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lumbosacral 96-918 Rose V West_disk Disease
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allan
Author: USCVA
Typist: USCVA
UNITED STATES COURT OF VETERANS APPEALS
No. 96-918
Jack O. Rose, Appellant,
v.
Togo D. West, Jr.,
Acting Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Appellee.
On Appeal from the Board of Veterans' Appeals
(Decided April 20, 1998
)
Ronald L. Smith was on the brief for the appellant.
Robert E. Coy, Acting General Counsel; Ron Garvin, Assistant General
Counsel; Joan E. Moriarty, Deputy Assistant General Counsel; and
Jacqueline M. Sims, Senior Appellate Attorney, were on the brief for the
appellee.
Before KRAMER, HOLDAWAY, and IVERS, Judges.
KRAMER, Judge: The appellant, Jack O. Rose, appeals a May 3, 1996,
decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) denying service
connection for a back disorder (Record (R.) at 6-25), subsequent to the
Court's remand decision that new and material evidence had been submitted
to reopen the appellant's claim (R. at 284). This appeal is timely, and
the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 7252(a). For the
reasons that follow, the Court will reverse the decision of the BVA and
remand the matter with an order that the Board grant service connection
for a back disability and for the prompt assignment of an appropriate
disability rating for the appellant's back condition.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
The appellant served in the U.S. Coast Guard from November 1951 to
May 1954. R. at 28. He has averred that he injured his back while
lifting a hatch on-board ship in March 1952 (R. at 125)
and has submitted a statement from a fellow serviceman who was present
when this event occurred (R. at 110). The appellant's service medical
records reveal that he was treated for back pain in service first in March
1952 and repeatedly thereafter until at least August 1953. R. at 43, 46-
48, 52, 54, 58. In 1985, the appellant was diagnosed by Dr. Ira M. Hardy,
II, as having profound lumbar disc disease marked by large, bulging discs
in the L3-L4 and L4-L5 joints, a degenerative disc in the L5-S1 joint, and
nerve root impingement. R. at 86. This diagnosis has been
supported by similar diagnoses from Drs. John R. Kindell (R. at
90), Matthew L. Zettl (R. at 94), and Ralph M. Coonrad (R. at 251). Of
these three doctors, Dr. Zettl characterized the appellant's condition as "
lumbar disc disease, as well as degenerative arthritis of the lumbar spine
" (R. at 94), and Dr. Kindell stated, "I feel there is no doubt that this
man's present disability is directly related to his original injury of 28
March 1952" (R. at 200). Finally, without providing a specific diagnosis,
Dr. Richard W. Borden stated: "After thorough review of [the appellant]'s
medical history, including his service records, it is my professional
opinion that the continued back problem is, with[]out a doubt related to
his service injury in 1952." R. at 160.
Based on the diagnoses discussed above, the BVA characterized the
appellant's condition as "[d]egenerative arthritis of the lumbosacral
spine with disc disease and nerve root impairment." R. at 9. After the
Board expressly found that he did not have a back condition prior to
service, the Board concluded that "[d]egenerative arthritis of the
lumbosacral spine with disc disease was not incurred in or aggravated by
service, nor may arthritis be presumed to have been so incurred." Id. In
denying his claim, the BVA stated, in essence, that the appellant's
evidence did not meet the requirements of 38 C.F.R. 3.303(b) (1997
). R. at 19, 22-24.
II. ANALYSIS
Establishing service connection generally requires medical evidence
of a current disability, see Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 141 (1992);
medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service
incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and medical evidence of
a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present
disease or injury. See Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd
per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table); see also Epps v. Gober,
126 F.3d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (expressly adopting definition of
well- grounded claim set forth in Caluza, supra), petition for cert. filed,
No. 97-7373 (Jan. 5, 1998);
Heuer v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 379 (1995); Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 91 (
1993). Alternatively, under 38 C.F.R. 3.303(b), service connection may
be awarded for a "chronic" condition when: (1) a chronic disease manifests
itself and is identified as such in service (or within the presumption
period under 38 C.F.R. 3.307 (1997)) and the veteran presently has the
same condition; or (2) a disease manifests itself during service (or
during the presumptive period) but is not identified until later, there is
a showing of continuity of symptomatology after discharge, and medical
evidence relates the symptomatology to the veteran's present condition.
See Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 488, 495-98 (1997).
A finding of service connection is a finding of fact. See Russo v.
Brown, 9 Vet.App. 46, 50 (1996); Horowitz v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 217, 221 (
1993). The Court reviews BVA fact finding under a "clearly erroneous"
standard of review. Under this standard "if there is a 'plausible' basis
in the record for the factual determinations of the BVA . . . [the Court]
cannot overturn them." Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 53 (1990).
However, the Board may not substitute its own unsubstantiated medical
conclusion to refute medical evidence favorable to a claim. See Alemany v.
Brown, 9 Vet.App. 518, 519 (1996); Thurber v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 119, 120-
22 (1993).
The Secretary's brief concedes that "there is no medical opinion of
record that supports the Board's conclusion that the [a]ppellant's back
disorder is not related to service," and that the Board relied on its own
unsubstantiated medical conclusion to refute the appellant's favorable
evidence. Secretary's Brief at 13-15. However, the Secretary argues that
the Board's decision should not be reversed, but rather that the decision
should be vacated and the matter should be remanded for further
adjudication. The essence of the Secretary's position appears to be, like
that of the Board, that the appellant cannot be granted service connection
because he cannot satisfy the requirements of 3.303(b).
The Secretary's position is without merit. Section 3.303(b) provides
an alternative method of demonstrating entitlement to service connection.
Savage, 10 Vet.App. at 495-6 (section 3.303(b) is provision that veteran "
may utilize" because it provides "a substitute way" of proving service
connection) (emphasis added). Nothing in 3.303(b) requires that its
criteria must be met to establish service connection. To the contrary, it
is clear that service connection may be established by medical evidence of
an in-service injury or aggravation, medical evidence of a current
condition,
and medical evidence of a nexus between the two. See Caluza, supra.
This is not to say that medical evidence of nexus could not be rebutted,
in an appropriate case, by medical evidence that demonstrates the
significance of a lack of continuity of symptomatology. However, no such
evidence exists and it is not the function of judicial review simply to
accord the government a remand to obtain such evidence
Whether a disability is incurred in or aggravated during service or
incurred during a presumption period is a finding of fact. See Russo; and
Horowitz, supra. This Court reviews BVA fact finding under a "clearly
erroneous" standard of review. Under this standard "if there is a
'plausible' basis in the record for the factual determinations of the BVA
. . . [the Court] cannot overturn them." Gilbert, 1 Vet.App. at 53. Here,
each of the three requirements under Caluza is unequivocally supported by
the medical evidence submitted by the appellant. There is no medical
evidence in the record that is contrary to the appellant. As the
Secretary concedes, the Board improperly refuted this evidence with its
own unsubstantiated medical opinion. See Alemany, supra. Because the BVA
has articulated no valid basis for denying service connection, its
decision is not plausible and is, accordingly, clearly erroneous. See
Russo and Gilbert, supra.
In view of the uncontested nature of the evidence of service
connection, the Board's decision must be reversed. See Traut v. Brown, 6
Vet.App. 495, 500 (1994) (where medical evidence of record addresses all
elements of service connection, is uncontradicted by competent evidence,
and definitively supports appellant's position, reversal rather than
remand is appropriate); Harder v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 183, 189-90 (1993);
Willis v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 66, 70 (1991). Cf. Talley v. Brown, 6 Vet.
App. 72, 74-75 (1993) (vacating and remanding claim where appellant's
favorable medical evidence characterized his claim as merely "plausible
").
III. CONCLUSION
The May 3, 1996, BVA decision is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED
for the BVA to award service connection for a back disorder and for the
prompt assignment of an appropriate disability rating for the back
condition.
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