toimi

[quote Why should they cost more at VA?

The following study is from “Reforming VA’s Medication Copayment Statute” by Timothy J. McDonald. “..graduate of the Health Law Certificate Program at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and is currently serving as a Presidential Management fellow in the Patient Care Services Office of the Veterans Health Administration.” A link follows. This is followed by studies showing the effect of the VA copay increases. “The limitation imposed by the copayment legislation that prevents VA from charging the veteran more than the cost of the medication to VA has led to at least one case before the Board of Veterans’Appeals (Board). 31 This case involved “pill splitting,” a practice where VA provides medication in a dosage that is higher than needed, and then has the patient split a single pill into two separate doses” “However, the current medication copayment that many veterans are charged is based on outdated legislation…” “This problem is not limited to cases where the veteran is splitting tablets. In fact, based on VA’s increased efficiency and price negotiation in the pharmaceutical arena, it seems very likely that under the current copayment plan many veterans are charged excessive copayments by VA.44” http://www.va.gov/vbs/bva/manuals/vlr1mcdonald.pdf Co-Payment Increases Result in Gaps in Veterans' Prescription Usage American Heart Association rapid access journal report: Study highlights: -- Cholesterol-lowering drug adherence drops with an increase in VA prescription co-payments. DALLAS, Jan. 13, 2009 — Fewer veterans filled their prescriptions for cholesterol-lowering drugs after an increase in co-payment costs for prescription drugs, researchers report in Circulation: Journal of the American Heart Association. http://www.reuters.com/article/pressReleas...009+PRN20090114 Impact of a prescription copayment increase on lipid-lowering medication adherence in veterans. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19139387 The Effect of a Medication Copayment Increase on Metformin Adherence by Veterans with Diabetes Rationale: Copayment increases have been shown to affect health care demand in many settings, and adherence to essential medications may decrease when medication copayments rise. In 2002, the Veterans Administration (VA) increased medication copayments from $2.00 to $7.00 per 30-day prescription fill. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_...0444_index.html

New topic same subject. VA benefits not all the same. = For the reasons made obvious as you read, the Board of Veterans' Appeals, so-called veterans’ court, once again, are determined in frustrating my efforts in appealing my claim, by a still further delay. Is there something about this case that warrants this delay? Could the reason be, of the well over 1.1 million VA prescriptions, veterans are being over-charged? = My claim, VA violation of 38 USC 1722A was denied by the Board of Veterans Appeals. I then filed with the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CVA). On 7/11/2007 was remanded back to the Veterans Board of Appeals (BVA). The BVA lost and rebuilt the file, that being the reason for the remand. After repeated checking, as of 5/20/08, now 10 months later, this remand, has not been returned to the BVA. So they say. It is obvious they may have lost it again in order that this claim, or I, would go away. Disappear. Perhaps I'll die? Case closed! = VA prescriptions are dispensed in supplies of 90 days. However, for those unfamiliar with my claim, to explain these over-charges by the VA in violation of 38 USC 1722A, this example will be at it's simplest and most understandable throughout my explanation, . Let's say that you are at the VA, standing in line getting your prescription. The vet in front of you is getting the exact same prescription. She picks up her 30 day supply of 30 pills. Her copay for a 30 day supply of 30 pills is $8. You also are dispensed an $8 supply of 30 pills of the same exact prescription. Being that your condition is not as severe, your prescription requires you to split this 30 pill $8 supply. After you sit down at your kitchen table and split your 30 pill supply, now you have 60 split pills, a 2 month supply. But hold on! Except your co-payment cost for this 30 pill, $8 supply, now that it has been split, has increased. It now carries a co-payment of $16. This explains how veterans' has been overcharged by the VA since 2002. Shafted again (3/13/07) by the Board of Veterans Appeals in their phony denial. Do you see anything wrong? You should! = "Pursuant to Section 20.1404( (2002), the motion alleging clear and unmistakable error in a prior Board decision must set forth clearly and specifically the alleged clear and unmistakable error, or errors, of fact or law in the Board decision, the legal or factual basis for such allegations, and why the result would have been different but for the alleged error." = The two persons listed on the denial that had crafted, and fashioned up the logic that follows? Board of Veterans’ Appeals counsel M. Taylor, and Veterans' Law Judge, Judge John E. Ormand. I will show you exactly where, in their efforts to mislead, and to rewrite the law. This is the kind of garbage veterans have to put up with! Let's look at the reasoning in their BVA denial. = Cited on the cover page of my denial was, "THE ISSUE. Whether the veteran is obligated to pay the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) a copayment for each 30-day or less supply of medication provided by the VA on an outpatient basis in an amount established under 39 C.F.R. § 17.110." = “Criteria & Analysis by the Board of Veterans Appeals.” 3/13/ 2007 = Here the Board understands the problem. "The record reflects that the appellant is prescribed a 12.5 mg daily dose of his medication. Because the medication is not dispensed in a 12.5 mg tablet, his physician has instructed him to split a 25 mg tablet in half to achieve the proper daily dosage. Thus, he receives a 30-day prescription consisting of fifteen 25 mg pills, each of which he splits in half to take one half of a pill per day. The appellant contends that the standard co-payment is excessive in light of the pill splitting." However, no where in my claim did I mention the word ‘standard', nor was the word 'standard' mentioned in 38 USC 1722A, or Federal Register, Final Rule. Here, in introducing 'standard', supposedly for the purpose of establishing two (2) ‘standard’ co-payments, counsel Taylor purposely has rewritten the law, in order to mislead. = “In addition, the Board notes that the reference to the cost of medication contained in 38 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1722A clearly pertains to VA’s cost in dispensing the medication, not the cost to the appellant.” Is there a difference? My claim...clearly pertains to VA's co-pay cost in dispensing medication, and it’s inflated cost to the appellant! Which is the "excess of the cost" for the 'standard' co-payment, and is then arbitrarily increased, to those veterans required to split their 30-pill, $8 supplies. Dispensed exactly the same, and in like manner, as all other VA dispensed 'standard' co-payment and abundant 30-day $8 supplies of 30-45-60-90 pills. = Counsel Taylor references remarks from the July 16, 2001 Federal Register. “Also, as we stated in the proposal, under 38 U.S.C. 1722A, VA may not require a veteran to pay an amount in excess of the actual cost of the medication and the pharmacy administrative costs related to the dispensing of the medication. VHA conducted a study...and found that the VA incurred a cost of $7.28 to dispense an outpatient medication even without consideration of the actual cost of medication..” = Dispensing! Where there is no difference in the prescription, supply amount, handling, or dispensing time, a 30 pill supply is dispensed, with a $16 co-payment. Interestingly, in the same exact manner as all 30-day, 30 pill $8 supplies are dispensed, as explained in the Federal Register! No splitting of pills was involved in the dispensing procedure. However, of an exact same $8 dispensed supply, automatically these 'standard' 30-day $8 co-payment whole pill supplies are increased 100% (2 month split pill supply). = Counsel Taylor, citing, "1722A clearly pertains to VA's cost in dispensing". Counsel Taylor just does not get it! Nor does Judge Ormand. Their is no difference! No difference in dispensing two supplies that are exactly alike in prescription and supply, or to the cost related to dispensing! However, counsel Taylor is emphatic in making the point, conclusive, that it clearly pertains to the cost in dispensing? Or is it the ISSUE, the " 30-day or less supply"? For some unknown reason, which counsel Taylor did not elaborate on, a second exact duplicate supply increases, double the co-pay cost? Although, counsel Taylor may have tried, but failed. = “38 USC 1722A; (a)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary shall require a veteran to pay the United States $8 for each 30-day supply of medication furnished such veteran under this chapter on an outpatient basis for the treatment of a non-service-connected disability or condition. If the amount supplied is less than a 30-day supply, the amount of the charge may not be reduced.” Which then also means, if the amount is not less than 30-day supplies, as described in paragraph (1) the Secretary may not require a veteran to pay an amount in excess of the cost for medication provided to a veteran as described in paragraph (2). = Citing my argument, BVA’s counsel Taylor, quotes inaccurately, to confuse, again to mislead. 38 USC 1722A “Copayment for medications. Paragraph (2) The Secretary may not require a veteran to pay an amount in excess of the cost of the Secretary for medication as described in paragraph (1).” = The correct reading is, “(2) The Secretary may not require a veteran to pay an amount in excess of the cost to the Secretary for medication described in paragraph (1).” = "The appellant has not cited to, and the Board is unable to find any authority allowing for a deviation from the standard copayment." The Board is right! I too, am unable to find that authority. = Where the Board got it wrong! Of all what you have understood and read so far, what follows puts to rest any doubts as to the 30-day medication over-charges in my claim, and refutes the reasoning of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals in their reading of 38 USC 1722A. Of everything that has been explained, BVA counsel Taylor’s reference to 38 USC 17.110, (addressed in my claim) is the key to explaining, what counsel Taylor and Veterans Law Judge John E. Ormand, and the VA failed to, or did not, want to comprehend, or consider in their thinking, in understanding 38 USC 1722A. = The Board counsel Taylor, referenced 38 USC 17.110; Copayments for Medication. “..a veteran is obligated to pay a copayment for each 30-day or less supply of medication provided by the VA on an outpatient basis (other than medication administered during treatment).” = Counsel Taylor made it a point to reference 17.110. Veterans' do know we have to pay a co-payment. THE ISSUE was obviously a "30-day or less supply." The Board's main argument to my claim, is their erroneous interpretation of what the law is. "Each 30-day or less supply", is suggesting to them, an across the board 30-day 15 pill supply is less. However, "..each 30-day or less supply", refers to only one (1) condition. Veterans who may visit a VA facility on a one time basis as an outpatient. For emergency room care, or see a doctor for a cut finger, brief illness, etc. I wish counsel Taylor would explain another circumstance in which a veteran may be charged an “excess of the cost”? Please enlighten us. I know of no other "excess of the cost" than what I claim. = Counsel Taylor better not again, bring up 15 pills is less than a 30-day supply! The reality is, a veteran who falls under the 17.110 meaning, "obligated to pay a co-payment for each 30-day or less supply...on an outpatient basis (other than medication administered during treatment.)", refers to medication, in a dispensed 30-day supply of 15 pills, for treatment on an outpatient basis. The veteran in fact is not receiving less than a 30-day supply, this is his full 30-day monthly supply during outpatient treatment! For this reason, as described in 1722A, paragraph (2) is the basis for my claim. A 30-day, 30-pill, dispensed supply, for treatment, whether or not it is split, according to 1722A carries the maximum co-payment of $8. Which the Board refuses to recognize, but rather relies on a "each 30-day or less" argument. "The secretary may not require a veteran to pay an amount in excess of the cost, for medication described in paragraph (1)." $8 for each dispensed 30-pill, 30-day supply co-payment, includes supplies of the abundant 30-day supplies of 45-60 or 90 pills, and as well for all veterans' under treatment, receiving a same exact dispensed 30-pill supply. A prescribed 2 month supply (split pill). = Counsel Taylor in an effort in re-enforcing the Board's position cites “(:) The Secretary, pursuant to regulations which the Secretary shall prescribe may-...(1) increase the co-payment amount in effect under subsection (a);..” Pursuant to regulations? Means according to the law! To regulations as written. Where is this regulation mentioned in the Code of Federal Regulations, this "standard" co-payment you talk about, for $16 split pill supplies? Where, counsel Taylor, does it mention increased co-payment cost for one of two (2) exact duplicate 30-day prescription supplies? Other than my example, where is it mentioned 15 pills is less than 30-day supply? "The Administrative Procedure Act requires that agencies publish administrative regulations in the Federal register before they can be legally effective." Where? = The VA, and the BVA , they want me to pass on, disappear. When that happens, veterans you lose. They don't want you to win. However, this claim will live on, when other veterans think it's important enough of a veteran's issue to file a claim. Turned down by the RO, it's (BVA) $50 filing fee is well spent. A younger veteran, whose prescription requires splitting, and over-charged, can file right now, and can keep playing the same silly game that the VA and the BVA insists on playing, just as long as they can.

VA violation of 38 USC 1722a update Here is an updated example of how veterans' are treated by our government, and how a veterans' due process, is again being denied. I have been working on this since March of 2002. After my withholding of medication co-payment over-charges, the VA turned over this alleged indebtedness to the Department of the Treasury. This action was taken without explanation, the denied due process. = In April 2005 I filed a claim against the Veterans Administration in violation of 1722a, VA prescription over-charges with the Board of Veterans' Appeals. They denied my claim, and at some point, they conveniently lost the original. = I then went to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans' Claims. My claim was remanded back to the BVA. I was notified of this remand on July 16, 2007. The reason for the remand, the USCAVC would work with a rebuilt claim. = Seven (7) months later, on Feb. 11, 2008, I called the BVA inquiring about my claim. I was told it was "coming back from the Court, but hasn't reached us yet." On 4/10/2008, I called again asking for it's status. "Still at the Court of Veterans Appeals." For this advisement, 4/30/2008 I called the Board of Veteran Affairs again. My claim has still not been returned to the court. It's been now over nine (9) months! Because it has not been returned, the courts either, have lost my claim a second time, or are intentionally delaying, stalling, and awaiting my death. = Are they not in the same town? Is my claim such a hot item that the VA does not want to adjudicate it? Apparently so. I know they want me to die! Then my claim dies. This is how the VA works. How our courts work. And how veterans' are continually being treated. There is no due process. Think this is bad? You haven't seen nothing yet. Wait till our men and women return from Iraq and Afghanistan.

I'm looking at Department of Veterans Affairs Eligibility Reform sheet, Guestions and Answers, dated 1/8/2001,at... http://www.va.gov/health/elig/faqfinancial.html which reads "Can VA bill my insurance company for treatment of a service-connected disability? No, they cannot."

Sunday April 6, 10:13 am ET By Hope Yen, Associated Press Writ AP IMPACT: VA Workers Charge $2.6B on Gov't Credit Cards at Luxury Hotels, High-End Retailers = WASHINGTON (AP) -- Veterans Affairs employees last year racked up hundreds of thousands of dollars in government credit-card bills at casino and luxury hotels, movie theaters and high-end retailers such as Sharper Image and Franklin Covey -- and government auditors are investigating, citing past spending abuses. = All told, VA staff charged $2.6 billion to their government credit cards. ======================================================================== Yes, and then there are those few veterans, including my brother, criticize me for going after my claim, VA violation of 1722a, split pill co-payment overcharges. Well, I’m glad I’m doing it. Because this is what happens when you are not vigilant, with nobody watching the store. Here are just a few remarks, regarding my claim, from those that apparently have more money than others, and march to a different drummer. = ---------------------------------------- “So what exactly do you want them to do? Other than waste the time and money of the VA dealing with a trivial claim so that they can't help other veterans. = It really bothers me to see people waste the VA's resources on things like this. It probably cost the VA thousands of dollars to work this claim up to the point of the BOVA, not to mention a lot of time of the people working in the VA. Even if you would have won on the claim, it would have wound up costing the VA more money so they could set up a new accounting system to deal with the change. That would likely cost them hundreds of thousands of dollars and would not really have benefited anyone that I can see.” = ------------------------------- Veterans get prescription drug benefits? I'd love to complain about $8.00 prescriptions. Every attempt I've made to get into the VA Health System I've been told I don't have any benefits. = It's annoying to hear some people complain about what they are getting while others of us are "locked out" of the system entirely. = ---------------------------------- HOGWASH! I suggest you do some homework. = ---------------------------------------------- No one is doubting your claim, as much as why you are doing it. What they are trying to say is, you are tieing up valuable resources that could be better served to adjudicate an individuals claim that had to go the way of the courts. What they are saying, also, is be thankful you have the VA who charges much less a co-pay than what most greedy outside civilian insurance companies charge. When I had outside insurance, before I became TDIU, I was paying $15.00, $20.00, and $25.00 as my co-pays for my medication, so 8 dollars is fairly trivial an amount to pay for prescriptions, not to mention people that have to pay full price for medications...co-pays do not exist for them. So I do understand where you are coming from and where you are trying to go, it just seems like you are trying shove this issue down everyones collective throats to get your point. Good luck in your endeavors, yet I hope some other veterans claim hasn't been backed up because of your want to change what seems to you to be an inequity seen only by you. -------------------------------

I regret I’ve taken this long to reply, however, I’ve been busy boy. I don't think it's possible to ask them about filling your medications other than their policy of each 30-day prescription at the copay of $8. If your receiving 2 prescriptions each 30 day period the charge is $8 for each prescription. The following was from one veteran who said he receives a 2 month supply of 30 pills to be split at a copay of $8.00. This is how I answered. Perhaps this will explain. = If the VA is charging you $8 for a 2 month, 60 day supply, I can then only assume the VA pharmacy that dispenses your medication has a pricing policy different than what the VA and what the BVA conclusion of Law has advised me. Which I will repeat. "The appellant is obligated to pay VA copayment for each 30-day or less supply of medication provided by VA on an outpatient basis. 38 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1722a; 38 C.F.R. Sec. 17.110 (2006)." = The co-payment each 30-day period being $8.00, is explained in Title 38 USC 1722a “ Paragraph (a)(1) subject to paragraph (2),. the Secretary shall require a veteran to pay the United States $8.00 for each 30-day supply of medicine..if the amount supplied is less than a 30-day supply the amount of the charge may not be reduced.” = Paragraph 2. “The Secretary may not require a veteran to pay an amount in excess of the cost to the Secretary for medication as described in paragrapgh 1.” = Or perhaps your condition was one where you went to the VA for a condition that only required you to get a prescription for a cold, something that was not required for long term care, such as heart medicine, diabetes, etc? Then I can understand your questioning. = If you are receiving long term care medication, you state "..not 30-pills, but 30 days..." You received 60 pills which you are required to split, making it 2 (two) 30-day supplies of 15 pills each 30-day period, and you were only charged $8, this is what my claim is trying to accomplish. BVA states, “.. 1722a clearly pertains to VA‘s cost in dispensing the medication...,The VA incurred a cost...to dispense medication..”, What does it cost for a supply of VA dispensed 30 pills for a 30-day supply? VA’s copay cost is $8. Therefore, as the BVA had explained dispensed, this same 30 pill dispensed supply should not have a copay of $16 for a 2 month supply that requires splitting. = I trust this clears up any mis-understanding. = Haiki

Sounds like you are familiar with the VA pharmacy somewhat. However, my experience is the VA pharmacy does not work that way. I can't believe the VA sets up prescriptions at everybody's convenience. As far as I know, they set up prescriptions on a 3 month basis, for veterans who are undergoing treatment for an continuing medical problem, that is , a heart condition, diabetes,etc. Now if your experience with the VA pharmacy, and advising your VA doctors how to schedule your medication is different, please let us know.

[quote name='USMCVeteranChic77' I am confused by this.

The Board of Veterans' Appeals, denial, Conclusion of Law, states, "The appellant is obligated to pay VA copayment for each 30-day or less supply of medication provided by VA on an outpatient basis. 38 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1722a; 38 C.F.R. Sec. 17.110 (2006)." Finally, after the Criteria and Analysis, and references to other law statutes, the Board, in concluding states, “38 USCA 1722a clearly pertains to VA’s cost in dispensing the medication, not the cost to the appellant... The Federal register of July 16th, 2001; Also under U.S.C. 1722A, VA may not require a veteran to pay an amount in excess of the actual cost of medication and pharmacy administrative costs related to the dispensing of the medication. VHA conducted a study...and found that the VA incurred a cost of $7.28 to dispense an outpatient medication....under these circumstances, we believe that a $7 copayment would not exceed VA’s cost.” Clearly, dispensing of medication is the key to the Board’s argument, as well as mine. The VA pharmacy dispenses a supply of 30 pills, the copay cost, whether the amount is 15, 30, 60, or 90 pills the copay is $8. A 30 pill prescription may require that the supply be split. Now becoming a 2 month supply. VA’s copayment charge is $16. A supply of 30 pills carries the maximum copayment charge of $8, for a 30-day supply, and a veteran is not required to pay an amount in excess of the cost to the Secretary, as described in 38 USC 1722a paragraph 2, and noted in the Decision of the Board of Veterans Appeals reference. The Board citing the Federal register, 12/6/2001. “The VA incurred a cost of $7.28 to dispense an outpatient medication..” (rounded out to $8). Why is it, that a veteran is charged $16 for the exact same $8 prescription, 30 pill supply? The BVA in denying the appeal, they cite, “.. 1722a clearly pertains to VA‘s cost in dispensing the medication...,The VA incurred a cost...to dispense medication..”, providing the answer to their apperception. Dispensing! The VA charges the veteran twice, or double, as claimed, for the same dispensing cost required to dispense the exact same, one(1) 30-day, $8 supply. Exceeding the cost a veteran is not required to pay. I, like the Board, I am, “..unable to find any authority allowing for a deviation from the standard copayment.” As well, “The Board has no authority to act outside the constraints of the statutory and regulatory criteria.”

This is the short version. Lee County, Florida Judge Margaret O. Steinbeck, Former Military lawyer, avoided the use of a veteran's disability compensation benefits as alimony, in Fisher v. Fisher citing, " USC 38 sec. 5301 is a general statute which prohibits assignability, levy or seizure." Having avoiding conflict with federal law, using her status, and the authority of her court to inflict her punishment to the veteran, in the only other way that she could, because Mr. Fisher argued federal law precludes VA disability benefits as an award of alimony, Judge Steinbeck goes after his Social Security disability compensation. Citing, in Fisher, her Memorandum of Law, USC 10 sec. 1408 Uniformed Services Former Spouses protection Act. (USFSPA). “We now move to a more specific law USC 10 sec. 1408 © which allows the court to treat retired pay as property of the member and spouse.” Judge Steinbeck then uses, as her primary decisions of law, in the justification of awarding alimony by going after this veterans Social Security disability compensation. Citing, “Finally, we look at USC 42 sec. 659 which allows garnishment to enforce alimony obligations.” Here is the connection Judge Steinbeck tries to make, while having nothing to do with a veterans disability compensation, to justify her Social Security ruling. “Of more importance is 659 (h)(I)(A)(ii)(V). Money subject to process which includes disability paid...to a former member...who has waived a portion of the retirement or retainer pay in order to receive such compensation which is exactly the situation of our present case.” Being two distinct, and unrelated issues, the obvious question being, what has a Veterans’ Administration retired pay benefits have to do with Social Security disability compensation? Absolutely nothing! Except for the fact it reveals the judges thinking. Into her not letting Fisher get off that easy. And as many Judges do, will use the authority of the court to punish a veteran. As I have just illustrated with the Judge Steinbeck ruling, I have seen many references, that state courts, indicate and refer quite readily, as you will see, when justifying an alimony award in going after a veterans' Social Security compensation, to Title 42 USC 659. As I read it, 659 is not a law used in a court proceeding determining the rightfulness of an alimony award. 659 is purely administrative, only to be used after a withholding judgment has been made. An administrative follow-up process upon the direction, and pursuant to State or local law, then administered by the Secretary of the Treasury according to 42 USC 659. As I mentioned, Judges will try any trick in the book. And this is a classic. Please read the law and see for yourself. Here is the reference that started my thinking on the subject. From a Nigel Crum, Friend of the Court, Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, State of Michigan. To Gordon Sutton. "You state, correctly that USCS 407 is clear in stating that these benefits cannot be garnished. However there is an exception. 42 USCS 659, which you cited in your letter, is the exception. That law consents to income withholding from SSD for the purposes of child support or alimony." Yes, 659 is the consent, upon written effective notice, to the Secretary of the Treasury, to withholding as determined only through a court of law! 659 is not the justification by legal counsel, the courts, or the Secretary of the Treasury, the consent to, or seize withholding without the proper legal arguments in the taking of a veteran’s compensation. 659 is not the legal principle of law over titles 38 USC 5301, 42 USC 407 arguments as to what is truly the law in the unfolding court room legal process. Only then, and only after the legal withholding of moneys has been determined, and upon effective written notice, administrative consent (42 USC 659) is given by the United States to the Secretary of the Treasury to process withholding. Consent of 659 is not given to any judge. The consent role of 659 law is given to the Secretary of the Treasury. To enforcement of court proceedings. "( Consent to support enforcement. With respect to notice to withhold income pursuant to.. or any other order or process to enforce support obligations.. (2) Response to notice or process. If an agent.. receives notice pursuant to State procedures in effect... or is effectively served with any order, process or interrogatory, with respect to an individual's child support or alimony payment obligations, the agent shall..." And this all is explained in “(5) Legal process. The term ‘legal process’ means any writ, order, summons, or other similar process in the nature of garnishment (a) which is issued by (i) a court or an administrative agency of competent jurisdiction in any State, territory, or possession of the United States; (iii) an authorized official pursuant to an order of such a court or an administrative agency of competent jurisdiction or pursuant to State or local law; and (B) which is directed to, and the purpose of which is to compel, a governmental entity which holds moneys which are otherwise payable to an individual to make payment from the moneys to another party in order to satisfy a legal obligation of the individual to provide child support or make alimony payments.” Part (B) explains it all. Contrary to Mr. Nigel’s statement, there is no exception to 407 or 5301. 596 is a yet to be determined law that may be required in the fulfillment of a court determination that withholding is accepted. Another example, of possibly hundreds more, in the complete misuse and mis-interpretation of 42 USC 659. See for yourself, reading 659. Here, in what follows, the court has used 42 USC 659, a Secretary of the Treasury administrative garnishment provision in repealing the LHWCA Workers Compensation Act. 659 being administrative only, but in Moyle v. OWPC, the courts had used it to repeal the LHWCA. Argued and Submitted June 2, 1998--Seattle, Washington. Let me illustrate my point, in another way, how the court is using the wrong law in court proceedings when awarding alimony (Fisher). Let's say you were the Secretary of the Treasury, or his agent, involved in enforcing withholding matters. A judge phones, or writes you a note explaining although he had not yet finalized a ruling in an alimony award, he requests that you immediately start withholding of Social Security disability compensation, citing that his final ruling will be based on 659. The question then being, before the finalization of a court ordered withholding judgment, would you honor the request? Your answer should be, no, I can't. Because 42 USC 659 is not a cause of action, and can be only implemented after final court judgment, and provides, "... receiving notice to state procedures in effect...or is effectively served with any order, process, or interrogatory, with respect to an individuals child support or alimony payment obligations, the agent shall..." This is exactly what did not happen in Fisher, where the judge, arbitrarily applied an administrative law in her ruling. Here, Judge Steinbeck, finds, orders, and adjudges 659 in justifying withholding in an award of alimony. A law that comes into play, not during or before judgment ruling, but is presented, and processed only after a formal finalized court ordered writ, or similar process is presented to the Secretary of the Treasury. William H. Heino Sr.

[quote and if they could find a way to beat you out of it they think of that as a win for them

While on the subject of VA prescriptions I thought you may be interested in my United States Court of Appeals for veterans Claim, VA violation of 38 USC 1722a. Let's assume you are at the VA picking up your prescription. You and another veteran in line in front of you are prescribed the exact same identical prescription of 45 pills. Both supplies carry a copay of $8. Right? But, your prescription requires that you split your supply. You now have a 3 month supply (15 pills 1/2 pill per day). This $8 supply now increases in copay cost to $24, for the exact pill medication and supply that costs $8. But let's kick it up a notch, assume that veteran in front of you, having still the same prescription, his supply for a 30-day supply is instead 90 pills. Copay remains at $8 for this 30-day 90 pill supply. = Hope this explains, how the veteran is overcharged by the VA, and just got shafted again (3/13/07) by the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA).What veterans have known as fact, is that veterans continue to lose benefits. This is just another example. = Criteria & Analysis by the Board of Veterans Appeals. “. ...The appellant contends that the standard copayment is excessive in light of the pill splitting.” No where in my claim did I mention the word ‘standard.’ To determine what then is the standard $8, 30 day supply, one must compare 2 supplies. The VA apparently has two(2) standard supplies. A 30 day supply of 30-60-90 pills. Copayment cost $8. Then a second standard 30 day supply of 15 pills, $8 copay. Two distinct and different standards. A standard in cost, but no standard in supply. One does not have to read any further to see the unfairness of the BVA decision. = The BVA cites my argument, 38 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1722a “Copayment for medications. Paragraph (2) The Secretary may not require a veteran to pay an amount in excess of the cost to the Secretary for medication as described in paragraph (1).” As just described above. = Paragraph "(a)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), The Secretary shall require a veteran to pay the United States $8 for each 30-day supply of medication furnished such veteran under this chapter on an outpatient treatment of a non-service connected disability or condition. If the amount supplied is less than a 30-day supply, the amount of the charge may not be reduced." If the 'standard', mentioned first by the BVA describing, "The appellant contends that the standard copayment is excessive.." and according to paragraph 1, is $8 for 30-day supplies of 30,60, or 90 pills, why are veterans charged $16 for a 2 month supply of 30 pills? = "In addition, the Board notes that the references to the cost of medication contained in 38 USC 1722a clearly pertains to VA's cost in dispensing the medication, not the cost to the appellant." That statement is incorrect. Copayment For Medication, 1722a, (listed above) clearly, makes no mention the VA's cost of dispensing medication. It mentions only the veterans' copayment obligation. A reference is made to the VA cost in the Federal Register, however, the "cost in dispensing the medication" is not the argument. It is the cost in overcharges to the veteran. = To you, and me it is quite simple. “The Secretary may not require a veteran to pay amount in excess of the cost to the Secretary for medication as described in paragraph (1).” If one supply can be a standard 60, or 90 pill 30 day supply with a copay of $8, how then can a 30 day supply, limited to only 15 pills, for medication administered during treatment lasting several months, at a copay of $8, each 30 day period be standard supply? "...As described in paragraph (1)". Therefore, an "excess of the cost" does indeed exist. = If given to an eight grade grammar school class this arithmetic problem of the two supplies to find the excess of the cost, what would be their answer? They too, would find that an excess of the cost does exist, “..for medication as described in paragraph (1)” This is a bad sign. Indicating exactly how veterans with disabilities claims, going before the BVA, and Veterans' Law Judge, John E. Ormand, Jr., are adjudicated. = “( The Secretary, pursuant to regulations which the Secretary shall prescribe may-...(1) increase the copayment amount in effect under subsection (a);..” "Pursuant to regulations" means according to the law as written. The BVA , has decided the Secretary (VA) can make law to fit, rather than prescribe the law, or regulations as written. = Citing..Under 38 C.F.R. Sec. 17.110 Copayments for medications. "(:( Copayments. (1) Unless exempted under paragraph © of this section, a veteran is obligated to pay VA a copayment for each 30-day or less supply of medication provided by the VA on an outpatient basis (other than medication administered during treatment)." If ‘administered during treatment’ meant hospitalization, that’s not what it says, or should have been worded. But it did not. It is not ambiguous in the context in which it is presented. Citing, ‘on an outpatient basis, other than medication administered during treatment’ The meaning is quite clear. A patient receiving 60, or 90 day outpatient supply is clearly a treatment of a condition, such as a heart condition, diabetes, etc. = BVA mentions, “Thus, it is clear that the VA’s cost of filling the appellant’s 30-day prescription exceeds the $8 copayment under 38 C.F.R. Sec. 17.110.” Again the argument clearly is not the VA cost as noted in the Federal Register 12/6/2001. When determining the medication copay cost, VA factored in everything, except the cost of the medication. The BVA’s inadequacy, and mindset shown here, is for all to see. = BVA denial in part, "...adherence in the face of overwhelming evidence in support of the result in a particular case: such adherence would result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on the VA with no benefit flowing to the claimant." Never mind the burden of overcharges, or the benefit flowing to well over 1.1 million veterans whose prescriptions call for pill splitting. = It is clear, the BVA came up with this denial of overcharges claim due to national budget concerns due to the involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and who knows were else. Veterans did not cause that. But men and women went to military service because of it. This is how they get rewarded by a grateful nation. There are many things in life we do not like, but ignoring a veterans' cause, or the law is not an option. Who lost? Having sat in the lobby of my VA hospital and observed those that passed by, it's not hard to see, there are many who could use any help they can get, as well those returning from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Walter Reed. = The filing process for an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has begun. CVA Docket No.07-0864

Pete53... If you think you are upset because of having to split your VA prescribed pills, you are going to be doubly upset when I tell you are being overcharged as well. There are well over 1.1 million VA split pill prescriptions, meaning overcharges to these many veterans that can least afford it. A scam that has been going on since March of 2002, when I first notified the VA and Mr.Principi. = Let me explain. Let's assume you are at the VA picking up your prescription. You and another veteran in line in front of you are prescribed the exact same identical prescription of 30 pills. Both supplies carry a copay of $8. Right? But, your prescription requires that you split your supply. You now have a two month supply (15 pills 1/2 pill per day). This $8 supply now increases in copay cost to $16, for the exact pill medication and supply that costs $8. But let's kick it up a notch, assume that veteran in front of you, having still the same prescription, his supply for a 30-day supply is instead 90 pills. Copay remains at $8 for this 30-day 90 pill supply. = Hope this explains, how the veteran is overcharged by the VA, and just got shafted again (3/13/07) by the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA).What veterans have known as fact, is that veterans continue to lose benefits. This is just another example. = Criteria & Analysis by the Board of Veterans Appeals. “. ...The appellant contends that the standard copayment is excessive in light of the pill splitting.” No where in my claim did I mention the word ‘standard.’ To determine what then is the standard $8, 30 day supply, one must compare 2 supplies. The VA apparently has two(2) standard supplies. A 30 day supply of 30-60-90 pills. Copayment cost $8. Then a second standard 30 day supply of 15 pills, $8 copay. Two distinct and different standards. A standard in cost, but no standard in supply. One does not have to read any further to see the unfairness of the BVA decision. = The BVA cites my argument, 38 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1722a “Copayment for medications. Paragraph (2) The Secretary may not require a veteran to pay an amount in excess of the cost to the Secretary for medication as described in paragraph (1).” As just described above. = Paragraph "(a)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), The Secretary shall require a veteran to pay the United States $8 for each 30-day supply of medication furnished such veteran under this chapter on an outpatient treatment of a non-service connected disability or condition. If the amount supplied is less than a 30-day supply, the amount of the charge may not be reduced." If the 'standard', mentioned first by the BVA describing, "The appellant contends that the standard copayment is excessive.." and according to paragraph 1, is $8 for 30-day supplies of 30,60, or 90 pills, why are veterans charged $16 for a 2 month supply of 30 pills? = "In addition, the Board notes that the references to the cost of medication contained in 38 USC 1722a clearly pertains to VA's cost in dispensing the medication, not the cost to the appellant." That statement is incorrect. Copayment For Medication, 1722a, (listed above) clearly, makes no mention the VA's cost of dispensing medication. It mentions only the veterans' copayment obligation. A reference is made to the VA cost in the Federal Register, however, the "cost in dispensing the medication" is not the argument. It is the cost in overcharges to the veteran. = To you, and me it is quite simple. “The Secretary may not require a veteran to pay amount in excess of the cost to the Secretary for medication as described in paragraph (1).” If one supply can be a standard 60, or 90 pill 30 day supply with a copay of $8, how then can a 30 day supply, limited to only 15 pills, for medication administered during treatment lasting several months, at a copay of $8, each 30 day period be standard supply? "...As described in paragraph (1)". Therefore, an "excess of the cost" does indeed exist. = If given to an eight grade grammar school class this arithmetic problem of the two supplies to find the excess of the cost, what would be their answer? They too, would find that an excess of the cost does exist, “..for medication as described in paragraph (1)” This is a bad sign. Indicating exactly how veterans with disabilities claims, going before the BVA, and Veterans' Law Judge, John E. Ormand, Jr., are adjudicated. = “( The Secretary, pursuant to regulations which the Secretary shall prescribe may-...(1) increase the copayment amount in effect under subsection (a);..” "Pursuant to regulations" means according to the law as written. The BVA , has decided the Secretary (VA) can make law to fit, rather than prescribe the law, or regulations as written. = Citing..Under 38 C.F.R. Sec. 17.110 Copayments for medications. "(B) Copayments. (1) Unless exempted under paragraph © of this section, a veteran is obligated to pay VA a copayment for each 30-day or less supply of medication provided by the VA on an outpatient basis (other than medication administered during treatment)." If ‘administered during treatment’ meant hospitalization, that’s not what it says, or should have been worded. But it did not. It is not ambiguous in the context in which it is presented. Citing, ‘on an outpatient basis, other than medication administered during treatment’ The meaning is quite clear. A patient receiving 60, or 90 day outpatient supply is clearly a treatment of a condition, such as a heart condition, diabetes, etc. = BVA mentions, “Thus, it is clear that the VA’s cost of filling the appellant’s 30-day prescription exceeds the $8 copayment under 38 C.F.R. Sec. 17.110.” Again the argument clearly is not the VA cost as noted in the Federal Register 12/6/2001. When determining the medication copay cost, VA factored in everything, except the cost of the medication. The BVA’s inadequacy, and mindset shown here, is for all to see. = BVA denial in part, "...adherence in the face of overwhelming evidence in support of the result in a particular case: such adherence would result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on the VA with no benefit flowing to the claimant." Never mind the burden of overcharges, or the benefit flowing to well over 1.1 million veterans whose prescriptions call for pill splitting. = It is clear, the BVA came up with this denial of overcharges claim due to national budget concerns due to the involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and who knows were else. Veterans did not cause that. But men and women went to military service because of it. This is how they get rewarded by a grateful nation. There are many things in life we do not like, but ignoring a veterans' cause, or the law is not an option. Who lost? Having sat in the lobby of my VA hospital and observed those that passed by, it's not hard to see, there are many who could use any help they can get, as well those returning from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Walter Reed. = A claim with the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has been filed. 4/9/07 CVA docket No. 07-0864

Alimony award of disability question settled. It has been indicated that Michigan 19th District Circuit Court Judge James M. Batzer has, because of the United States Supreme Court veterans' disability benefits, child support ruling in Rose v. Rose, he was re-thinking his Murphy v. Murphy court order (1/4/06) “..concluding that it could not consider the Veterans’ Administration (VA) [disability] benefits of the defendant”. While doing research, discovered something that was right there all the time, specifically 38 USC 5301. Contrary to the conclusion reached in Rose v. Rose by the U.S. Supreme Court (1987) in the question of congressional intent. Here are just three references to Congress' intent, as determined by the United States Supreme Court in arguing Rose v. Rose. (1.) (d) Provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act, which provide that moneys payable by the Government to any individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings (42 U.S.C. 659(a)), but which specifically exclude VA disability benefits, do not establish a congressional intent to exempt such benefits from legal process. ".... (2.) On the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with a federal statute, this Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination whether Congress has `positively required by direct enactment' that state law be pre-empted. (3.)we conclude that Congress would surely have been more explicit had it intended the Administrator's apportionment power to displace a state court's power to enforce an order of child support. The State of Tennessee in following up on the United States Supreme Court's Rose v. Rose ruling, the following 2 paragraphs of veterans' benefits references are 'notes based on decisions', having been included in Tennessee Title 36, Domestic Relations. To clarify the understanding of veterans benefits decisions in divorce actions, according to the ruling in Rose v. Rose. 44. - Veterans' Benefits. There is no indication that congress intended the veterans' administration to make child support determinations contrary to the determinations of state courts. The interest in uniform administration of veterans' benefits focuses, instead, on the technical interpretations of the statutes granting entitlements, particularly on the definitions and degrees of recognized disabilities and the application of the graduated benefits schedules. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S. Ct. 2029, 95 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1987). An exception to the federal prohibition against attachment, levy, or seizure of veterans' benefits would not undermine the federal purpose in providing these benefits. Therefore,...we conclude 3101(a) [5307]does not extend to protect a veteran's disability benefits from seizure where the veteran invokes that provision to avoid an otherwise valid order of child support. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S. Ct. 2029, 95 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1987). Some Code references (internet) mentioned in the U.S. Supreme Court ruling, as well as other Code references were indicated incorrectly, perhaps purposely, due to typo, or confusion. I have bracketed the correct Code number. For example, from Rose v. Rose, © State-court jurisdiction is not pre-empted by 38 U.S.C. 3101(a) [5301], which provides that veterans' benefits payments made to, or on account of, a beneficiary, shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure. 38 USC 3101 refers to CHAPTER 31--TRAINING AND REHABILITATION FOR VETERANS WITH SERVICE- CONNECTED DISABILITIES Sec. 3101. Definitions., Section 5301 is explicit, as to Congress' intent, and does appear to protect veterans' disability benefits. "Nonassignability and exempt status of benefits (a) Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law administered by the Secretary shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically authorized by law, and such payments made to, or on account of, a beneficiary shall be exempt from taxation, shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary. The preceding sentence shall not apply to claims of the United States arising under such laws nor..." Under 38 USC 5301 Congress indicates that the Supremacy Clause does indeed apply. By reference to the paragraph, sentence, and reading of, "The preceding sentence shall not apply to claims of the United States..." If benefits that are not assignable, shall be exempt, from seizure, etc., shall not apply to claims of the United States under such laws, who's claims, other than the United States are they referring to? Yes, 5301 says the United States can claim owed taxes, and debts from the veteran, this is the exception. But Congress had written this as law for someone other than the United States, explaining, except for the United States, this law applies. And the question is, applies to who? Clearly, the States, and anybody else. 5301 refers to State actions that are not authorized by Congress, This... was the intent of Congress! This is something which has been argued by veterans' all along. But in nearly every case it has been ruled against. Why? Because the paragraph can be deceiving. In a quick reading of the paragraph, it is glanced over, focusing mainly on non-assignability, exempt, etc. To be used by veterans’ in court to fight over. Nothing else was needed. Except... the last sentence! Because of the United States Supreme Court's ruling hinged on the reference of the "intent of Congress" in Rose V. Rose, finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear to state courts this intent. That payments, administered by the Secretary to the veteran shall not be assignable, except to the extent specifically authorized by law, are exempt from attachment, or seizure, under any legal or equitable process. This is no longer an argument veterans have to fight over. In Rose v. Rose, the Supreme Court, relying on United States statutes, used words, such as, “we are not persuaded”. Tennessee's statutes suggesting "there is no indication.." In other words an opinion... left open to interpretation. But nothing to “indicate unequivocally” that a veteran's disability benefits are not provided solely for that veteran's support....until now. As you see, 5301 provides the criteria, and the proof that Congress had specifically provided that veterans' disability compensation is exempt. When the U.S. Supreme Court argued Rose v. Rose, they got it wrong. How wrong? 5301 was not even mentioned in Rose v. Rose, and strangely left out of the brief for the United States in the Amicus Curiae supporting appellant. However, it doesn't make any difference, as 5301 is, and has been the intent of Congress. Tennessee, in arguing, conveniently left out 5301. Which included, "The preceding sentence shall not apply to claims of the United States..." The only thing that can be done in future cases is to bring up, and argue strongly, and correctly 5301, and against the Supreme Court's and Tennessee' version of Rose v. Rose. We must remind those with whom we argue, it was the United States Supreme Court... in Rose v. Rose that brought up "the intent of Congress". 38 USC 5301 is the law of the land, therefore... the intent of Congress. Does the court look at these laws independently, or rather argue on the basis of what both sides give them? The answer,.... it's unbelievable, and inconceivable how 38 USC 5301 was not even thought of, or considered by the United States Supreme Court. From the book, "The Brethren" Inside the Supreme Court, by Bob Woodward, Scott Armstrong. These are references to the research work done by the U.S. Supreme Court law clerks, "...basis for yet another draft, and he quickly sent his senior and most trusted law clerk back to work."......"he assigned a law clerk to prepare a detailed research memorandum on the pertinent law"....."his research indicated that they had the power to set forth any remedy they desired necessary".."had his clerk's massive research memorandum printed and presented." I ask, why was 38 USC 5301 ignored, left out? Veterans' can only speculate as to the many reasons. 1986 U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion, which holds true today, concluded using the words of Justice Brandeis, commenting on the presumption of stability in statutory interpretation..."Stare decisis is usually wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." Charlie Wayne Rose a Vietnam veteran, blind in one eye, a triple amputee, unfortunately, and sadly, lost this case, because, "..it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon. 2/10/05. Karen M. Landis v. James E. Landis. DR 0203154,A123666. "In McCarty v. McCarty...the United States Supreme Court held that military retirement pay was not divisible according to state community property laws, because such division would harm a clear and substantial federal interest in securing veterans' financial secutiry. Recognizing the adverse implications of the decision for many veterans' spouses, the Court wrote, "Congress may well decide, as it has in the Civil Service and Foreign Service contexts, that more protection should be afforded a former spouse of a retired service member. This decision, however, is for Congress alone." Now, we have the ammunition, to fight these state judges and their awarding of veterans' disability compensation as part of any divorce decree. This is now every veterans’ argument. We did not bring up “intent“. The United States Supreme Court in arguing Rose v. Rose, looking for the "intent of Congress" brought it up. Finally explaining definitively for veterans’ once and for all, what was missing. They gave it to us. 38 USC 5301,...it was there all the time. And all the time the U.S. Supreme Court claiming, "we are not persuaded", and Tennessee suggesting "there is no indication".

I' can't help you much, but when you go though life and problems occur where their may be problems as a result later on, always document phone calls, dates, conversations, received correspondence, etc. This could mean winning or losing. If up to this time you haven't done that, start now the best you can, by writing down and recalling the past.

A message I send to veterans, and it works. I encourage all veterans, if it’s possible, to get involved in these illegal veterans’ disability compensation alimony award cases in your state. As in the Michigan (and Georgia) case, there are laws on the books in every state, as I have found out, that could possibly turn these abusive, and illegal awards around. Your job would be to find them, via the internet search. You will be surprised by what you may find. State laws that support you, and run contrary to a judges ruling. Keep in mind, using a veterans disability compensation in alimony awards is illegal. Title 38 USC 5301, Chapter 53. Nonassignability and exempt status of benefits. All you have to do is research the internet. Yes, it may seem like a lot of work, but remember why you are doing it. The United States government is not protecting veterans’ in state courts. We have to do it. You can do it! There may, and there's a good bet, there will always be just that one state law, statute, or legal reference, that you will find, and this is all you need to turn around a contempt order against you, or another veteran, and doing possible jail time. But, once you have found this one law, it's state statute, legal reference, write the judge, then publicize your finding by including his name, and the law, on the internet. With your help, veterans can win these phony, illegal state veterans disability compensation alimony awards by abusive state court judges. It's your turn to fight back!

Georgia Superior Court Judge Keeble does an ‘about face’ in the Jere Beery divorce VA disability compensation $24,000 alimony award to ex-wife. Jere Beery, press release, Firebase Atlanta, 10/12/05. “In a totally unexpected and surprising development this week, the ex-Mrs. Jere Beery filed papers with Coweta County Superior Court, in Newnan Georgia releasing Mr. Jere Beery from any court ordered alimony payments. According to Mrs. Beery, her attorney and a Georgia Superior Court Judge were wrong to target Mr. Beery’s VA disability compensation to calculate alimony. “My husband earned his VA disability compensation in combat 17 years before we were married. He earned that disability compensation with his blood. We have no children together and I am not entitled to any of his VA money,” Mrs. Beery said in a recent telephone interview.” Although, asking for help from VA, several national VSO’s, with their expertise, Jere Beery was denied the help he was seeking. Everybody, who you would think that was able, and in the position to help, even his own lawyers, failed him. Two VSO’s, however, the DAV, and the PVA had voiced their support, as did the many veterans, and independent veterans organizations. This ‘about face’ by Judge Keeble, all came about because, individual veterans sticking together, when seeing something obviously wrong, against the law, and interested in helping other veterans, with focus, determination, researched the law, case law, digging in. They keep at it. Not knowing, you may not come up with, or find anything, but then again, as we have found out,.. you will be surprised what you will find, two(2) counties over, i.e., Warren v. Warren, Muscogee County Georgia 1981, denying alimony garnishment award of veterans’ disability benefits. Beery’s own lawyers, could not do, what veteran’s who decided this judge, is not going to get away with “trashing” veterans law, and VA disability rights. A violation of the law, is a violation of the law. It didn’t take much to research the ‘other side’ of the issue, the law, if you are interested. If these VSO’s were interested, they may have resolved the issue in Beery’s favor, long ago. Jere Beery, by vocalizing the issue, stuck with his belief, and in the end, giving encouragement, making it just a little bit better for all veteran's, including members of VSO’s, such as the American Legion. Jere Beery did not give up. We cannot afford to give up. For complete information http://jerebeery.com/press_releases_page.htm

Georgia Superior Court Judge Keeble does an ‘about face’ in the Jere Beery divorce VA disability compensation $24,000 alimony award to ex-wife. Jere Beery, press release, Firebase Atlanta, 10/12/05. “In a totally unexpected and surprising development this week, the ex-Mrs. Jere Beery filed papers with Coweta County Superior Court, in Newnan Georgia releasing Mr. Jere Beery from any court ordered alimony payments. According to Mrs. Beery, her attorney and a Georgia Superior Court Judge were wrong to target Mr. Beery’s VA disability compensation to calculate alimony. “My husband earned his VA disability compensation in combat 17 years before we were married. He earned that disability compensation with his blood. We have no children together and I am not entitled to any of his VA money,” Mrs. Beery said in a recent telephone interview.” Although, asking for help from VA, several national VSO’s, with their expertise, Jere Beery was denied the help he was seeking. Everybody, who you would think that was able, and in the position to help, even his own lawyers, failed him. Two VSO’s, however, the DAV, and the PVA had voiced their support, as did the many veterans, and independent veterans organizations. This ‘about face’ by Judge Keeble, all came about because, individual veterans sticking together, when seeing something obviously wrong, against the law, and interested in helping other veterans, with focus, determination, researched the law, case law, digging in. They keep at it. Not knowing, you may not come up with, or find anything, but then again, as we have found out,.. you will be surprised what you will find, two(2) counties over, i.e., Warren v. Warren, Muscogee County Georgia 1981, denying alimony garnishment award of veterans’ disability benefits. Beery’s own lawyers, could not do, what veteran’s who decided this judge, is not going to get away with “trashing” veterans law, and VA disability rights. A violation of the law, is a violation of the law. It didn’t take much to research the ‘other side’ of the issue, the law, if you are interested. If these VSO’s were interested, they may have resolved the issue in Beery’s favor, long ago. Jere Beery, by vocalizing the issue, stuck with his belief, and in the end, giving encouragement, making it just a little bit better for all veteran's, including members of VSO’s, such as the American Legion. Jere Beery did not give up. We cannot afford to give up. For complete information http://jerebeery.com/press_releases_page.htm

Regarding VA violation of 38 USC 1722a, you'll remember I last left you, advising that the Board of Veterans Appeals turned down my docket advance request. In other words they don't care if this involves 1.1 million veterans who receive prescriptions for pill splitting. I wrote the BVA, Mr. Hogeboom 8/20/05, briefly, "I want to know why, you substitued 'severe financial hardship' as my claim and why 'interpretation of the law of general application affecting other claims' was not considered." No answer. However, when reading 38 USC 1722a, a short and simple law, people read what they want out of it. But, if you keep it simple, it's understandably simple. Unless you work for the VA. Because of this confusion and mis-understanding, I wrote Senator Durbin, who I keep informed, about this mis-understanding problem. I explained it, in it's basic simple terms, because I wanted to make sure if he is going to defend it, I must be sure he understands it. Writing back, "I have been informed of the nature of your concern and will do my best to assist you.. ..a Senate aide in my Chicago office, assists me in matters such as these and will contact the Department of Veterans Affairs..to make an inquiry...You will be contacted as soon as a response has been received." Wheino This is for etihur: You have 2(two) 30 day supplies of 30 pills exactly alike, no difference. One supply, $7 co-pay, but your supply is going to cost you $14. Please explain why?

8/4/05 With regard to your veterans benefits, my claim, (search)VA violation of 38 USC 1722a, I had asked, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, 38 CFR 20.900 “© Advancement on the docket. (1) Grounds for advancement..A case may be advanced on the docket..may be granted only if the case involves interpretation of the law of general application affecting other claims...appellant is seriously ill..severe financial hardship..other sufficient cause..administrative error resulting in significant delay in docketing the case or the advanced age of the appellant…defined as 75 or more years.” In a letter, dated 7/27/05, from the Board of Veterans’ Appeals my request for early adjudication, because, as they suggested, of severe financial hardship, was denied. I made no such claim! My 6/20/05,request for advance, I wrote, “My claim, VA violation of 38 USC 1722a, involves 1.1 million veterans’ co-payment over-charges. It is evident that a clear and unmistakable error’ based on RO ’statement of the case’, i.e., “interpretation of law of general application effecting other claims,” and “sufficient cause shown” has occurred. Subject to Sec. 7107(2) motion for early consideration. Where the BVA got the ‘financial hardship’ from,..I guess, they saw the reference to the problems of 1.1 million veterans over-charges as the ‘financial hardship’. And any question regarding illegal over-charges of 1.1 million veterans therefore carries no weight. Nor does interpretation of law effecting other claims, administrative error, or delay, as to any early settlement of 1722(a). Justice delayed, is justice denied, again. On the back of the VA billing statement, it states, “When a notice of dispute is received..suspend further notices..while we resolve the question.” My property (over-charges held) was seized without explanation or due process rights (5th, 14th Amendment Rights). To reach the Board, and VA to recognize my 1st Amendment Right, to redress grievances, has taken over 3 years. Now more delay. Is this the “administrative error resulting in significant delay” mentioned in 38 CFR 20.900? Apparently not. I, as a Korean War era veteran, when you die, this claim dies with you. However, this is were they have it wrong. Because this claim, filed on behalf of all veterans. It is about every veterans’ right to benefits. This is where you veterans, many returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, take over. It will then be up to you, to fight the VA. I need your help, and it’s now all up to you veterans. I can’t do no more. So that the VA understands, “interpretation of law of general application affecting other claims” and what this fight is all about, every veteran reading this message who receives pill medication that requires splitting (and those that do not), I want you to write, using a .23 cent post card, for a copy of, “How Do I Appeal” from.... Department of Veterans Affairs, Board of Veterans’ Appeals, 811 Vermont Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20420. It’s free, and you do not have to file. We need to show them these “other claims“.. YOURS! Something they may understand. It seems the “clear and unmistakable error (CUE)” based on interpretation of a law effecting approx. 1.1 million veterans is not sufficient cause to advance, and settle 1722, i.e., illegal taking of hundreds of thousands of unrecoverable veterans’ much needed dollars. That is what is behind this denial. You know, and I know who. Will the “interpretation of law of general application affecting other claims” , in veterans medication costs, be upheld? It’s your duty to see that a question, regarding your veterans’ benefits, before the BVA, is answered. Even if your understanding is vague. Request “How Do I Appeal”. Veterans will be counting on you. Reunion? Spread the word! REPLY TO BVA Mr. Charles Hogeboom 8/20/05 Deputy Vice Chairman Board of veterans Appeals 810 Vermont Ave. N.W. Washington DC 20420 Dear Mr. Hogeboom; Re:0141NT/13 The BVA went against my docket advance request, and their own criteria. As you had explained to me, in part, “Interpretation of law of general application. This exception contemplates a situation where the interpretation of a question of law in your case would affect other claims and is of widespread interest and application…a motion submitted under this exception should clearly identify the specific legal question presented and explain why a board decision on this issue would affect the claims of other appellants.” You read, because I had requested that illegal over-charges in violation of 38 USC 1722a, be returned to me. You then denied my request, because of ‘severe financial hardship’. I did not say in my request, or indicate, I had a severe financial hardship. I said, “Upon a favorable decision, I request all monies secured, in the violation of 38 USC 1722a be returned to me.” I was asking that money taken from me, illegally, be returned. You made it a severe financial hardship! I had no idea when a favorable decision would be made? After which, in my 3rd paragraph, I then asked that my case docket be “moved forward as to a decision, for the following reasons.” Violation of law, i,e., an infraction or breach of the law; a transgression. Is this not a question of law? A inter-pretation of law issue? “..a situation where the inter-pretation of a question of law in your case would affect other claims and is of widespread interest and application…” If someone accused me of a violation of law, the first thing I would do is look up the law, and see if they know what they are talking about. If the BVA were concerned with ‘Interpretation of law of general application’, you would have read my entire letter. I mentioned the, “..alleged violation of VA law, pigeonholed while penalizing thousands of veterans in illegal co-pay over-charges, which continue to this day. Over-charges many veterans can ill-afford, in the years awaiting a decision. Over-charges that may not be recoverable.” This you avoided, or ignored, and failed to consider! But you invented, ‘severe financial hardship’. Having nothing to do with my request. In a follow-up letter, I wrote, “..involves 1.1 million veterans’ co-payment over-charges. It is evident that a ‘clear and unmistakable error’ based on RO ‘statement of the case’, i.e., ‘interpretation of law of general application affecting other claims’ and ‘sufficient cause shown’ has occurred.” Is this not ‘sufficient cause’? Federal Register 9/12/03, 38 CFR part 20. (c.) “Advancement on the Docket. (1) Grounds for Advancement…Involves interpretation of law of general application affecting other claims,.. severe financial hardship.. shall include.. administrative error resulting in a significant delay in docketing the case of advanced age of the appellant. For the purpose of this rule, ‘advanced age’ is defined as 75 or more years of age. This paragraph does not require the Board to advance a case on the docket, in the absence of a motion, of a party to the case or the party’s representative.” First of all, I am not seriously ill. And not, contrary to your ruling, under severe financial hardship. Not, at the advanced age of 75 years, yet. This case is a question about a violation of law. Second, this is about 1.1 million veterans affected by this violation. The problem is, a favorable VBA ruling, regarding the mis-appropriation of illegally collected co-pay over-charges of 1.1 million veterans, would be a victory for veterans. Of this 1.1 million veterans’ affected by this claim before the VBA, how many seriously ill veterans, would be affected? How many with a severe financial hardship? How many veterans of the advanced age of 75, or more years? It must be assumed there are many. Is this “other sufficient cause shown”? We know that there may not be veterans that do not fall under these considerations, but they are all affected by a violation of law. Law, as explained and referenced in Black’s Law Dictionary, “All law is the law of a group of individuals or of groups made up of individuals. No one can make a law purely for himself.” Does law mean,.. all individuals (veterans)? If I bring up, a violation of law, any law, this is not just about one persons law. This is in everybody’s ‘widespread interests’. A law basically includes, or is ‘general application‘. Does it not? Which the VBA refuses to recognize. You chose to ignore, the illegal co-pay charges affecting the ‘widespread interests’ of 1.1 million veterans. It is obvious why this is, and not hard to figure out. I’ve been at this for over three years, all the while the VA has fought against, but forced finally, allowing me to bring this to appeal. If it was about me, I would have given up long ago. Add 1.1 million veterans to the VA claims backlog. Veterans have a right to their benefits law. You state, “While these criteria are strict, please remember that there are other appellants waiting for the Board to issue decisions in their appeals..,” I agree. You must also agree, there is the possibly many, of the 1.1 million veterans, that fall under this criteria. They will have to wait, and be purged. And this is exactly what the VA counts on, either the veteran gives up, or the death of the veteran, in order to expedite and purge the huge backlog of claims. I want to know why, you substituted ‘severe financial hardship’ as my claim, and why ’interpretation of the law of general application affecting other claims’ was not considered. Sincerely; William H. Heino Sr. P.S. Where I said, I would have given up long ago, that was a lie. Cc: Senator Durbin Senator Obama Rep. Gutierrez Veterans file file

Mary; If I understand, you received a 'Statement of the Case' back from the RO and now you want to add to the original claim additional information regarding his PTSD. But you have not yet filed a claim with the BVA. From.. VA form 4107 "CAN I GIVE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE?" YES. YOU CAN SEND US MORE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CLAIM WHETHER OR NOT YOU APPEAL TO THE BOARD. IF YOU WANT TO APPEAL, THOUGH, DON'T FORGET THE ONE-YEAR TIME LIMIT!..IF YOU HAVE MORE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CLAIM, IT'S IN YOUR BEST INTEREST TO GIVE US THAT EVEIDENCE AS SOON AS YOU CAN...PLEASE KEEP IN MIND THAT WE CAN ONLY CONSIDER NEW EVIDENCE THAT (1) WE HAVEN'T ALREADY SEEN AND (2) RELATES TO YOUR CLAIM. If I understood your question, I would send in additional information. Why clutter up the problem. I hope this helps. Toimi