Agent Orange ( Defoliant)

[kkp]

I know for many of you Vets, the Viet Nam war started in 1964. How-be-it, Many of us know from experance it started long befor then, But thats another topic for another day.

I have done alot of research trying to reconstruct events of my own expearances. AO (Defoliants) was used as early as 1960 in Laos and parts of Viet Nam, maybe earlier But I can document the war and ao use from 1960 on.

At any rate heres a little tid bit. At worst its a good read

kkp

5. Diem gravely concerned over deterioration situation southern Laos in recent months and

would of course like to see action taken to clean up that area. Any decision on part of GVN

to throw sizable force into this effort would be grave one not only because it would

represent broadening of war in which GVN now engaged but because of limited available

GVN forces to meet current military needs. Believe however that GVN would seriously

consider as part cooperative effort commitment some additional forces beyond small

number of Vietnamese Special Forces and regulars now engaged in Laos and along Lao

border. GVN officials continue to talk in admiring and favorable terms about use of

Pakistani troops in Laos, but we are not in position judge practicality of this idea. Diem

might not insist upon actual involvement of US combat forces at outset of cooperative

action in Laos but would certainly seek to obtain clear commitment by US to send in

combat forces if need developed.

GVN operations Laos tactically and strategically sound and desirable. Due guerrilla war

now going on in Viet Nam GVN military forces immediately available for cooperative

action in Laos could probably consist only additional small units somewhat similar those

now in Laos (principally along route 9) but with perhaps broader role, possibly to include

limited combat support of Lao units. GVN might as calculated risk commit larger forces to

Laos with view toward preventing intensified future VC infiltration through Laos, but

sizable GVN operation in Laos could probably be considered only within time frame

required to mobilize, train and equip additional forces now planned but not yet available.

Forces being added under 30,000 increase will provide additional capability but these not

available in significant numbers before late 1962. Should be recognized that, if the above

occurs, there is possibility that increased enemy action will force GVN to escalate its forces

committed across Lao border beyond whatever level it originally decides-e.g., small to

sizable. In latter case it important it be kept in mind that additional 30,000 increment is

required for GVN primary task of defeating insurgency within Viet Nam at approximately

its present intensity.

Bangkok and Vientiane much better qualified than me to comment on likelihood Sarit and

Phoumi cooperation in cleanup southern Laos. From Saigon it would appear that Phoumi

could be persuaded without much trouble as we believe there is inclination on his part at

times to throw in towel re northern Laos, withdraw his forces to south and attempt set up

separate government there. Phoumi would probably regard cooperative effort in southern

Laos as at least giving him greater assurance of being able hold out there if he is obliged

give up north.

Would appear to US Sarit might be harder to convince that southern Laos should have

priority as against occupying all parts of Laos adjacent to Mekong and thus bordering

Thailand. We would assume if enough outside support thrown in (e.g., Pakistani troops) to

conduct both operations, Sarit would willingly cooperate on southern Laos operation as

well.

Above is based on my understanding first question under five refers to cooperative action

just as remaining two questions do. If, however, first question stands alone and refers to

unilateral GVN troop employment in eastern Laos for primary purpose defense South Viet

Nam, then our response is:

With respect infiltration individuals or small groups VC, GVN troops not now capable with

or without pushing out into Laos controlling very numerous rugged and forested infiltration

points which occur entire length all borders here. Military forces required for high degree

control infiltration type described above would be prohibitive regardless location of troops.

On other hand for control any sizable communist troop units or supply routes GVN forces

located Laos on major avenues of approach and commanding terrain worthy consideration.

This for purposes early warning and desirability meeting enemy ahead of own borders plus

additional indication determination stop aggression. Extent GVN troop commitment for this

purpose would be governed by essentially same factors as those outlined above with respect

to cooperative action in Laos. Presently RVNAF are studying MAAG recommended

techniques to reduce infiltration such as defoliant, change from present static guard posts to

mobile concept involving additional patrols including dogs, establishment of buffer

population, additional roads and air fields and like, which are long range in nature and

cannot be expected to stop but only progressively reduce infiltration.

Nolting

121. Editorial Note

The Conclusions of National Intelligence Estimate 14.3/53-61, August 15, 1961, entitled

"Prospects for North and South Vietnam", are printed in United States-Vietnam Relations,

1945-1967, Book 11, pages 245-246.

122. Editorial Note

On August 17, 1961, William J. Jorden, a former New York Times correspondent who

became a member of the Department of State's Policy Planning Council earlier in the

month, left the United States for a fact-finding mission to South Vietnam. His task was to

gather documentation on infiltration by North Vietnamese forces into the South. In a letter

of August 17 to Ambassador Nolting, Vietnam Task Force Director Sterling J. Cottrell

wrote that Jorden had only learned of his assignment the previous week and the suggestion

that he be sent had been approved by the President within 24 hours. Cottrell described

Jorden as "soft-spoken and willing to listen" and added:

"He is extremely serious about this undertaking and realizes that the material which he is

able to assemble with your help and write up is likely to have a considerable influence on

U.S. policy decisions. He is also prepared for the fact that he may not be able to obtain

enough evidence to make a fully impressive case." (Department of State, Vietnam Working

Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, VN 1961 Presidential Program Psychological TF 26 thru 31)

123. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense

(McNamara)/1/

JCSM-583-61

Washington, August 24, 1961.

[Berta]

This is good info too on AO and Laos:

http://www.ffrd.org/Agent_Orange/laosao.htm

http://cybersarges.tripod.com/aolaos.html same info but some good links-

Haven't read this but this too might be good:

http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID...9B3809EC588EEDF

It would make absolutely no tactical sense to use AO in Vietnam but not use in in Laos or Cambodia or Thailand. There was as much jungle enemy cover in those countries too.

Of course lot a good it did- thousands of the EN were underground in the tunnels and avoided the jungles.

I met a vet at the VA Chapel who hand sprayed it in Thailand.

Edited December 10, 2006 by Berta