secretary detailed the steps VA has taken to work legacy appeals, noting that the oldest cases are being worked on first. The Secretary has recognized that these cases have been allowed to linger for far too long and has put in place a plan to address them. At this point, it seems to be nothing more than an empty gesture for the Court to insert itself into the Secretary's process in dealing with these appeals. Because VA is addressing this problem, I do not see any reason to inject ourselves into the process without some indication that the Secretary's current plan has failed. Here, not only is the majority ordering the Secretary to act on these cases within a much shorter time frame than VA had planned and budgeted, the Court is simultaneously certifying the Court's first class action as part of its decision. I fear there will be some confusion and delay as both the Court and the Secretary deal with a class action. Because VA is aware of the delay associated with these legacy appeals and is actively working on them, I would allow the Secretary to complete what he has started. If, at some point in the future, it becomes clear that the Secretary's plan for working on these appeals is insufficient, then I would consider getting involved. Until that time, I would let the Secretary run his agency. godsey-v-wilkie.pdf View full record

In the context of a claim of unreasonable delay, the first stage of judicial inquiry is to consider whether the agency's delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus. Although this court has decided several cases involving claims of unreasonable delay, *see, e.g., PCHRG v. FDA,* 740 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984); *Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter,* 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *PEPCO,* 702 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC ("MCI"),* 627 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1980); *Nader v. FCC,* 520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1975), we have not articulated a single test for when the writ should issue. On reading these cases together, however, one can discern the hexagonal contours of a standard. Although the standard is hardly ironclad, and sometimes suffers from vagueness, it nevertheless provides useful guidance in assessing claims of agency delay: (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a "rule of reason," *PEPCO,* 702 F.2d at 1034; *MCI,* 627 F.2d at 340; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason, *PCHRG v. FDA,* 740 F.2d at 34-35; *PCHRG v. Auchter,* 702 F.2d at 1158, n. 30; *PEPCO,* 702 F.2d at 1034; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; PCHRG v. FDA, 720 F.2d at 34; *PCHRG v. Auchter,* 702 F.2d at 1157; *see also Blankenship v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,* 587 F.2d 329, 334 (6th Cir. 1978); (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority, *see, e.g., PCHRG v. FDA,* 740 F.2d at 34; *PCHRG v. Auchter,* 702 F.2d at 1158; (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay, *PCHRG v. FDA,* 740 F.2d at 35; and (6) the court need not "find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is `unreasonably delayed.'" *PCHRG v. FDA,* 740 F.2d at 34. HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: The Telecommunications Research Action Center ("TRAC") and several other not-for-profit corporations and public interest groups petition this court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "the Commission") to decide certain unresolved matters now pending before the agency. The essence of TRAC's claim is that the FCC has unreasonably delayed determining whether American Telephone and Telegraph Company ("ATT") must reimburse ratepayers for two separate instances of allegedly unlawful overcharges. The first instance relates to the rate of return earned by ATT and the Bell System on interstate and foreign services furnished during 1978. The second concerns the treatment of expenses incurred by ATT's manufacturing subsidiary, Western Electric, in its development of "customer premises equipment" ("CPE") during 1980-1982. Customer premises equipment includes "all equipment provided by common carriers and located on customer premises except over voltage protection equipment, inside wiring, coin operated or pay telephones and multiplexing equipment to deliver multiple channels to the customers." American Telephone Telegraph Co. ("AT T Capitalization Request"), 91 F.C.C.2d 578, 579, n. 2 (1982), petition for review pending sub nom. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, No. 84-4090 (2d Cir. filed June 15, 1984). The most important question that we face in our consideration of this interlocutory appeal is a threshold jurisdictional issue. Our resolution of this issue is of particular significance because it is dispositive of both the instant case and a similar appeal involving the Civil Aeronautics Board that was argued before this panel on the same day as this case. Seenote 22 infra. Our jurisdictional inquiry focuses on whether a petition to compel unreasonably delayed agency action properly lies in this court or in the District Court, or whether the two courts have concurrent jurisdiction, when any final agency action in the matter would be directly reviewable only in the Court of Appeals. Although we find the precedent in this circuit to be less than clear on this question, we conclude that, where a statute commits final agency action to review by the Court of Appeals, the appellate court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear suits seeking relief that might affect its future statutory power of review. On the merits of the instant appeal, we decide that, because the agency has assured us that it is now moving expeditiously to resolve the pending overcharge claims, we need not determine whether the cited delays are so egregious as to warrant mandamus. The court, however, will retain jurisdiction over this case until final disposition by the agency. I. BACKGROUND A. The Rate of Return on Interstate and Foreign Services in 1978 In 1976, acting under the ratemaking authority conferred by 47 U.S.C. § 205(a), the FCC set the maximum rate of return for ATT interstate and foreign operations at 9.5 percent, with a .5 percent additional margin to encourage productivity and efficiency. The Commission agreed not to reduce ATT's interstate rates provided that its overall rate of return did not exceed ten percent. In order "to fully protect the public," however, the FCC required that ATT maintain an accounting of its relevant revenues to facilitate refunds if an excessive rate of return should occur. American Telephone Telegraph Co., 57 F.C.C.2d 960, 973 (1976). Id. American Telephone Telegraph Co., 58 F.C.C.2d 1, 4 (1976). ATT's 1978 interstate rate of return was either 10.22, 10.1, 10.02, or 9.89 percent, depending on the methodology used to calculate it. On July 20, 1979, the petitioners filed a Petition for Enforcement of Accounting with the FCC in which they requested that the Commission determine whether ATT had received excess revenues and, if so, that the FCC order appropriate relief to the ratepayers. Rather than acting directly on this petition, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry on October 1, 1979, soliciting comments on several issues related to ATT's earnings. Both comments and reply comments were filed by the end of 1979. The Commission has taken no further action during the almost five years since the filing of comments. Brief for Intervenor American Telephone and Telegraph Co. ("Brief for AT T") 5. Brief for AT T 6, Petitioners' Brief Supporting Petition for Mandamus and Petition for Review ("Petitioners' Brief") 4-5. In Matter AT T's Earnings on Interstate and Foreign Services During 1978: Notice of Inquiry, 75 F.C.C.2d 412, 413-14 (Adopted September 18, 1979; Released October 1, 1979). Representative Timothy Wirth, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, has twice written to the FCC to inquire about the unexplained delay in agency action. In 1981, FCC officials responded that they expected a staff recommendation that fall. However, no such recommendation was produced. In the spring of 1984, agency officials modified their response and estimated that a staff recommendation would be issued that summer. The agency failed on this commitment, too. Now, in the face of this court action, the Commission has recently indicated that it plans to resolve the matter on or before November 30, 1984. Hearings on Implementation of the Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Procurement Agreement, June 9, 1981; Licensing of VHF Television Stations in New Jersey and Delaware — H.R. 2128, June 16, 1981; FCC Oversight, July 23, 1981; Cable Franchise Investigation, July 28, 1981, Before The Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 481-82 (1981). Petitioners' Brief, Appendix. Letter from Daniel Armstrong, FCC Associate General Counsel, to this court (September 12, 1984). B. The Treatment of CPE Expenses In May of 1980, the FCC decided that CPE and enhanced telecommunications services should no longer be regulated under Title II of the Communications Act. It is unnecessary to detail here the effects of this order on ratemaking and carrier accounting. It suffices to note that, in order to shield the regulated market from costs appropriately allocated to the competitive market and from anticompetitive activities, the Commission required ATT to create a separate subsidiary to act in the enhanced services and CPE markets. The FCC also required that all costs associated with competitive activities, such as CPE development costs, be charged solely to this subsidiary, not passed along to the regulated ratepayer. "Enhanced services," as opposed to basic transmission services are those "which employ computer processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information." 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1982). See Second Computer Inquiry ("Computer II"), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), *aff'd sub nom. Computer and Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC,* 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC,103 S.Ct. 2109 (1983). 47 U.S.C. § 201-224 (1982). Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d at 474; *Computer and Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC,* 693 F.2d at 205, n. 22; 208, 211. Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d at 467, 476-487. Between May 1980, and January of 1983, Western Electric spent about $500 million developing CPE. Because these development costs were expensed as they were incurred, the Commission, in an order dated November 10, 1982, expressed concern that between 1980 and 1982 regulated service ratepayers might have impermissibly contributed to recovery of these development expenses. But because the FCC concluded that it could not determine from the existing record whether ratepayer reimbursement for these expenses was warranted, it ordered ATT to provide it with additional information. Due to the importance of this question and because of the significant amount of money involved the FCC also invited public comments. ATT filed its comments in December of 1982 and other comments were filed in January and February 1983. AT T Capitalization Request, 91 F.C.C.2d at 581, 604-07. Id. at 607. Petitioners' Brief 11. On November 15, 1983, petitioners Florida Consumers Federation and others filed a Petition for Intervention and Expeditious Resolution. On May 22, 1984, Chairman Wirth inquired about the status of this matter and was told that action was expected during the summer of 1984. The Commission now says it will act with respect to the ratemaking treatment of these CPE development expenses on or before June 28, 1985. To date, though, the Commission has not acted, either on the petition or on its own inquiry into Western Electric's CPE development expenses. Petitioners' Brief 12. Petitioners' Brief, Appendix. Letter from Daniel Armstrong, supra note 10. II. JURISDICTION As an initial matter, this case raises two significant and recurrent jurisdictional questions. First, where a statute commits final agency action to review by the Court of Appeals, does that court have jurisdiction to hear suits seeking relief that would affect its future statutory power of review? Second, if the Court of Appeals does have jurisdiction, is that jurisdiction exclusive or concurrent with that of the District Courts? Although the parties have not contested our jurisdiction over the petitioners' suit, we requested them, as well as the parties to *Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International v. CAB (ALPA),* 750 F.2d 81, wherein a claim of unreasonable agency delay was filed initially in the District Court, to address in their briefs and arguments "whether a petition to compel allegedly unreasonably delayed agency action properly lies before this Court or before a United States District Court, or whether those courts have concurrent jurisdiction, when any final agency decision in the matter would be directly reviewable in this Court." Order No. 84-1035 (D.C. Cir. June 12, 1984). Because ALPA and the instant case raise identical jurisdictional issues, we treat them as companion cases. For the sake of economy, our discussion of these jurisdictional issues is dispositive for both ALPA and this case. We recognize that our precedent concerning jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from agency action (or inaction) is somewhat inconsistent and may be confusing for litigants attempting to select the proper forum for these claims. We are convinced that this state of disarray in which we find the law is the product of innocent inadvertence, sometimes attributable to a desire by the court and parties to promptly resolve claims of unreasonable delay, and sometimes attributable to a failure by the parties to raise or to pursue jurisdictional inquiries. Nevertheless, "[j]urisdiction is, of necessity, the first issue for an Article III court. The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and they lack the power to presume the existence of jurisdiction in order to dispose of a case on any other grounds." *Tuck v. Pan American Health Organization,* 668 F.2d 547, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1981). We are therefore obliged to consider and finally resolve the question pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to hear claims of the sort raised in this case and in the companion ALPA case. See note 22, supra. In deciding this issue, for the reasons hereafter enumerated, we hold that where a statute commits review of agency action to the Court of Appeals, any suit seeking relief that might affect the Circuit Court's future jurisdiction is subject to the exclusive review of the Court of Appeals. *Compare, e.g., Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC ("National Advertisers"),* 627 F.2d 1151, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1979), *cert. denied,* 447 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 3011, 65 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1980) (holding that the District Court had general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over nonfrivolous constitutional claims of agency bias and prejudgment); *Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Comm'r, Food Drug Administration ("PCHRG v. FDA"),* 740 F.2d 21, 34-35(D.C. Cir. 1984) (original jurisdiction of District Court not questioned, Court of Appeals remands to District Court for further evidence); *Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter,* 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (original jurisdiction of District Court not questioned), *with Potomac Electric Power Co. v. ICC ("PEPCO"),* 702 F.2d 1026, 1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (initially brought in Court of Appeals, jurisdiction upheld); *MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC,* 627 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (initially brought in Court of Appeals, jurisdiction not questioned); *National Advertisers,* 627 F.2d at 1179 (Leventhal, J., concurring) (jurisdiction to compel agency action lies exclusively in the appellate court that has jurisdiction to review on the merits); *Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin,* 428 F.2d 1093, 1098-99 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that Court of Appeals has jurisdiction where administrative inaction is the equivalent of an order denying relief). *See also Action for Children's Television v. FCC,* 546 F.Supp. 872, 874-75(D.D.C. 1982) (holding in favor of jurisdiction in Court of Appeals, not District Court). Because this holding resolves inconsistencies among our prior decisions, this part of our decision has been considered separately and approved by the whole court, and thus constitutes the law of the circuit. *See Irons v. Diamond,* 670 F.2d 265, 268 n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1981). A. The Basis of Our Jurisdiction We think it is clear — and no party disputes this point — that the statutory commitment of review of FCC action to the Court of Appeals, read in conjunction with the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982), affords this court jurisdiction over claims of unreasonable Commission delay. Exclusive jurisdiction over review of final FCC orders is vested in the Court of Appeals by 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (1982) and 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1982). See also FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc. ("ITT"), ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 1936, 1939, 80 L.Ed.2d 480 (1984). Here, of course, there is no final order — indeed, the lack of a final order is the very gravamen of the petitioners' complaint. This lack of finality, however, does not automatically preclude our jurisdiction. Section 2342(1) provides that: "The court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of — (1) all final orders of the Federal Communications Commission made reviewable by section 402(a) of title 47 . . . ." Section 402(a) makes reviewable "[a]ny proceeding to enjoin, set aside, annul or suspend any order of the Commission under this Act (except those appealable under subsection (b) of this section) . . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1982) narrows review jurisdiction over certain agency actions even further. It provides that certain agency proceedings, not at issue in this case, are appealable only in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Although the finality doctrine does limit judicial action, it does not do so in a precise and inflexible way. As the Supreme Court has instructed in *Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner,* 387 U.S. 136, 149-50, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515-16, 18 L.Ed.2d 681(1967), a federal court should apply the finality requirement in a "flexible" and "pragmatic" way. *See also PCHRG v. FDA,* 740 F.2d at 30. In PCHRG we found that the finality requirement does not preclude us from reviewing claims of unreasonable agency delay. Id. at 30-32. The All Writs Act provides that "the Supreme Court and all courts established by an Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). While it is firmly established that section 1651 does not expand the jurisdiction of a court, see, e.g., 9 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 110.26 at 282 (2d ed. 1983), it is equally well settled that "the authority of the appellate court is not confined to the issuance of writs in aid of jurisdiction already acquired by appeal but extends to those cases which are within its appellate jurisdiction although no appeal has been perfected.'" *[Federal Trade Commission v. Dean Foods Co.,* 384 U.S. 597, 603-04,](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/59149a7dadd7b04934625beb#p603>) [86 S.Ct. 1738, 1742-43,](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/59149a7dadd7b04934625beb#p1742>) [16 L.Ed.2d 802](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/59149a7dadd7b04934625beb>) (1966) (quoting *[Roche v. Evaporated Milk Association,* 319 U.S. 21, 25,](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914a286add7b04934699af5#p25>) [63 S.Ct. 938, 941,](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914a286add7b04934699af5#p941>) [87 L.Ed. 1185](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914a286add7b04934699af5>) (1943)). This authority extends to support an ultimate power of review, even though it is not immediately and directly involved. *[United States v. United States District Court,* 334 U.S. 258, 263,](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914a152add7b04934687232#p263>) [68 S.Ct. 1035, 1037,](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914a152add7b04934687232#p1037>) [92 L.Ed. 1351](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914a152add7b04934687232>) (1948). In other words, section 1651(a) empowers a federal court to issue writs of mandamus necessary to protect its prospective jurisdiction. *[Dean Foods,* 384 U.S. at 603-04,](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/59149a7dadd7b04934625beb#p603>) [86 S.Ct. at 1742-43](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/59149a7dadd7b04934625beb#p1742>); *[United States District Court,* 334 U.S. at 263,](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914a152add7b04934687232#p263>) [68 S.Ct. at 1037](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914a152add7b04934687232#p1037>); *[Potomac Electric Power Co. v. ICC ("PEPCO"),* 702 F.2d 1026, 1032](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/59149056add7b04934574dd4#p1032>) (D.C. Cir. 1983); *[Board of Governors v. Transamerica Corp.,* 184 F.2d 311, 315](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914cad8add7b049347fdb5f#p315>) (9th Cir.), *cert. denied,* **340 U.S. 883,** **71 S.Ct. 197,** **95 L.Ed. 641** (1950). Because the statutory obligation of a Court of Appeals to review on the merits may be defeated by an agency that fails to resolve disputes, a Circuit Court may resolve claims of unreasonable delay in order to protect its future jurisdiction. *[Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,* 439 F.2d 584, 593](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914c775add7b049347e2eaa#p593>) (D.C. Cir. 1971); *[see also Dean Foods,* 384 U.S. at 603,](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/59149a7dadd7b04934625beb#p603>) [86 S.Ct. at 1742](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/59149a7dadd7b04934625beb#p1742>) (quoting *[McClellan v. Carland,* 217 U.S. 268, 280,](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914a9d0add7b0493471757f#p280>) [30 S.Ct. 501, 504,](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914a9d0add7b0493471757f#p504>) [54 L.Ed. 762](<https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914a9d0add7b0493471757f>) (1910) ("[w]e think it the true rule that where a case is within the appellate jurisdiction of a higher court a writ . . . may issue in aid of the appellate jurisdiction which might otherwise be defeated. . . .'"). The authority of an appellate court to issue mandamus to an agency is analogous to its authority to issue the writ to District Courts. *See, e.g., National Advertisers,* 627 F.2d at 1179 (Leventhal, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has long recognized the authority of appellate courts to compel district court action through mandamus. *See, e.g., McClellan v. Carland,* 217 U.S. 268, 30 S.Ct. 501, 54 L.Ed. 762 (1910) (Court of Appeals could issue a writ of mandamus compelling a Circuit Court to proceed where, pending a decision in state court, the Circuit Court had stayed a proceeding before it, possibly preventing the adjudication of the issues in federal court and thus interfering with the Court of Appeal's potential review of the Circuit Court's determinations); Ex Parte Bradstreet, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 634, 8 L.Ed. 810 (1833) (ordering lower court judge to reinstate, try, and decide a case to ensure that the party before it could exercise her subsequent right to judgment by the Supreme Court); Ex Parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190, 191, 8 L.Ed. 92 (1831) (noting that Blackstone believed the writ of mandamus "`issues to the judges of any inferior court, commanding them to do justice, according to the powers of their office, whenever the same is delayed.'"). *Cf. PEPCO,* 702 F.2d at 1032-33 (premising appellate jurisdiction over claims of unreasonable agency delay on a slightly different rationale — postponement of an unreasonable delay claim until after the agency's decision may render it moot and deprive the Court of Appeals of the opportunity to review the delay claim, thus permitting present review under the All Writs Act). The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") provides additional support for our jurisdiction here. That Act directs agencies to conclude matters presented to them "within a reasonable time," 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1982), and stipulates that the "reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed . . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)(1982). While the APA unquestionably does not confer an independent grant of jurisdiction, *Califano v. Sanders,* 430 U.S. 99, 107, 97 S.Ct. 980, 985, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977), section 706(1) coupled with section 555(b) does indicate a congressional view that agencies should act within reasonable time frames and that court's designated by statute to review agency actions may play an important role in compelling agency action that has been improperly withheld or unreasonably delayed. *See, e.g., Public Citizen Research Group v. Commissioner, Food Drug Administration ("PCHRG v. FDA"),* 740 F.2d 21, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1984). B. The Exclusivity of Our Jurisdiction We also conclude that our present jurisdiction over claims that affect our future statutory review authority is exclusive. It is well settled that even where Congress has not expressly stated that statutory jurisdiction is "exclusive," as it has here with regard to final FCC actions, a statute which vests jurisdiction in a particular court cuts off original jurisdiction in other courts in all cases covered by that statute. *Compensation Department of District Five, United Mine Workers v. Marshall,* 667 F.2d 336, 340 (3rd Cir. 1981); *Assure Competitive Transportation, Inc. v. United States,* 629 F.2d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124, 101 S.Ct. 941, 67 L.Ed.2d 110 (1981); *Rochester v. Bond,* 603 F.2d 927, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1979); *Investment Co. Institute v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,* 551 F.2d 1270, 1278-79 (D.C. Cir. 1977). *See also Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans Trust Co.,* 379 U.S. 411, 422, 85 S.Ct. 551, 558, 13 L.Ed.2d 386 (1965) (where Congress has enacted a specific statutory scheme of review, the statutory mode must be adhered to notwithstanding the absence of an express statutory command of exclusiveness). By lodging review of agency action in the Court of Appeals, Congress manifested an intent that the appellate court exercise sole jurisdiction over the class of claims covered by the statutory grant of review power. It would be anomalous to hold that this grant of authority only strips the District Court of general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1982) when the Circuit Court has present jurisdiction under a special review statute, but not when the Circuit Court has immediate jurisdiction under the All Writs Act in aid of its future statutory review power. *See National Advertisers,* 627 F.2d at 1179 (Leventhal, J., concurring). Past suggestions that the District Court has general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over some of these claims were in error. *See, e.g., National Advertisers,* 627 F.2d at 1157 (statement that the District Court had jurisdiction over agency bias claim); *PCHRG v. FDA,* 740 F.2d at 34-35 (court tacitly upheld jurisdiction of District Court by remanding for further evidence). See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. See Note, Jurisdiction to Review Federal Administrative Action: District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 HARV.L.REV. 980, 983 (1975) ("[t]he rule of exclusivity is [best] justified as promoting the purposes for which Congress adopts special review statutes."). The District Court also lacks jurisdiction under both the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) and the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982). The All Writs Act is not an independent grant of jurisdiction to a court; it merely permits a court to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction acquired to grant some other form of relief. *See Stern v. South Chester Tube Co.,* 390 U.S. 606, 608, 88 S.Ct. 1332, 1333, 20 L.Ed.2d 177 (1968); *Covington Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Hager,* 203 U.S. 109, 110, 27 S.Ct. 24, 51 L.Ed. 111 (1906). Because the District Court has no present or future jurisdiction over agency actions assigned by statute to appellate court review, it can contemplate no exercise of jurisdiction that mandamus might aid. The mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 also fails to confer jurisdiction on the District Court to compel agency action. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is not available when review by other means is possible. *See, e.g., Kerr v. United States District Court,* 426 U.S. 394, 403, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 2124, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); *Council of and for the Blind v. Regan,* 709 F.2d 1521, 1533 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *In re Halkin,* 598 F.2d 176, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1979); *Cartier v. Secretary of State,* 506 F.2d 191, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947, 95 S.Ct. 1677, 44 L.Ed.2d 101(1975). Because review is available in the Court of Appeals under the special review statute and the All Writs Act, action by the District Court under section 1361 is not. As we said once, in the context of our own jurisdiction under the All Writs Act "[w]e have no appellate jurisdiction over the instant case, past, present, or future, which mandamus could `aid.' Therefore we lack jurisdiction to issue the writ." *In re Stone,* 569 F.2d 156, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The same is true of the District Court in this case. Nor is district court review permissible here under section 703 of the APA, which provides for district court review when statutory review is inadequate. Where statutory review is available in the Court of Appeals it will rarely be inadequate. We find untenable any suggestion that appellate review of nonfinal agency action may be inadequate due to Courts of Appeals' inability to take evidence. This precise argument was recently rejected by the Supreme Court in ITT, where the Court held that, if an agency record is insufficient, the Court of Appeals may either remand the record to the agency for further development or appoint a special master under 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b)(3). *ITT,* 104 S.Ct. at 1940. That section reads in pertinent part: 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1982). *See, e.g., PCHRG v. FDA,* 740 F.2d at 34-35. Although ITT dealt with final agency action and thus is not fully dispositive of the case at hand, we find its reasoning persuasive and follow it here. It would be highly anomalous for us to hold that remand to the agency or appointment of a special master cannot cure evidence deficiencies in the record of ongoing agency proceedings when the Supreme Court has said they are quite adequate for review of the same issues after final agency order. Furthermore, there are compelling policy reasons for holding that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is exclusive. Appellate courts develop an expertise concerning the agencies assigned them for review. Exclusive jurisdiction promotes judicial economy and fairness to the litigants by taking advantage of that expertise. In addition, exclusive jurisdiction eliminates duplicative and potentially conflicting review, *Investment Co. Institute,* 551 F.2d at 1279, and the delay and expense incidental thereto. There may be a small category of cases in which the underlying claim is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals (and thus adjudication of the claim in the District Court will not affect any future statutory review authority of the Circuit Court). In such cases, where a denial of review in the District Court will truly foreclose all judicial review, district court review might be predicated on the general federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For example, in *Leedom v. Kyne,* 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180, 3 L.Ed.2d 210 (1958), the Supreme Court held that, even though there is a statutory prohibition against review of representation orders of the National Labor Relations Board, a District Court has jurisdiction under section 1331 in the very limited circumstance where the Board has clearly violated an express mandate of the statute and the plaintiff has no alternative means of review. *See Hartz Mountain Corporation v. Dotson,* 727 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (D.C. Cir. 1984). However, we need not tarry over this narrow exception because it is in no way implicated in the case before us. The principal point of this decision is to make clear that where a statute commits review of agency action to the Court of Appeals, any suit seeking relief that might affect the Circuit Court's future jurisdiction is subject to the exclusive review of the Court of Appeals. We recognize that, because the precedent in this circuit may have implied that the District Court has concurrent jurisdiction over claims concerning nonfinal agency action, a number of suits mistakenly may have been filed in the District Court. We assume that, rather than dismiss these suits for want of jurisdiction, the District Court will transfer them to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1982). Section 1631 reads: III. MERITS OF THE UNREASONABLE DELAY CLAIM As we have noted above, there is no doubt that this court has present jurisdiction to hear claims concerning nonfinal agency action (or inaction) that might affect our future statutory review of final agency action. Nevertheless, given the clear legislative preference for review of final action, we must be circumspect in exercising jurisdiction over interlocutory petitions. Postponing review until relevant agency proceedings have been concluded "permits an administrative agency to develop a factual record, to apply its expertise to that record, and to avoid piecemeal appeals." *Association of National Advertisers v. FTC ("National Advertisers"),* 627 F.2d 1151, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Tamm, J.) (citing *McKart v. United States,* 395 U.S. 185, 193-94, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1662-63, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969)), *cert. denied,* 447 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 3011, 65 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1980). Accordingly, we have found the threshold a litigant must pass to obtain judicial review of ongoing agency proceedings to be a high one. Id. As Judge Leventhal emphasized in National Advertisers, "[o]nly in rare instances is a non-final agency action reviewed in the teeth of a general denial of jurisdiction." 627 F.2d at 1178(concurring opinion). Thus, we generally will hear only cases of "`clear right' such as outright violation of a clear statutory provision . . . or violation of basic rights established by a structural flaw, and not requiring in any way a consideration of the interrelated aspects of the merits . . . ." Id. at 1180 (emphasis omitted). Although the reasoning in National Advertisers was based on an exhaustion doctrine analysis, it is largely applicable to the finality doctrine. Claims of unreasonable agency delay clearly fall into that narrow class of interlocutory appeals from agency action over which we appropriately should exercise our jurisdiction. It is obvious that the benefits of agency expertise and creation of a record will not be realized if the agency never takes action. Agency delay claims also meet Judge Leventhal's suggested criteria for our interlocutory intervention — not only is there an outright violation of 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)'s mandate that agencies decide matters in a reasonable time, there also is no need for the court to consider the merits of the issue before the agency. Finally and most significantly, Congress has instructed statutory review courts to compel agency action that has been unreasonably delayed. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). In Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, the Supreme Court noted that judicial review of prolonged agency inaction may be obtained under this section of the APA. 445 U.S. 198, 220 n. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1095, 1108 n. 14, 63 L.Ed.2d 329 (1980). In the context of a claim of unreasonable delay, the first stage of judicial inquiry is to consider whether the agency's delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus. Although this court has decided several cases involving claims of unreasonable delay, *see, e.g., PCHRG v. FDA,* 740 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984); *Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter,* 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *PEPCO,* 702 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC ("MCI"),* 627 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1980); *Nader v. FCC,* 520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1975), we have not articulated a single test for when the writ should issue. On reading these cases together, however, one can discern the hexagonal contours of a standard. Although the standard is hardly ironclad, and sometimes suffers from vagueness, it nevertheless provides useful guidance in assessing claims of agency delay: (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a "rule of reason," *PEPCO,* 702 F.2d at 1034; *MCI,* 627 F.2d at 340; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason, *PCHRG v. FDA,* 740 F.2d at 34-35; *PCHRG v. Auchter,* 702 F.2d at 1158, n. 30; *PEPCO,* 702 F.2d at 1034; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; PCHRG v. FDA, 720 F.2d at 34; *PCHRG v. Auchter,* 702 F.2d at 1157; *see also Blankenship v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,* 587 F.2d 329, 334(6th Cir. 1978); (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority, *see, e.g., PCHRG v. FDA,* 740 F.2d at 34; *PCHRG v. Auchter,* 702 F.2d at 1158; (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay, *PCHRG v. FDA,* 740 F.2d at 35; and (6) the court need not "find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is `unreasonably delayed.'" *PCHRG v. FDA,* 740 F.2d at 34. Because, in the instant case, the FCC has assured us that it is moving expeditiously on both overcharge claims, we need not test the delay here against the above standard to determine if it is egregious enough to warrant mandamus. But in light of the Commission's failure to meet its self-declared prior deadlines for these proceedings, we believe these delays are serious enough for us to retain jurisdiction over this case until final agency disposition. In MCI we announced that: 627 F.2d at 340-41 (footnotes omitted). In that case we found a four year delay to be unreasonable. We observed that unless there was "some limit to the time tariffs unjustified under the law can remain in effect . . . the regulatory scheme Congress has crafted becomes anarchic and whatever tariff rates the `regulated' entity files become, for all practical purposes, the accepted rates." Id. at 325. In the instant case, the FCC has delayed almost five years on the rate of return inquiry and nearly two years on the proper ratemaking treatment of Western Electric's CPE development expenses. These delays have permitted AT T's allegedly excessive returns to "become for all practical purposes, the accepted" ones. Even the agency recognizes, at least with regard to the rate of return delay, that "an unfortunately long time has elapsed since [this] matter first appeared." Whether or not these delays would justify mandamus, we believe they clearly warrant retaining jurisdiction. We believe that this statement, although made in the context of review of tariff revisions under 47 U.S.C. § 204 (1982), applies to all aspects of the ratemaking process, including the proceedings at issue here. In 1976 the FCC had found AT T's WATS' tariff revisions to be unsupported by the data AT T had produced, but continued the effectiveness of these revisions pending final FCC action. By 1980, when this court heard MCI's complaint of unreasonable delay, the agency still had not completed the proceedings. 627 F.2d at 324-25. Brief for FCC 24. IV. CONCLUSION In accordance with the foregoing opinion, we order that the court's mandate shall issue immediately and that within 30 days from the issuance of this decision the FCC shall inform this court of the dates by which the agency anticipates resolution of both refund disputes. Every 60 days thereafter, the FCC shall advise the court of its progress in these matters. Prior to final agency orders, any party may petition this court to take additional appropriate action as may be warranted. On October 12, 1984, the FCC informed this court by letter that it anticipates resolution of the rate of return matter on or before November 30, 1984, and of the treatment of CPE expenses on or before June 28, 1985. See, supra notes 10 21 and accompanying text. In light of the facts before us on this petition and the Commission's explanations, we are not convinced that the latter date is reasonable. We suspect that the agency could easily conclude the CPE proceedings several months earlier, but the evidence currently before us is insufficient to permit a firm determination. This insufficiency should be cured by the agency's reports to this court. If the FCC adheres to the June 28, 1985 deadline, it should explain in its first report (thirty days from the issuance of this opinion) why resolution of this matter requires almost three years to complete (taking as the beginning date November 10, 1982, when the Commission first asked AT T for more information). If the petitioners are unpersuaded by the FCC's explanations, they may request this court to order an earlier resolution. We wish to make clear our understanding that the relief we grant here is in no way precluded by the Supreme Court's recent decision in *Heckler v. Day,* ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2249, 81 L.Ed.2d 88 (1984). In Heckler the Court struck down a broad injunction by the United States District Court for the District of Vermont which ordered the Secretary of Health and Human Services to conclude reconsideration of social security disability benefit claims and to issue reconsideration decisions within a specified time period set by the District Court. Based on a review of legislative history, the Court found that Congress had deliberately declined to impose deadlines on this administrative process and that in view of this unmistakable Congressional intent it would be an unwarranted judicial intrusion for federal courts to issue injunctions imposing across-the-board deadlines for future disability claims. Id. 2253, 2258. The Court made clear, however, that it was not prohibiting the proper use of injunctive relief to remedy individual claims. Id. at 2258, n. 33. In the instant proceeding, we adjudicate an individual case and fashion a remedy for the specific instances presented by this case. At this time, all we require is that the FCC fulfill its promise of expeditious treatment of the petitioners' claims and keep this court informed of its progress. View full record

All complicated cases are supposed to be referred to the Director, Compensation Services. The first step of that is to send it to a DRO in the Central Office. (Where my TDIU claim was sent). A DRO from the Central Office sent the review and recommendation to the Director who made the award. A claim for TDIU does not specifically have to be made. If you have stated that your multiple conditions that make you unable to find work, for example, TBI that makes mental work, as in desk jobs not possible, and injury residuals that make physical work not possible. While neither alone qualifies you for TDIU, in combination they do making the case complicated. My case when I was 40% combined. Awarded to the date of my last full time attempt at being employed on a desk job. I did eventually get the "presumptive ratings" after the TBI law took effect in 2009. But my award went back to 1985 when finished in 2020.

Another way is to apply for tdiu, that is, assuming you are not working. Or, if you are working, there may be other claims you overlooked.

Depending on your 90% rating breakdown, you could be 93% or 94% and the VA rounds down to a combined 90% but the additional 30% from 30% to 60% could possibly get you a 100% combined rating. All you would need is that your rating hit 95% and the VA would round up to 100% schedular.

Due to the fact that the veteran is having multiple symptoms within this category, The VA could actually rate him higher with a 60% rating. This of course does not mean they will. These are the criteria for each rating: GERD. 60 percent – the veteran experiences “pain, vomiting, material weight loss and hematemesis or melena with moderate anemia; or other symptom combinations productive of severe impairment of health.” 30 percent – the veteran experiences “persistently recurrent epigastric distress with dysphagia, pyrosis, and regurgitation, accompanied by substernal or arm and shoulder pain, productive of considerable impairment of heath.” 10 percent – the veteran has two or more symptoms of the 30 percent rating, but less severe. 4.7 Higher of two evaluations. Where there is a question as to which of two evaluations shall be applied, the higher evaluation will be assigned if the disability picture more nearly approximates the criteria required for that rating. Otherwise, the lower rating will be assigned.

You're maxed out. Not sure what you would gain.

Yes, you can continue to submit up until the point when it is in "Rating".

Using the online VA claim process. After one thought they submitted all support documents for a claim, and you push the button saying this is all I have, “please start my claim”, only to find out you came across something important to your claim, can you still submit it for review?

Thanks pacmanx1

Yes

Using the VA claim online process, after you submit all your evidence, it asks if you are done and want to pull the switch for it to be reviewed and decided. If for some reason, you find some other things relative to your claim, can you still submit data?

Maybe. Review the criteria for IBS/Gerd. You need to look those up yourself. As an example, many Veterans have "dual" mental health disorders..PTSD and Bipolar, and or something else. For mental health disorders, once service connected, they are rated on SYMPTOMS. Generally, VA compensates you for your percentage of your loss of an ability to earn an income. IDK what your symptoms are for IBS/Gerd and I dont know which symptoms overlap. But I do know that you dont get paid for the same symptom twice. Let me cite a hypothetical example: Lets say you have bouts of painful diarrhea which last 2 or 3 days where you can not work with Gerd "and also" with IBS. You would get compensated for one, not the other. But the Gerd may have an additional symptom. With mental heatlh disorders you get paid for all they symptoms combined into one disorder. If that makes sense. Pyramiding prevents a Veteran from getting paid for the same symptom twice. But, if I was service connected for my Right knee issue and the main symptom was pain which hurt when I walked. However, lets assume I was also SC for my back "including" back pain. Well I could get paid for symptoms of my back pain and my knee pain especially if they dont occur at the same time and I could not work 2 days a month due to back pain, and 1 day a week due to knee pain.

I’m currently rated at 30% for IBS/Gerd. I recently submitted a claim for diverticulitis which I believe would be rated under IBS. My diverticulitis symptoms are quite severe and am fairly certain it will be service connected especially considering my VA Gastro Doc provided a nexus letter. I know IBS is maxed at 30% and Gerd is 60%… So being that my IBS and Gerd are combined, would that mean that with my new Diverticultis (IBS) disability that my rating could be bumped up?

Since you are already rated 100% P & T and working, you can only get retroactive pay (money). This is if your effective date is before your current 100% P & T rating. The problem is even though the BVA granted your appeal, they remanded it to the regional office, and the regional office has to rate your percentage and assign an effective date. The regional office could assign you a 0% rating in which there would be no retroactive payment (money) and you win but you lose with no money coming your way. It could also be that with your new ratings the regional office could assign you an even earlier effective date, if your new rating boils down to you being awarded an earlier combined 100% rating. The VA did this to me and I had to file a new appeal. I was granted a 50% rating after my 100% P & T rating which amounted to absolutely no money in retroactive pay. When I filed my appeal, the BVA granted me an unadjudicated award going back to my original date of claim and I won my earlier effective dates.

Please excuse if this is a duplicate. Follow up Status: Entitled to Backpay if Legacy Claim is Adjudicated and Veterans is Already 100% SC I'm open to any insight and or shared experience. Thank you. Judge remanded conditions. Ordered VA to do another C&P exam, stated the previous exam was inadequate. Conditions were lost in VA "black hole" for over 20 years, finally adjudicated after PACT. I have an exam on Monday, I will definitely attend, however, not sure what to expect. Just wondering if this process will affect my current rating - 100% P & T. I am a DS Vet, served in Southwest Asia during Persian Gulf War. The board noted in my summary "the Veteran is a Persian Gulf War Veteran and presumptive toxic exposure under 38 U.S.C. 1117 has been conceded." I read somewhere that "veterans with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, especially those who were diagnosed long after leaving the military, are eligible under the law for Chronic Fatigue Syndrome Secondary to PTSD. Two Remanded conditions - Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (no formal diagnosis) as due to immunizations and as secondary to service-connected PTSD. (I am already 70% sc PTSD). Entitlement to service connection for fibromyalgia (no formal diagnosis), including multiple joint pains. Current Adjudicated Rating SC Sleep Apnea secondary to PTSD - 50 PTSD - 70 Chronic Sinusitis - 10 Cancer Residuals - 30 Neuropathy secondary to cancer treatments bilateral hands 30 right/30 left bilateral feet 20 right/20 left Painful surgical breast scar - 10 Tinntis - 10 Chronic Rhinitis - 0

A lot of times they request another C&P exam because the prior one may have missed something or they want a second opinion. It happened to me a lot and came out in my favor. Just go to the C&P exam and wait for the results. QTC has been fair with me on every C&P exam except one. If it comes back unfavorable, then get back to us. You can contest the exam with the VARO. I've done this with success and can guide you.