free_spirit_etc Posted May 28, 2007 Share Posted May 28, 2007 http://www.va.gov/vetapp01/files01/0104797.txt Citation Nr: 0104797 Decision Date: 02/15/01 Archive Date: 02/20/01 DOCKET NO. 94-26 808 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Denver, Colorado THE ISSUE Entitlement to an effective date earlier than August 24, 1992, for service connection for systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE). REPRESENTATION Veteran represented by: Paralyzed Veterans of America, Inc. ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Mark J. Swiatek, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran had active service from February 1974 to November 1974 and from December 1977 to December 1979. This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (the Board) on appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Denver, Colorado. The Board in March 1997 remanded the case to the RO for further development. The RO recently returned the case to the Board for appellate consideration. The veteran's representative in November 2000 included comments on questions not before the Board. One matter commented on was the RO's reduction, effective in August 1999, of the veteran's 100 percent rating for Hodgkin's disease and in the rate of special monthly compensation she receives. The representative also commented on correspondence from the RO late in 1999 and the local representative's written response regarding a claim of secondary service connection for depression for which there is no rating decision on file. Another matter mentioned is a RO denial late in 1999 of entitlement to additional special monthly compensation based on the need for regular aid and attendance or being housebound. These issues are being referred to the RO for clarification initially and then any further action warranted with respect to any of these issues, as there is no document on file that could be interpreted as a valid notice of disagreement regarding any of these issues. Therefore, in the Board's opinion, referral of these matters rather than remand is the appropriate course of action at this time. The Board remand asked the RO to provide the veteran with information to allow her to bring an appeal from an April 1994 rating decision regarding clear and unmistakable error in an October 1988 rating determination. The RO furnished the information to the veteran in an April 1997 letter. The remand instructed the RO to develop the issue for appeal if the appellant filed a notice of disagreement. The record shows that a notice of disagreement was not filed and there was no response to the April 1997 letter. As a result, the matter is not properly before the Board at this time and will be addressed no further. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The veteran did not appeal the June 1984 RO rating decision that denied service connection for SLE but the notice she received was materially deficient and constituted grave procedural error. 2. There was service medical record evidence and VA medical evidence, which the veteran had referred to in connection with her initial VA benefit application for SLE in 1984 and in subsequent application in 1988 that was not of record but which the RO was obligated to obtain in development of the claim. 3. The RO's failure to request pertinent specified VA medical evidence and service medical records also constituted grave procedural error that renders the June 1984 rating decision and subsequent 1988 decision nonfinal. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The June 1984 and October 1988 rating decisions wherein the RO denied service connection for SLE contained grave procedural error and are nonfinal. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 3.105(a), 20.1103 (2000). 2. The criteria for an effective date of May 15, 1984 for service connection for SLE have been met. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5110 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.155, 3.157, 3.160, 3.400 (2000). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Factual background The record shows that the RO received the veteran's claim to establish service connection for SLE on May 15, 1984. The statement in support of the claim filed by her representative referred to a VA diagnosis of SLE in 1982 and claimed that her service medical records supported that she had many of the symptoms. She had previously filed VA benefit claims for other disorders, initially early in 1980, and the RO had received service medical records and VA medical records that included several examination reports. None of the VA records on file mentioned SLE and the service medical records on file contained no reference to SLE. The claims file included several VA requests for information dated from 1981 to 1983, apparently connected with contemporaneous VA medical treatment that did not refer to SLE. The RO in June 1984 issued a rating decision that denied service connection for SLE. The rating decision narrative stated that a complete review of the veteran's service medical records was negative for findings, symptoms or diagnosis of SLE, and that the remainder of the medical evidence of record was also found to be negative for any indication of SLE. The VA notice letter in June 1984 did not mention SLE, but informed her that no change was warranted since the previous determination regarding her spinal disc condition and ear infection. On a VA examination late in 1984 to evaluate a service- connected spine disability, the examiner reported that the veteran had been diagnosed with SLE and that she was being treated for it. VA medical records obtained late in 1986 when she filed a claim for increase for a back disability included references to SLE in 1985 and 1986 and on one occasion reported the diagnosis had been made in 1981. The RO in June 1987 received a copy of the veteran's correspondence to a Member of Congress wherein she stated that VA doctors had found lupus and that the disorder was not properly diagnosed during her military service. VA's letter of June 1987 responding to the congressional interest mentioned that the claim to service connect SLE had been denied after review of all of her service medical records failed to show no findings, symptoms or diagnosis of the disorder. The RO sent a copy of the letter to the veteran's representative. The veteran sought to reopen her SLE claim in October 1988 with a September 1988 letter from a VA physician. The physician wrote that she had been cared for during the past seven or eight years after first being seen for a face and forearm rash that led to a dermatology evaluation that found SLE. It was reported that her history recalled the rash in service as well as joint pain and swelling and poor circulation. The examiner said there was a strong possibility that she exhibited SLE symptoms at that time and that perhaps the symptoms were not correlated with the disease because of the complicated nature of detection and diagnosis. The examiner also stated that her arthritis was a symptom of lupus. The record shows that the veteran disagreed with the RO determination in October 1988 to deny service connection for SLE. However, she did not file an appeal after the RO issued her a statement of the case in December 1988 at the mailing address she had provided in her notice of disagreement. The VA early in 1990 received a copy of her 1990 request for assistance to the same Member of Congress that included a duplicate of the VA physician's statement in 1988. VA's letter responding to the congressional interest discussed the recent adjudication history of the claim and the need for new and material evidence. The RO sent a copy of the letter to the veteran's representative. She submitted another copy of the 1988 letter later in 1990 with an application for individual unemployability benefits due to service-connected disability (TDIU). Contemporaneous VA records reported the veteran's hospitalization for translupus myelitis. The hospital records referred to SLE in 1981. The RO in July 1990 adjudicated the claim as one for increase, a temporary total hospitalization rating and TDIU. VA medical records dated later in 1990, which the RO reviewed in adjudicating a claim for pension benefits, show her admission to a nursing home unit for complications of SLE. The pension claim was granted in December 1990 and nonservice-connected SLE was rated 100 percent disabling from April 6, 1990, which coincided with the date of the veteran's admission to a VA hospital. The record shows that the veteran in 1991 actively prosecuted claims for restoration of aid and attendance benefits, waiver of overpayment and election of benefits. On August 24, 1992, the RO received a letter from the veteran's representative and her application for TDIU. The representative's letter of August 31, 1992, asserted the RO in October 1988 committed clear and unmistakable error (CUE) when it denied service connection for SLE on an incomplete record. The representative asked the RO to obtain her Army and Air Force service medical records and records from the Jefferson Barracks VA medical facility that a VA physician had referred to in a 1988 letter. Late in 1992, VA records sought were received that included a 1990 reference to SLE since 1981. Other VA records received from 1975 and 1979 through 1981 did not mention SLE. Service medical records received from the service department in April 1993 consisted of a 1973 physical examination and dental records from 1974. Service medical records received in June and July 1993 consisted of duplicate records from the 1979 medical board evaluation and a 1981 military examination that did not mention SLE. The representative on June 24, 1993, submitted service medical records from 1979 that were laboratory analysis reports and a transfer summary dated in February 1979 that reported laboratory data including "VDRL was 3+..." (highlighted) The representative in July 1993 submitted a June 1993 medical statement that indicated a review of records the veteran had submitted showed features in retrospect that were very consistent with SLE. The physician stated the specific features and laboratories from the available notes and laboratory data had been highlighted. The representative said in the July 1993 transmittal letter that the records the physician referred to had been submitted on June 24. The representative in August 1993 submitted duplicate service medical records variously dated in 1974. In addition, the representative asked that the RO obtain specified VA medical records. The representative submitted this request again the following month. The record shows that in September 1993 the RO received VA medical records from 1982 that showed the veteran was evaluated early in 1982 for gland swelling in the neck and under the left arm and that biopsy findings of the axillary lymph nodes were interpreted as consistent with reactive hyperplasia. In June 1982 she was evaluated for a dermatologic problem of the arms. Material from punch biopsies of the left arm was interpreted by one clinician as suggestive of SLE. Another pathology report found the changes were consistent with collagen vascular disorders rather than SLE. The corresponding clinical reports refer to a history of a developing lower arm rash in 1981 that was aggravated by sunlight and healed in the winter months with SLE to be ruled out. The records showed various clinical entries were highlighted. The RO in November 1993 asked for a VA medical opinion as to whether the veteran manifested SLE in military service as medical reviewers in 1988 and 1993 had opined. In November 1993 a VA specialist agreed with the previously referenced medical opinions regarding onset in service and pointed out the significance of the 3+ serology the veteran had in 1979 (false-positive test for syphilis commonly seen in SLE patients). A RO rating decision in November 1993 granted service connection for SLE with loss of use of the upper extremities and a 100 percent rating from August 24, 1992. The RO in December 1993 notified the veteran of the effective date of increase as a result of service connection for SLE. The representative in January 1994 argued for an unspecified earlier effective date based on the previously submitted CUE claim. The RO in April 1994 adjudicated the CUE claim in denying an earlier effective date, although the rating board acknowledged a question of adequacy of notice after the 1984 rating decision that initially considered and denied service connection for SLE. Pursuant to the Board remand, the RO was asked to consider whether consider whether the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156© were applicable in the determination of an earlier effective date. Specifically, the Board asked the RO to clarify which of the service medical records the various examiners had relied on had been contained in supplemental reports from the service department. The RO in February 1999 concluded that none of the records were on file at the time of the 1984 or 1988 rating decisions that denied service connection for SLE. The RO further found that none of the records alone constituted new and material evidence and that this evidence reviewed by an examiner with other evidence not on file at the time of either prior decision established entitlement to service connection. The RO did not adjust the effective date since it found the medical review was completed in connection with claim filed in 1992. Criteria A determination on a claim by the agency of original jurisdiction of which the claimant is properly notified is final if an appeal is not perfected as prescribed in Rule 302 (§ 20.302 of this part). 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1103. If new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to a claim which has been disallowed, the Secretary shall reopen the claim and review the former disposition of the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108. A decision of a duly constituted rating agency or other agency of original jurisdiction shall be final and binding on all field offices of the Department of Veterans Affairs as to conclusions based on the evidence on file at the time VA issues written notification in accordance with 38 U.S.C.A. § 5104 (West 1991). A final and binding agency decision shall not be subject to revision on the same factual basis except by duly constituted appellate authorities or except as provided in § 3.105 of this part. 38 C.F.R. § 3.104(a). "Notice" means written notice sent to a claimant or payee at his latest address of record. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(q) (1984). The claimant will be notified of any decision affecting the payment of benefits or granting relief. Notice will include the reason for the decision and the date it will be effectuated as well as the right to a hearing...The notification will also advise the claimant of his right to initiate an appeal by filing a Notice of Disagreement...the notice will advise him of the periods in which an appeal must be initiated and perfected. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (1984). A determination on a claim by the agency of original jurisdiction of which the claimant is properly notified shall become final if an appeal is not perfected as prescribed in Rule 29 (§ 19.129). 38 C.F.R. § 19.192 (1984). The regulations define new and material evidence as follows: New and material evidence means evidence not previously submitted to agency decision makers which bears directly and substantially upon the specific matter under consideration, which is neither cumulative nor redundant, and which by itself or in connection with evidence previously assembled is so significant that it must be considered in order to fairly decide the merits of the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2000). Where the new and material evidence consists of a supplemental report from the service department, received before or after the decision has become final, the former decision will be reconsidered by the adjudicating agency of original jurisdiction. This comprehends official service department records which presumably have been misplaced and have now been located and forwarded to the Department of Veterans Affairs. Also included are corrections by the service department of former errors of commission or omission in the preparation of the prior report or reports and identified as such. The retroactive evaluation of disability resulting from disease or injury subsequently service connected on the basis of the new evidence from the service department must be supported adequately by medical evidence. Where such records clearly support the assignment of a specific rating over a part or the entire period of time involved, a retroactive evaluation will be assigned accordingly except as it may be affected by the filing date of the original claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156©. The Board notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (hereinafter, Circuit Court) recently ruled that the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (VA Claims Court) erred in adopting the test articulated in Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171, 175 (1991). Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In Colvin, the Court adopted the following rule with respect to the evidence that would justify reopening a claim on the basis of new and material evidence, "there must be a reasonable possibility that the new evidence, when viewed in the context of all the evidence, both new and old, would change the outcome." Colvin, 1 Vet. App. at 174. In light of the holding in Hodge, the Board will analyze the evidence submitted in the case at hand according to the standard articulated in 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). For the purpose of establishing whether new and material evidence has been submitted, the credibility of the evidence is to be presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992). The Board does not have jurisdiction to consider a previously adjudicated claim unless new and material evidence is presented. Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1996). When new and material evidence has not been submitted in a previously denied claim "[f]urther analysis...is neither required, nor permitted." Butler v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 167, 171 (1996) (finding in a case of where new and material evidence had not been submitted that the Board's analysis of whether the claims were well grounded constituted a legal nullity). Thus, the well groundedness requirement did not apply with respect to reopening disallowed claims and revising prior final determinations. Jones v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 134 (1994). The Board notes that under 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104(a) and 3.105(a) (2000), taken together, a rating action is final and binding in the absence of clear and unmistakable error. A decision which constitutes a reversal of a prior decision on the grounds of clear and unmistakable error has the same effect as if the corrected decision had been made on the date of the reversed decision. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a). VA regulations provide that "previous determinations which are final and binding...will be accepted as correct in the absence of clear and unmistakable error." 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a). Where evidence establishes such error, the prior decision will be reversed or amended. Id. "Clear and unmistakable error" requires more than a disagreement on how the facts are weighed or evaluated; the appellant must show that the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the adjudicator or that pertinent regulatory or statutory provisions were incorrectly applied. Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313 (1992). In addition, "It is the kind of error, of fact or law, that when called to the attention of later reviewers compels the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the error. Fugo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 40, 43 (1993). A claim that the evidence was not properly weighed or evaluated cannot constitute clear and unmistakable error, and the allegation of clear and unmistakable error must specifically state what error and how the outcome would have been manifestly different. Id. at 44. The determination regarding clear and unmistakable error must be made based on the record and the law that existed at the time the decision was made. Damrel v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 242, 245 (1994); Russell, 3 Vet. App. at 314. Evidence that was not of record at the time of the decision cannot be used to determine if clear and unmistakable error occurred. Porter v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 233 (1993). Previous determinations which are final and binding, including decisions of service connection, degree of disability, age, marriage, relationship, service, dependency, line of duty, and other issues, will be accepted as correct in the absence of clear and unmistakable error. Where evidence establishes such error, the prior decision will be reversed or amended. 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a). For purposes of determining whether clear and unmistakable error is present in a prior determination: (1) "[e]ither the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the adjudicator (i.e., more than a simple disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated) or the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied," (2) the error must be "undebatable" and of the sort "which, had it not been made, would have manifestly changed the outcome at the time it was made," and (3) a determination that there was clear and unmistakable error must be based on the record and law that existed at the time of the prior adjudication in question. Damrel v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 242 (1994). Service connection may be granted for a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service in the line of duty. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 1991). Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Service connection connotes many factors but basically it means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred coincident with service in the Armed Forces, or if preexisting such service, was aggravated therein. This may be accomplished by affirmatively showing inception or aggravation during service or through the application of statutory presumptions. Each disabling condition shown by a veteran's service records, or for which he seeks a service connection must be considered on the basis of the places, types and circumstances of his service as shown by service records, the official history of each organization in which he served, his medical records and all pertinent medical and lay evidence. Determinations as to service connection will be based on review of the entire evidence of record, with due consideration to the policy of the Department of Veterans Affairs to administer the law under a broad and liberal interpretation consistent with the facts in each individual case. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). With chronic disease shown as such in service (or within the presumptive period under § 3.307) so as to permit a finding of service connection, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. This rule does not mean that any manifestation of joint pain, any abnormality of heart action or heart sounds, any urinary findings of casts, or any cough, in service will permit service connection of arthritis, disease of the heart, nephritis, or pulmonary disease, first shown as a clear-cut clinical entity, at some later date. For the showing of chronic disease in service there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "Chronic." When the disease identity is established (leprosy, tuberculosis, multiple sclerosis, etc.), there is no requirement of evidentiary showing of continuity. Continuity of symptomatology is required only where the condition noted during service (or in the presumptive period) is not, in fact, shown to be chronic or where the diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. When the fact of chronicity in service is not adequately supported, then a showing of continuity after discharge is required to support the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(:(. Service connection may be granted for lupus erythematosus, systemic although not otherwise established as incurred in service if manifested to a compensable degree within one year from the date of separation from service provided the rebuttable presumption provisions of § 3.307 are also satisfied. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309, as amended at 54 Fed. Reg. 26029, June 21, 1989. When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the appellant prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against a claim, in which case, the claim is denied. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). When, after consideration of all of the evidence and material of record in an appropriate case before VA, there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107( (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.3. The Secretary shall consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case before the Secretary with respect to benefits under laws administered by the Secretary. When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (hereafter VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, § 4, 114 Stat. 2096, 2098-99 (2000) (to be codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 5107). Except as otherwise provided, the effective date of an evaluation and award of pension, compensation or dependency and indemnity compensation based on an original claim, a claim reopened after final disallowance, or a claim for increase will be the date of receipt of the claim or the date entitlement arose, whichever is the later. 38 U.S.C.A § 5110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(:o(2)(i). Any communication or action, indicating an intent to apply for one or more benefits under the laws administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs, from a claimant, his or her duly authorized representative, a Member of Congress, or some person acting as next friend of a claimant who is not sui juris may be considered an informal claim. Such informal claim must identify the benefit sought. Upon receipt of an informal claim, if a formal claim has not been filed, an application form will be forwarded to the claimant for execution. If received within one year from the date it was sent to the claimant, it will be considered filed as of the date of receipt of the informal claim. (:( A communication received from a service organization, an attorney, or agent may not be accepted as an informal claim if a power of attorney was not executed at the time the communication was written. © When a claim has been filed which meets the requirements of § 3.151 or § 3.152, an informal request for increase or reopening will be accepted as a claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155. Effective date of pension or compensation benefits, if otherwise in order, will be the date of receipt of a claim or the date when entitlement arose, whichever is the later. A report of examination or hospitalization which meets the requirements of this section will be accepted as an informal claim for benefits under an existing law or for benefits under a liberalizing law or Department of Veterans Affairs issue, if the report relates to a disability which may establish entitlement. Acceptance of a report of examination or treatment as a claim for increase or to reopen is subject to the requirements of Sec. 3.114 with respect to action on Department of Veterans Affairs initiative or at the request of the claimant and the payment of retroactive benefits from the date of the report or for a period of 1 year prior to the date of receipt of the report. 38 C.F.R. § 3.157. A pending claim is an application, formal or informal, which has not been finally adjudicated. 38 C.F.R. § 3.160. Analysis There are currently two statutorily authorized means to obtain reevaluation of a final VA benefit decision. A final decision disallowing a claim may be revised based upon a showing of CUE in a prior decision by the Secretary or the Board pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109A and 7111, or reopened based upon submission of new and material evidence pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108. The veteran does argue that the RO committed CUE in 1988 so that means of obtaining reevaluation is brought to the Board. The Board notes the argument is that the RO in 1988 committed CUE when it denied the claim on an incomplete record. The Board will not provide a comprehensive discussion of CUE in such instances in view of the decision to find the 1984 claim remained, in essence, a pending claim that was not affected by the 1988 rating decision. It is sufficient to point out that the constructive receipt rule established in Bell v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 611 (1992) would have no application to this case since the rating decision at issue was prior to the date the Bell decision was issued, July 21, 1992. See, for example, Damrel, 6 Vet. App. at 246; Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 308, 313 (1991). Further, any failing to develop for VA evidence would have been a breech of the duty to assist, and as such it cannot be a basis for a CUE claim, although the record may have been incomplete. Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 377 (1994). The Board also concludes that in view of grave procedural error new and material evidence was not required to obtain a reevaluation or review of the claim denied initially in 1984. Thus the Board is not limited by the effective date rules that apply in such circumstances. Further, as the additional service medical records alone apparently did not alone establish SLE in service the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156© do not require review of the 1984 decision. Nor does the Board need to discuss another potential means of obtaining review discussed in Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998), as the facts do not warrant its application. The Board observes that in Hayre v. West, 188 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1999) the Circuit Court created a nonstatutory means to obtain review of a previously denied claim, holding that while a breach of the duty to assist is not the type of error that can provide the basis for a CUE claim in accordance with this Court's case law, in cases of grave procedural error RO or Board decisions are not final for purposes of direct appeal. Id. at 1333. In Hayre the Circuit Court held that a breach of the duty to assist in which the VA failed to obtain pertinent SMRs specifically requested by the claimant and failed to provide the claimant with notice explaining the deficiency is a procedural error of, at least, comparable gravity that vitiates the finality of an RO decision for purposes of direct appeal. The VA Claims Court, interpreting the reach of Hayre in Simmons v. West, 14 Vet. App. 84, 91 (2000), noted that: Not only do we believe that Hayre does not require that a "garden variety" breach of VA's duty to assist, in the development of a claim that is well grounded, be construed as tolling the finality of an underlying RO decision, but we also believe that it would be unwise for this Court to extend Hayre to encompass such a duty- to-assist violation. At some point, there is a need for finality within the VA claims adjudication process; thus, the tolling of finality should be reserved for instances of "grave procedural error"--error that may deprive a claimant of a fair opportunity to obtain entitlements provided for by law and regulation. The holding in Hayre as explained in Tetro v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 100 (2000) provided for review of unappealed decisions where grave procedural error had occurred so as to render the decision nonfinal. In Hayre the vitiating error was failure to assist in obtaining specifically requested service medical records and failure to provide the claimant with notice explaining the deficiency. Other examples of grave procedural error referred to in Tetro were Tablazon v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 359, 361 (1995) (failure to provide a statement of the case after receiving a notice of disagreement); Hauck v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1994) (failure to provide notification of denial tolls period to file a notice of disagreement); Kuo v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 662, 666 (1992) (failure to send statement of the case to accredited representative tolled 60 day period to respond) and Ashley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 307, 311 (1992) (evidence sufficient to rebut presumption of administrative regularity for mailing of appeal notice). The Board observes that at the time of the 1984 decision, the scope of the Secretary's duty to assist concerning the procurement of VA records and service medical records was clearly defined. There were specific VA Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1 provisions paras 5.01 et seq., 22.01 et seq. and 25.01 et seq. prescribing the steps to be taken to obtain such records. These provisions were clear authority to guide the RO in 1984 concerning the procurement of VA and service medical records that were specifically mentioned. Therefore, the failure to obtain such records would give rise to a grave procedural error comparable to that in Hayre. The Board believes the holding here accords due consideration to the VA Claims Court's explanation in Simmons of the relevant factors relied on by the Circuit Court in Hayre. First, the VA assistance sought was "specifically requested" regarding service medical records and VA treatment that was directly referenced. The initial request to the service department that produced service medical records apparently did not include those later relied on to find SLE likely was incurred in service. There does not appear to have been a supplemental request prior to the mid 1990's even though the veteran mentioned the likely existence of such treatment records. Further, the VA records from the early 1980's were apparently not requested until the early 1990's although there had been earlier references to pertinent medical treatment at the time of the 1984 claim and later in 1988. VA adjudication procedures required the RO to obtain the VA reports since, under the circumstances, the veteran was not required to make a specific request. Second, the lack-of- notice element present here is such that it may undermine the operation of the veterans' benefits system by altering its manifestly pro-claimant character and jeopardizing the veteran's ability to appeal in what may appear to be a fundamentally unfair manner. The RO did not follow up regarding VA records or service medical records in 1984 or 1988, although it seemed obvious in view of the medical references that more records than reflected in the claims file were compiled. There was clearly notice of VA records from the early 1980's relevant to the SLE claim that were not requested until years after the 1984 claim. There is recognition of the particularly vital role that service medical records and VA records can play in determining the question of in-service incurrence of a disability. It does not appear there was notice to the veteran explaining the failure to obtain pertinent and specifically requested service medical records and specified VA records. These were essential to insuring that the RO would adequately develop a veteran's claim before deciding it on the merits. The opinion in Simmons noted that VA has substantively defined its obligation to obtain such records in its Manual M21-1 and recently recognized the special role of such records and VA's access to them by referring to VA Veterans Benefits Administration Letter 20-99-60 at 1 (Aug. 30, 1999) (directing all ROs that service medical records and VA medical center records are to be requested in all cases and considered to be records in VA custody. This policy, in view of the Manual M21-1 provisions previously mentioned, was substantially in effect in 1984 and is authority for the RO's duty to assist. It was a situation where VA was in control of evidence necessary to prove her claim. The VA Claims Court pointed out that where documents containing certain information are under VA control (real or constructive), failure to produce them is likely to frustrate an award of benefits. Simmons, 14 Vet. App. at 89-90. As noted previously another basis to find grave procedural error is the failure to provide notification of denial in 1984, which in turn tolls the period to file a notice of disagreement. Hauck, 6 Vet. App. at 519. The notice in 1984 was clearly deficient in not advising the veteran that her claim for service connection of SLE had been denied. In addition, the 1988 decision was nonfinal since the essential records, which had been mentioned, were not developed for by the RO. In essence, the 1984 claim remained a pending claim. In summary, the Board holds that Hayre as explained in Tetro v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 100 (2000) and Simmons should apply in this case given its facts so as to render nonfinal the June 1984 RO decision. Further, there is no applicability of a CUE claim in this case and the nonfinality of the 1984 decision renders the 1988 decision a nullity. The Board has not overlooked the potential application of the recently enacted Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 [Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000)], but finds the record is adequate for a determination of the proper effective date. Since the claim to establish service connection for SLE was a pending claim from May 1984 in view of the grave procedural errors then, and which rendered the 1988 RO decision a nullity, the effective date for service connection should coincide with the May 15, 1984 date of claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.400. The Board is not inclined to decide what rating is warranted for the period prior to August 1992 since that determination has not been addressed by the RO in the first instance. Nor does the Board infer or suggest that any particular rating is warranted for the entire period. The Board, however, directs the attention of the appellant and the RO to the guidance recently provided in Meeks v. West, 216 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000) regarding the retroactive rating in claims such as the appellant's. See also Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). ORDER Entitlement to an effective date of May 15, 1984, for service connection for SLE is granted. Heather J. Harter Acting Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Berta Posted May 28, 2007 Share Posted May 28, 2007 (edited) This is an interesting case but "grave procedural error" claims were overruled by Cook V Principi-Fed Circuit Court-2002 and then again in Tetro V. Principi. In the past-many at the older hadit board-there was much discussion on the Hayre decision and Cook. CUE claims are the way to overcome procedural error these days by a claim that clerar and unmistakable error has been committed by VA in a final decision. Cue only involves VA case law and regs and not medical determinations. WHat I mean is - say VA failed to rate a veteran as high as the veteran thought the rating should go,depending on evidence in his/her c file- years later -having not appealed the decision , the vet decides to raise the issue of CUE in that older rating. The vet finds that the DC (diagnostic code) the rater used was the wrong one. WIth the wrong DC used -the rating percentage assigned in the older decision was wrong and medical evidence warranted a higher rating at that time. When the rater put the wrong DC code on the rating sheet - he committed a legal error- a CUE-as the right CD code with the med evidence of record caused the veteran to lose money which a CUE claim could restore. However- Violation of the VCAA is a procedural error- If the error is prejudicial to the veteran- Since VCAA is a Duty to Assist reg- a CUE claim cannot challenge it. This is why I asked Senator Schumer to sponsor an amendment I wrote- Remands at the BVA due to VCAA violations are supposed to circumvent the violation with a "re-do" of the VCAA - yet I strongly believe that not only claimants but vet reps and lawyers should be able to challenge this violation right at the RO level upon receipt of an inappropriate VCAA letter. Your rep knows if it is illegal. One problem is this- after years of doing claims counseling on the net and locally I never saw a real VCAA letter-local claims I help with are beyond that point. what I got as a VCAA letter didn't make sense and my rep said just to respond to it as best as I could- However the election notice was missing-I didnt know what an election notice was. Along with major rep screw ups on my claim-this VCAA violation got me into the wrong stack at the RO- They continually denied and said I had sent NO evidence. Without a signed election notice from me-they didnt have to do anything at all. Of course that got squared away (I think)and they said I can expect a decision soon. I overcame the prejudicial part of the VCAA error myself by obtaining 3 IMOs. If the 3 IMOs continue to be ignored -I will really raise Hell. I have documentation from my POA that seemed to strongly indicate they did not want my evidence to be considered by VA. The main boss even said I could expect perhaps the same treatment from VA on my 3rd IMo as what the other IMOs got (they were not even read) Shows you how dumb they are-I have documentation from them that proves what they did to sabotage my claim. They even told me that if you elect a DRO review-you can't submit further evidence. I got that in writing and have a witness. I did get a better rep but he is retiring in June- I will give his replacement a chance - they do have some excellent reps- and then decide what's next. My lawyer who said he would rep me is still in process of moving his practice closer to me. Edited May 28, 2007 by Berta (see edit history) Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
free_spirit_etc Posted May 29, 2007 Author Share Posted May 29, 2007 This is where I get all messed up - where one thing cancels out the other. But it seemed like this one was more of a CUE because they made the decision on an incomplete record - and the missing records were SMRs. I guess one of the best ways to find the most current thinking is to look at very recent BVA and Court cases and seeing what they are quoting. It seems like they have their favorites... and just keep quoting the same ones over and over again. I was reading that case -- where they were pretty much afraid that if they let duty to assist be a CUE - that people could some back at any time with anything. But that is not allowing valid claims (such as yours) in order to try to deter frivolous claims. But I think there will be valid claims and frivolous claims anyway -- and they still have to hear them both. When it is fatal to your case -and the results would have been different- it should be a CUE (though I know it is not) Free This is an interesting case but "grave procedural error" claims were overruled by Cook V Principi-Fed Circuit Court-2002 and then again in Tetro V. Principi. In the past-many at the older hadit board-there was much discussion on the Hayre decision and Cook. CUE claims are the way to overcome procedural error these days by a claim that clerar and unmistakable error has been committed by VA in a final decision. Cue only involves VA case law and regs and not medical determinations. WHat I mean is - say VA failed to rate a veteran as high as the veteran thought the rating should go,depending on evidence in his/her c file- years later -having not appealed the decision , the vet decides to raise the issue of CUE in that older rating. The vet finds that the DC (diagnostic code) the rater used was the wrong one. WIth the wrong DC used -the rating percentage assigned in the older decision was wrong and medical evidence warranted a higher rating at that time. When the rater put the wrong DC code on the rating sheet - he committed a legal error- a CUE-as the right CD code with the med evidence of record caused the veteran to lose money which a CUE claim could restore. However- Violation of the VCAA is a procedural error- If the error is prejudicial to the veteran- Since VCAA is a Duty to Assist reg- a CUE claim cannot challenge it. This is why I asked Senator Schumer to sponsor an amendment I wrote- Remands at the BVA due to VCAA violations are supposed to circumvent the violation with a "re-do" of the VCAA - yet I strongly believe that not only claimants but vet reps and lawyers should be able to challenge this violation right at the RO level upon receipt of an inappropriate VCAA letter. Your rep knows if it is illegal. One problem is this- after years of doing claims counseling on the net and locally I never saw a real VCAA letter-local claims I help with are beyond that point. what I got as a VCAA letter didn't make sense and my rep said just to respond to it as best as I could- However the election notice was missing-I didnt know what an election notice was. Along with major rep screw ups on my claim-this VCAA violation got me into the wrong stack at the RO- They continually denied and said I had sent NO evidence. Without a signed election notice from me-they didnt have to do anything at all. Of course that got squared away (I think)and they said I can expect a decision soon. I overcame the prejudicial part of the VCAA error myself by obtaining 3 IMOs. If the 3 IMOs continue to be ignored -I will really raise Hell. I have documentation from my POA that seemed to strongly indicate they did not want my evidence to be considered by VA. The main boss even said I could expect perhaps the same treatment from VA on my 3rd IMo as what the other IMOs got (they were not even read) Shows you how dumb they are-I have documentation from them that proves what they did to sabotage my claim. They even told me that if you elect a DRO review-you can't submit further evidence. I got that in writing and have a witness. I did get a better rep but he is retiring in June- I will give his replacement a chance - they do have some excellent reps- and then decide what's next. My lawyer who said he would rep me is still in process of moving his practice closer to me. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
SLEDGE Posted May 29, 2007 Share Posted May 29, 2007 Did the veteran that was mentioned ever get her benefits? 17 years is a long time to wait for somebody to pull their head out when your health is circling the drain. Then the BVA just told the RO to start the adjudication over from a particular prior date. I don't call that relief, I call it a fraudulent, significant, unjustifiable, illegal delay while waiting for the helpless veteran to die. sledge Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
free_spirit_etc Posted May 29, 2007 Author Share Posted May 29, 2007 Who knows if they ever granted the benefits. It would be nice if you could cross reference the cases - or see what happened AFTER the remand. I guess they had to go back and rate how disabled they thought she was at different points. One of my husband's claims was simple. He asked for his free one time dental treatment a vet is entitled to upon discharge (if they haven't already gotten it in certain number of days before discharge). It is supposed to be noted right on their discharge papers whether they got it or not. He filed at retirement. He was denied compensation for dental. The BVA remanded because he was only asking for TREATMENT. The RO sent him to a dentist...and denied compensation again. He told them he only wanted TREATMENT. THe BVA remanded again -- as they thought the record indicated he MIGHT be entitled to compensation. The RO denied him compensation again. He stopped sending letters telling them he just wanted TREATMENT.. as no one was reading them for the past five years. The BVA finally upheld the denial of compensation. No one ever decided whether he did or did not get TREATMENT. (though I guess that was decided by default) So what a wonder that there is a backlog. A veteran retires and asks for his ONE TIME dental treatment he is CLEARLY entitled to -- and they bounce it around in the system for years -- and don't bother to ever decide if he can get what he asked for. That should have taken about 10 minutes. Look at the record. Did he get his dental treatment 90 days before discharge? No. Then he is entitled to one time treatment of his dental conditions. Free Did the veteran that was mentioned ever get her benefits? 17 years is a long time to wait for somebody to pull their head out when your health is circling the drain. Then the BVA just told the RO to start the adjudication over from a particular prior date. I don't call that relief, I call it a fraudulent, significant, unjustifiable, illegal delay while waiting for the helpless veteran to die. sledge Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
SLEDGE Posted May 29, 2007 Share Posted May 29, 2007 "So what a wonder that there is a backlog." You got it........ How can any system function when overly complicated dysfunction is the desired goal of the system's administration? Like, too many Indians and no chief. Lawyers set it up. Lawyers run it. Lawyers within the VA do everything possible to keep us from finding our way through the screwed up mess. Lawyers are yet to be made available to us, congress ain't done yet, there will be a last minute provision or amendment or new regulation or nullification of our new right to counsel of choice before this lawyer access business goes into affect. And, of course, there is always the possibility of some new court decision that will require 500,000 claims to be reworked so the VA can have another go at losing files. It all boils down to WHO controls what and how determined the controllers are to keep their control of whatever they now control. (the power to control the money) sledge Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
free_spirit_etc Posted May 29, 2007 Author Share Posted May 29, 2007 Yep. And by the time the vet has been allowed to get a lawyer -- it is late in the game - and the lawyer has to try to work with the mess that could have been avoided had he been involved earlier. You should have done this - you shouldn't have done that..etc. It is kind of like if you were having a trial -- and THEY had lawyers the whole time - but YOU are only allowed to have a lawyer the LAST DAY of the trial. The lawyer gets to make a last ditch effort to try to save you from all the legal ploys that have ALREADY occured. I know they say they are afraid that involving lawyers will backlog the system. But Social Security uses lawyers without the horrid backlogs that the VA has. Initially, the system probably will be backlogged - because lawyers will have so much to file. However, in time - maybe the VA will start getting it right the first time. Unfortunately, those vets currently pursuing claims will have to pay the price (timewise) for hopefully straightening out the process. But then again, they are already waiting for years anyway. Free "So what a wonder that there is a backlog." You got it........ How can any system function when overly complicated dysfunction is the desired goal of the system's administration? Like, too many Indians and no chief. Lawyers set it up. Lawyers run it. Lawyers within the VA do everything possible to keep us from finding our way through the screwed up mess. Lawyers are yet to be made available to us, congress ain't done yet, there will be a last minute provision or amendment or new regulation or nullification of our new right to counsel of choice before this lawyer access business goes into affect. And, of course, there is always the possibility of some new court decision that will require 500,000 claims to be reworked so the VA can have another go at losing files. It all boils down to WHO controls what and how determined the controllers are to keep their control of whatever they now control. (the power to control the money) sledge Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Question
free_spirit_etc
http://www.va.gov/vetapp01/files01/0104797.txt
Citation Nr: 0104797
Decision Date: 02/15/01 Archive Date: 02/20/01
DOCKET NO. 94-26 808 ) DATE
)
)
On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Denver,
Colorado
THE ISSUE
Entitlement to an effective date earlier than August 24,
1992, for service connection for systemic lupus erythematosus
(SLE).
REPRESENTATION
Veteran represented by: Paralyzed Veterans of America,
Inc.
ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD
Mark J. Swiatek, Counsel
INTRODUCTION
The veteran had active service from February 1974 to November
1974 and from December 1977 to December 1979.
This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (the
Board) on appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
Regional Office (RO) in Denver, Colorado. The Board in March
1997 remanded the case to the RO for further development.
The RO recently returned the case to the Board for appellate
consideration.
The veteran's representative in November 2000 included
comments on questions not before the Board. One matter
commented on was the RO's reduction, effective in August
1999, of the veteran's 100 percent rating for Hodgkin's
disease and in the rate of special monthly compensation she
receives. The representative also commented on
correspondence from the RO late in 1999 and the local
representative's written response regarding a claim of
secondary service connection for depression for which there
is no rating decision on file. Another matter mentioned is a
RO denial late in 1999 of entitlement to additional special
monthly compensation based on the need for regular aid and
attendance or being housebound. These issues are being
referred to the RO for clarification initially and then any
further action warranted with respect to any of these issues,
as there is no document on file that could be interpreted as
a valid notice of disagreement regarding any of these issues.
Therefore, in the Board's opinion, referral of these matters
rather than remand is the appropriate course of action at
this time.
The Board remand asked the RO to provide the veteran with
information to allow her to bring an appeal from an April
1994 rating decision regarding clear and unmistakable error
in an October 1988 rating determination. The RO furnished
the information to the veteran in an April 1997 letter. The
remand instructed the RO to develop the issue for appeal if
the appellant filed a notice of disagreement. The record
shows that a notice of disagreement was not filed and there
was no response to the April 1997 letter. As a result, the
matter is not properly before the Board at this time and will
be addressed no further.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The veteran did not appeal the June 1984 RO rating
decision that denied service connection for SLE but the
notice she received was materially deficient and constituted
grave procedural error.
2. There was service medical record evidence and VA medical
evidence, which the veteran had referred to in connection
with her initial VA benefit application for SLE in 1984 and
in subsequent application in 1988 that was not of record but
which the RO was obligated to obtain in development of the
claim.
3. The RO's failure to request pertinent specified VA
medical evidence and service medical records also constituted
grave procedural error that renders the June 1984 rating
decision and subsequent 1988 decision nonfinal.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The June 1984 and October 1988 rating decisions wherein
the RO denied service connection for SLE contained grave
procedural error and are nonfinal. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105
(West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 3.105(a), 20.1103 (2000).
2. The criteria for an effective date of May 15, 1984 for
service connection for SLE have been met. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5110
(West 1991 & Supp. 1999); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.155, 3.157, 3.160,
3.400 (2000).
REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Factual background
The record shows that the RO received the veteran's claim to
establish service connection for SLE on May 15, 1984. The
statement in support of the claim filed by her representative
referred to a VA diagnosis of SLE in 1982 and claimed that
her service medical records supported that she had many of
the symptoms. She had previously filed VA benefit claims for
other disorders, initially early in 1980, and the RO had
received service medical records and VA medical records that
included several examination reports. None of the VA records
on file mentioned SLE and the service medical records on file
contained no reference to SLE. The claims file included
several VA requests for information dated from 1981 to 1983,
apparently connected with contemporaneous VA medical
treatment that did not refer to SLE.
The RO in June 1984 issued a rating decision that denied
service connection for SLE. The rating decision narrative
stated that a complete review of the veteran's service
medical records was negative for findings, symptoms or
diagnosis of SLE, and that the remainder of the medical
evidence of record was also found to be negative for any
indication of SLE. The VA notice letter in June 1984 did not
mention SLE, but informed her that no change was warranted
since the previous determination regarding her spinal disc
condition and ear infection.
On a VA examination late in 1984 to evaluate a service-
connected spine disability, the examiner reported that the
veteran had been diagnosed with SLE and that she was being
treated for it. VA medical records obtained late in 1986
when she filed a claim for increase for a back disability
included references to SLE in 1985 and 1986 and on one
occasion reported the diagnosis had been made in 1981.
The RO in June 1987 received a copy of the veteran's
correspondence to a Member of Congress wherein she stated
that VA doctors had found lupus and that the disorder was not
properly diagnosed during her military service. VA's letter
of June 1987 responding to the congressional interest
mentioned that the claim to service connect SLE had been
denied after review of all of her service medical records
failed to show no findings, symptoms or diagnosis of the
disorder. The RO sent a copy of the letter to the veteran's
representative.
The veteran sought to reopen her SLE claim in October 1988
with a September 1988 letter from a VA physician. The
physician wrote that she had been cared for during the past
seven or eight years after first being seen for a face and
forearm rash that led to a dermatology evaluation that found
SLE. It was reported that her history recalled the rash in
service as well as joint pain and swelling and poor
circulation. The examiner said there was a strong
possibility that she exhibited SLE symptoms at that time and
that perhaps the symptoms were not correlated with the
disease because of the complicated nature of detection and
diagnosis. The examiner also stated that her arthritis was a
symptom of lupus.
The record shows that the veteran disagreed with the RO
determination in October 1988 to deny service connection for
SLE. However, she did not file an appeal after the RO issued
her a statement of the case in December 1988 at the mailing
address she had provided in her notice of disagreement. The
VA early in 1990 received a copy of her 1990 request for
assistance to the same Member of Congress that included a
duplicate of the VA physician's statement in 1988. VA's
letter responding to the congressional interest discussed the
recent adjudication history of the claim and the need for new
and material evidence. The RO sent a copy of the letter to
the veteran's representative. She submitted another copy of
the 1988 letter later in 1990 with an application for
individual unemployability benefits due to service-connected
disability (TDIU).
Contemporaneous VA records reported the veteran's
hospitalization for translupus myelitis. The hospital
records referred to SLE in 1981. The RO in July 1990
adjudicated the claim as one for increase, a temporary total
hospitalization rating and TDIU. VA medical records dated
later in 1990, which the RO reviewed in adjudicating a claim
for pension benefits, show her admission to a nursing home
unit for complications of SLE. The pension claim was granted
in December 1990 and nonservice-connected SLE was rated 100
percent disabling from April 6, 1990, which coincided with
the date of the veteran's admission to a VA hospital.
The record shows that the veteran in 1991 actively prosecuted
claims for restoration of aid and attendance benefits, waiver
of overpayment and election of benefits. On August 24, 1992,
the RO received a letter from the veteran's representative
and her application for TDIU. The representative's letter of
August 31, 1992, asserted the RO in October 1988 committed
clear and unmistakable error (CUE) when it denied service
connection for SLE on an incomplete record. The
representative asked the RO to obtain her Army and Air Force
service medical records and records from the Jefferson
Barracks VA medical facility that a VA physician had referred
to in a 1988 letter. Late in 1992, VA records sought were
received that included a 1990 reference to SLE since 1981.
Other VA records received from 1975 and 1979 through 1981 did
not mention SLE.
Service medical records received from the service department
in April 1993 consisted of a 1973 physical examination and
dental records from 1974. Service medical records received
in June and July 1993 consisted of duplicate records from the
1979 medical board evaluation and a 1981 military examination
that did not mention SLE. The representative on June 24,
1993, submitted service medical records from 1979 that were
laboratory analysis reports and a transfer summary dated in
February 1979 that reported laboratory data including "VDRL
was 3+..." (highlighted)
The representative in July 1993 submitted a June 1993 medical
statement that indicated a review of records the veteran had
submitted showed features in retrospect that were very
consistent with SLE. The physician stated the specific
features and laboratories from the available notes and
laboratory data had been highlighted. The representative
said in the July 1993 transmittal letter that the records the
physician referred to had been submitted on June 24. The
representative in August 1993 submitted duplicate service
medical records variously dated in 1974. In addition, the
representative asked that the RO obtain specified VA medical
records. The representative submitted this request again the
following month.
The record shows that in September 1993 the RO received VA
medical records from 1982 that showed the veteran was
evaluated early in 1982 for gland swelling in the neck and
under the left arm and that biopsy findings of the axillary
lymph nodes were interpreted as consistent with reactive
hyperplasia. In June 1982 she was evaluated for a
dermatologic problem of the arms. Material from punch
biopsies of the left arm was interpreted by one clinician as
suggestive of SLE. Another pathology report found the
changes were consistent with collagen vascular disorders
rather than SLE. The corresponding clinical reports refer to
a history of a developing lower arm rash in 1981 that was
aggravated by sunlight and healed in the winter months with
SLE to be ruled out. The records showed various clinical
entries were highlighted.
The RO in November 1993 asked for a VA medical opinion as to
whether the veteran manifested SLE in military service as
medical reviewers in 1988 and 1993 had opined. In November
1993 a VA specialist agreed with the previously referenced
medical opinions regarding onset in service and pointed out
the significance of the 3+ serology the veteran had in 1979
(false-positive test for syphilis commonly seen in SLE
patients).
A RO rating decision in November 1993 granted service
connection for SLE with loss of use of the upper extremities
and a 100 percent rating from August 24, 1992. The RO in
December 1993 notified the veteran of the effective date of
increase as a result of service connection for SLE. The
representative in January 1994 argued for an unspecified
earlier effective date based on the previously submitted CUE
claim. The RO in April 1994 adjudicated the CUE claim in
denying an earlier effective date, although the rating board
acknowledged a question of adequacy of notice after the 1984
rating decision that initially considered and denied service
connection for SLE.
Pursuant to the Board remand, the RO was asked to consider
whether consider whether the provisions of 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.156© were applicable in the determination of an earlier
effective date. Specifically, the Board asked the RO to
clarify which of the service medical records the various
examiners had relied on had been contained in supplemental
reports from the service department. The RO in February 1999
concluded that none of the records were on file at the time
of the 1984 or 1988 rating decisions that denied service
connection for SLE. The RO further found that none of the
records alone constituted new and material evidence and that
this evidence reviewed by an examiner with other evidence not
on file at the time of either prior decision established
entitlement to service connection. The RO did not adjust the
effective date since it found the medical review was
completed in connection with claim filed in 1992.
Criteria
A determination on a claim by the agency of original
jurisdiction of which the claimant is properly notified is
final if an appeal is not perfected as prescribed in Rule 302
(§ 20.302 of this part). 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R.
§ 20.1103.
If new and material evidence is presented or secured with
respect to a claim which has been disallowed, the Secretary
shall reopen the claim and review the former disposition of
the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108.
A decision of a duly constituted rating agency or other
agency of original jurisdiction shall be final and binding on
all field offices of the Department of Veterans Affairs as to
conclusions based on the evidence on file at the time VA
issues written notification in accordance with 38 U.S.C.A. §
5104 (West 1991). A final and binding agency decision shall
not be subject to revision on the same factual basis except
by duly constituted appellate authorities or except as
provided in § 3.105 of this part. 38 C.F.R. § 3.104(a).
"Notice" means written notice sent to a claimant or payee
at his latest address of record. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(q) (1984).
The claimant will be notified of any decision affecting the
payment of benefits or granting relief. Notice will include
the reason for the decision and the date it will be
effectuated as well as the right to a hearing...The
notification will also advise the claimant of his right to
initiate an appeal by filing a Notice of Disagreement...the
notice will advise him of the periods in which an appeal must
be initiated and perfected. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (1984).
A determination on a claim by the agency of original
jurisdiction of which the claimant is properly notified shall
become final if an appeal is not perfected as prescribed in
Rule 29 (§ 19.129). 38 C.F.R. § 19.192 (1984).
The regulations define new and material evidence as follows:
New and material evidence means evidence
not previously submitted to agency
decision makers which bears directly and
substantially upon the specific matter
under consideration, which is neither
cumulative nor redundant, and which by
itself or in connection with evidence
previously assembled is so significant
that it must be considered in order to
fairly decide the merits of the claim.
38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2000).
Where the new and material evidence consists of a
supplemental report from the service department, received
before or after the decision has become final, the former
decision will be reconsidered by the adjudicating agency of
original jurisdiction. This comprehends official service
department records which presumably have been misplaced and
have now been located and forwarded to the Department of
Veterans Affairs. Also included are corrections by the
service department of former errors of commission or omission
in the preparation of the prior report or reports and
identified as such. The retroactive evaluation of disability
resulting from disease or injury subsequently service
connected on the basis of the new evidence from the service
department must be supported adequately by medical evidence.
Where such records clearly support the assignment of a
specific rating over a part or the entire period of time
involved, a retroactive evaluation will be assigned
accordingly except as it may be affected by the filing date
of the original claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156©.
The Board notes that the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (hereinafter, Circuit Court) recently
ruled that the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims (VA Claims Court) erred in adopting the test
articulated in Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171, 175
(1991). Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
In Colvin, the Court adopted the following rule with respect
to the evidence that would justify reopening a claim on the
basis of new and material evidence, "there must be a
reasonable possibility that the new evidence, when viewed in
the context of all the evidence, both new and old, would
change the outcome." Colvin, 1 Vet. App. at 174. In light
of the holding in Hodge, the Board will analyze the evidence
submitted in the case at hand according to the standard
articulated in 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a).
For the purpose of establishing whether new and material
evidence has been submitted, the credibility of the evidence
is to be presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513
(1992).
The Board does not have jurisdiction to consider a previously
adjudicated claim unless new and material evidence is
presented. Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
1996). When new and material evidence has not been submitted
in a previously denied claim "[f]urther analysis...is
neither required, nor permitted." Butler v. Brown, 9 Vet.
App. 167, 171 (1996) (finding in a case of where new and
material evidence had not been submitted that the Board's
analysis of whether the claims were well grounded constituted
a legal nullity). Thus, the well groundedness requirement
did not apply with respect to reopening disallowed claims and
revising prior final determinations. Jones v. Brown, 7 Vet.
App. 134 (1994).
The Board notes that under 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104(a) and 3.105(a)
(2000), taken together, a rating action is final and binding
in the absence of clear and unmistakable error. A decision
which constitutes a reversal of a prior decision on the
grounds of clear and unmistakable error has the same effect
as if the corrected decision had been made on the date of the
reversed decision. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a).
VA regulations provide that "previous determinations which
are final and binding...will be accepted as correct in the
absence of clear and unmistakable error." 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.105(a). Where evidence establishes such error, the prior
decision will be reversed or amended. Id.
"Clear and unmistakable error" requires more than a
disagreement on how the facts are weighed or evaluated; the
appellant must show that the correct facts, as they were
known at the time, were not before the adjudicator or that
pertinent regulatory or statutory provisions were incorrectly
applied. Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313 (1992).
In addition, "It is the kind of error, of fact or law, that
when called to the attention of later reviewers compels the
conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that
the result would have been manifestly different but for the
error. Fugo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 40, 43 (1993).
A claim that the evidence was not properly weighed or
evaluated cannot constitute clear and unmistakable error, and
the allegation of clear and unmistakable error must
specifically state what error and how the outcome would have
been manifestly different. Id. at 44.
The determination regarding clear and unmistakable error must
be made based on the record and the law that existed at the
time the decision was made. Damrel v. Brown, 6 Vet.
App. 242, 245 (1994); Russell, 3 Vet. App. at 314. Evidence
that was not of record at the time of the decision cannot be
used to determine if clear and unmistakable error occurred.
Porter v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 233 (1993).
Previous determinations which are final and binding,
including decisions of service connection, degree of
disability, age, marriage, relationship, service, dependency,
line of duty, and other issues, will be accepted as correct
in the absence of clear and unmistakable error. Where
evidence establishes such error, the prior decision will be
reversed or amended. 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a).
For purposes of determining whether clear and unmistakable
error is present in a prior determination: (1) "[e]ither the
correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not
before the adjudicator (i.e., more than a simple disagreement
as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated) or the
statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were
incorrectly applied," (2) the error must be "undebatable" and
of the sort "which, had it not been made, would have
manifestly changed the outcome at the time it was made," and
(3) a determination that there was clear and unmistakable
error must be based on the record and law that existed at the
time of the prior adjudication in question. Damrel v. Brown,
6 Vet. App. 242 (1994).
Service connection may be granted for a disease or injury
incurred in or aggravated by active service in the line of
duty. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 1991).
Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed
after discharge, when all the evidence, including that
pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was
incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d).
Service connection connotes many factors but basically it
means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a
particular injury or disease resulting in disability was
incurred coincident with service in the Armed Forces, or if
preexisting such service, was aggravated therein. This may
be accomplished by affirmatively showing inception or
aggravation during service or through the application of
statutory presumptions.
Each disabling condition shown by a veteran's service
records, or for which he seeks a service connection must be
considered on the basis of the places, types and
circumstances of his service as shown by service records, the
official history of each organization in which he served, his
medical records and all pertinent medical and lay evidence.
Determinations as to service connection will be based on
review of the entire evidence of record, with due
consideration to the policy of the Department of Veterans
Affairs to administer the law under a broad and liberal
interpretation consistent with the facts in each individual
case. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a).
With chronic disease shown as such in service (or within the
presumptive period under § 3.307) so as to permit a finding
of service connection, subsequent manifestations of the same
chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are
service connected, unless clearly attributable to
intercurrent causes.
This rule does not mean that any manifestation of joint pain,
any abnormality of heart action or heart sounds, any urinary
findings of casts, or any cough, in service will permit
service connection of arthritis, disease of the heart,
nephritis, or pulmonary disease, first shown as a clear-cut
clinical entity, at some later date.
For the showing of chronic disease in service there is
required a combination of manifestations sufficient to
identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to
establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from
merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word
"Chronic." When the disease identity is established
(leprosy, tuberculosis, multiple sclerosis, etc.), there is
no requirement of evidentiary showing of continuity.
Continuity of symptomatology is required only where the
condition noted during service (or in the presumptive period)
is not, in fact, shown to be chronic or where the diagnosis
of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. When the fact
of chronicity in service is not adequately supported, then a
showing of continuity after discharge is required to support
the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(:(.
Service connection may be granted for lupus erythematosus,
systemic although not otherwise established as incurred in
service if manifested to a compensable degree within one year
from the date of separation from service provided the
rebuttable presumption provisions of § 3.307 are also
satisfied. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309, as amended at 54 Fed. Reg.
26029, June 21, 1989.
When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for
determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in
relative equipoise, with the appellant prevailing in either
event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against
a claim, in which case, the claim is denied. Gilbert v.
Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990).
When, after consideration of all of the evidence and material
of record in an appropriate case before VA, there is an
approximate balance of positive and negative evidence
regarding the merits of an issue material to the
determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in
resolving each such issue shall be given to the claimant.
38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(
(West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.3.
The Secretary shall consider all information and lay and
medical evidence of record in a case before the Secretary
with respect to benefits under laws administered by the
Secretary. When there is an approximate balance of positive
and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the
determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the
benefit of the doubt to the claimant. Veterans Claims
Assistance Act of 2000 (hereafter VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475,
§ 4, 114 Stat. 2096, 2098-99 (2000) (to be codified as
amended at 38 U.S.C. § 5107).
Except as otherwise provided, the effective date of an
evaluation and award of pension, compensation or dependency
and indemnity compensation based on an original claim, a
claim reopened after final disallowance, or a claim for
increase will be the date of receipt of the claim or the date
entitlement arose, whichever is the later. 38 U.S.C.A
§ 5110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(:o(2)(i).
Any communication or action, indicating an intent to apply
for one or more benefits under the laws administered by the
Department of Veterans Affairs, from a claimant, his or her
duly authorized representative, a Member of Congress, or some
person acting as next friend of a claimant who is not sui
juris may be considered an informal claim. Such informal
claim must identify the benefit sought. Upon receipt of an
informal claim, if a formal claim has not been filed, an
application form will be forwarded to the claimant for
execution. If received within one year from the date it was
sent to the claimant, it will be considered filed as of the
date of receipt of the informal claim. (:( A communication
received from a service organization, an attorney, or agent
may not be accepted as an informal claim if a power of
attorney was not executed at the time the communication was
written. © When a claim has been filed which meets the
requirements of § 3.151 or § 3.152, an informal request for
increase or reopening will be accepted as a claim. 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.155.
Effective date of pension or compensation benefits, if
otherwise in order, will be the date of receipt of a claim or
the date when entitlement arose, whichever is the later. A
report of examination or hospitalization which meets the
requirements of this section will be accepted as an informal
claim for benefits under an existing law or for benefits
under a liberalizing law or Department of Veterans Affairs
issue, if the report relates to a disability which may
establish entitlement. Acceptance of a report of examination
or treatment as a claim for increase or to reopen is subject
to the requirements of Sec. 3.114 with respect to action on
Department of Veterans Affairs initiative or at the request
of the claimant and the payment of retroactive benefits from
the date of the report or for a period of 1 year prior to the
date of receipt of the report. 38 C.F.R. § 3.157.
A pending claim is an application, formal or informal, which
has not been finally adjudicated. 38 C.F.R. § 3.160.
Analysis
There are currently two statutorily authorized means to
obtain reevaluation of a final VA benefit decision. A final
decision disallowing a claim may be revised based upon a
showing of CUE in a prior decision by the Secretary or the
Board pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109A and 7111, or reopened
based upon submission of new and material evidence pursuant
to 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108.
The veteran does argue that the RO committed CUE in 1988 so
that means of obtaining reevaluation is brought to the Board.
The Board notes the argument is that the RO in 1988 committed
CUE when it denied the claim on an incomplete record. The
Board will not provide a comprehensive discussion of CUE in
such instances in view of the decision to find the 1984 claim
remained, in essence, a pending claim that was not affected
by the 1988 rating decision. It is sufficient to point out
that the constructive receipt rule established in Bell v.
Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 611 (1992) would have no application
to this case since the rating decision at issue was prior to
the date the Bell decision was issued, July 21, 1992. See,
for example, Damrel, 6 Vet. App. at 246; Karnas v. Derwinski,
1 Vet. App. 308, 313 (1991). Further, any failing to develop
for VA evidence would have been a breech of the duty to
assist, and as such it cannot be a basis for a CUE claim,
although the record may have been incomplete. Caffrey v.
Brown, 6 Vet. App. 377 (1994).
The Board also concludes that in view of grave procedural
error new and material evidence was not required to obtain a
reevaluation or review of the claim denied initially in 1984.
Thus the Board is not limited by the effective date rules
that apply in such circumstances. Further, as the additional
service medical records alone apparently did not alone
establish SLE in service the provisions of 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.156© do not require review of the 1984 decision. Nor
does the Board need to discuss another potential means of
obtaining review discussed in Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360
(Fed. Cir. 1998), as the facts do not warrant its
application.
The Board observes that in Hayre v. West, 188 F.3d 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) the Circuit Court created a nonstatutory means to
obtain review of a previously denied claim, holding that
while a breach of the duty to assist is not the type of error
that can provide the basis for a CUE claim in accordance with
this Court's case law, in cases of grave procedural error RO
or Board decisions are not final for purposes of direct
appeal. Id. at 1333. In Hayre the Circuit Court held that a
breach of the duty to assist in which the VA failed to obtain
pertinent SMRs specifically requested by the claimant and
failed to provide the claimant with notice explaining the
deficiency is a procedural error of, at least, comparable
gravity that vitiates the finality of an RO decision for
purposes of direct appeal.
The VA Claims Court, interpreting the reach of Hayre in
Simmons v. West, 14 Vet. App. 84, 91 (2000), noted that:
Not only do we believe that Hayre does not require that
a "garden variety" breach of VA's duty to assist, in the
development of a claim that is well grounded, be
construed as tolling the finality of an underlying RO
decision, but we also believe that it would be unwise
for this Court to extend Hayre to encompass such a duty-
to-assist violation. At some point, there is a need for
finality within the VA claims adjudication process;
thus, the tolling of finality should be reserved for
instances of "grave procedural error"--error that may
deprive a claimant of a fair opportunity to obtain
entitlements provided for by law and regulation.
The holding in Hayre as explained in Tetro v. Gober, 14 Vet.
App. 100 (2000) provided for review of unappealed decisions
where grave procedural error had occurred so as to render the
decision nonfinal. In Hayre the vitiating error was failure
to assist in obtaining specifically requested service medical
records and failure to provide the claimant with notice
explaining the deficiency. Other examples of grave
procedural error referred to in Tetro were Tablazon v. Brown,
8 Vet. App. 359, 361 (1995) (failure to provide a statement
of the case after receiving a notice of disagreement); Hauck
v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1994) (failure to provide
notification of denial tolls period to file a notice of
disagreement); Kuo v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 662, 666 (1992)
(failure to send statement of the case to accredited
representative tolled 60 day period to respond) and Ashley v.
Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 307, 311 (1992) (evidence sufficient
to rebut presumption of administrative regularity for mailing
of appeal notice).
The Board observes that at the time of the 1984 decision, the
scope of the Secretary's duty to assist concerning the
procurement of VA records and service medical records was
clearly defined. There were specific VA Adjudication
Procedure Manual M21-1 provisions paras 5.01 et seq., 22.01
et seq. and 25.01 et seq. prescribing the steps to be taken
to obtain such records. These provisions were clear
authority to guide the RO in 1984 concerning the procurement
of VA and service medical records that were specifically
mentioned. Therefore, the failure to obtain such records
would give rise to a grave procedural error comparable to
that in Hayre.
The Board believes the holding here accords due consideration
to the VA Claims Court's explanation in Simmons of the
relevant factors relied on by the Circuit Court in Hayre.
First, the VA assistance sought was "specifically requested"
regarding service medical records and VA treatment that was
directly referenced. The initial request to the service
department that produced service medical records apparently
did not include those later relied on to find SLE likely was
incurred in service. There does not appear to have been a
supplemental request prior to the mid 1990's even though the
veteran mentioned the likely existence of such treatment
records. Further, the VA records from the early 1980's were
apparently not requested until the early 1990's although
there had been earlier references to pertinent medical
treatment at the time of the 1984 claim and later in 1988.
VA adjudication procedures required the RO to obtain the VA
reports since, under the circumstances, the veteran was not
required to make a specific request. Second, the lack-of-
notice element present here is such that it may undermine the
operation of the veterans' benefits system by altering its
manifestly pro-claimant character and jeopardizing the
veteran's ability to appeal in what may appear to be a
fundamentally unfair manner. The RO did not follow up
regarding VA records or service medical records in 1984 or
1988, although it seemed obvious in view of the medical
references that more records than reflected in the claims
file were compiled. There was clearly notice of VA records
from the early 1980's relevant to the SLE claim that were not
requested until years after the 1984 claim. There is
recognition of the particularly vital role that service
medical records and VA records can play in determining the
question of in-service incurrence of a disability.
It does not appear there was notice to the veteran explaining
the failure to obtain pertinent and specifically requested
service medical records and specified VA records. These were
essential to insuring that the RO would adequately develop a
veteran's claim before deciding it on the merits. The
opinion in Simmons noted that VA has substantively defined
its obligation to obtain such records in its Manual M21-1 and
recently recognized the special role of such records and VA's
access to them by referring to VA Veterans Benefits
Administration Letter 20-99-60 at 1 (Aug. 30, 1999)
(directing all ROs that service medical records and VA
medical center records are to be requested in all cases and
considered to be records in VA custody. This policy, in view
of the Manual M21-1 provisions previously mentioned, was
substantially in effect in 1984 and is authority for the RO's
duty to assist. It was a situation where VA was in control
of evidence necessary to prove her claim. The VA Claims
Court pointed out that where documents containing certain
information are under VA control (real or constructive),
failure to produce them is likely to frustrate an award of
benefits. Simmons, 14 Vet. App. at 89-90.
As noted previously another basis to find grave procedural
error is the failure to provide notification of denial in
1984, which in turn tolls the period to file a notice of
disagreement. Hauck, 6 Vet. App. at 519. The notice in 1984
was clearly deficient in not advising the veteran that her
claim for service connection of SLE had been denied. In
addition, the 1988 decision was nonfinal since the essential
records, which had been mentioned, were not developed for by
the RO. In essence, the 1984 claim remained a pending claim.
In summary, the Board holds that Hayre as explained in Tetro
v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 100 (2000) and Simmons should apply in
this case given its facts so as to render nonfinal the June
1984 RO decision. Further, there is no applicability of a
CUE claim in this case and the nonfinality of the 1984
decision renders the 1988 decision a nullity. The Board has
not overlooked the potential application of the recently
enacted Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 [Pub. L. No.
106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000)], but finds the record is
adequate for a determination of the proper effective date.
Since the claim to establish service connection for SLE was a
pending claim from May 1984 in view of the grave procedural
errors then, and which rendered the 1988 RO decision a
nullity, the effective date for service connection should
coincide with the May 15, 1984 date of claim. 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.400. The Board is not inclined to decide what rating is
warranted for the period prior to August 1992 since that
determination has not been addressed by the RO in the first
instance. Nor does the Board infer or suggest that any
particular rating is warranted for the entire period. The
Board, however, directs the attention of the appellant and
the RO to the guidance recently provided in Meeks v. West,
216 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000) regarding the
retroactive rating in claims such as the appellant's. See
also Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993).
ORDER
Entitlement to an effective date of May 15, 1984, for service
connection for SLE is granted.
Heather J. Harter
Acting Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals
(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
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