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Caluza Triangle defines what is necessary for service connection
Tbird posted a record in VA Claims and Benefits Information,
Caluza Triangle – Caluza vs Brown defined what is necessary for service connection. See COVA– CALUZA V. BROWN–TOTAL RECALL
This has to be MEDICALLY Documented in your records:
Current Diagnosis. (No diagnosis, no Service Connection.)
In-Service Event or Aggravation.
Nexus (link- cause and effect- connection) or Doctor’s Statement close to: “The Veteran’s (current diagnosis) is at least as likely due to x Event in military service”-
- 0 replies
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Tbird, -
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Post in ICD Codes and SCT CODES?WHAT THEY MEAN?
Timothy cawthorn posted an answer to a question,
Do the sct codes help or hurt my disability ratingPicked By
yellowrose, -
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Post in Chevron Deference overruled by Supreme Court
broncovet posted a post in a topic,
VA has gotten away with (mis) interpreting their ambigious, , vague regulations, then enforcing them willy nilly never in Veterans favor.
They justify all this to congress by calling themselves a "pro claimant Veteran friendly organization" who grants the benefit of the doubt to Veterans.
This is not true,
Proof:
About 80-90 percent of Veterans are initially denied by VA, pushing us into a massive backlog of appeals, or worse, sending impoverished Veterans "to the homeless streets" because when they cant work, they can not keep their home. I was one of those Veterans who they denied for a bogus reason: "Its been too long since military service". This is bogus because its not one of the criteria for service connection, but simply made up by VA. And, I was a homeless Vet, albeit a short time, mostly due to the kindness of strangers and friends.
Hadit would not be necessary if, indeed, VA gave Veterans the benefit of the doubt, and processed our claims efficiently and paid us promptly. The VA is broken.
A huge percentage (nearly 100 percent) of Veterans who do get 100 percent, do so only after lengthy appeals. I have answered questions for thousands of Veterans, and can only name ONE person who got their benefits correct on the first Regional Office decision. All of the rest of us pretty much had lengthy frustrating appeals, mostly having to appeal multiple multiple times like I did.
I wish I know how VA gets away with lying to congress about how "VA is a claimant friendly system, where the Veteran is given the benefit of the doubt". Then how come so many Veterans are homeless, and how come 22 Veterans take their life each day? Va likes to blame the Veterans, not their system.Picked By
Lemuel, -
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Post in Re-embursement for non VA Medical care.
broncovet posted an answer to a question,
Welcome to hadit!
There are certain rules about community care reimbursement, and I have no idea if you met them or not. Try reading this:
https://www.va.gov/resources/getting-emergency-care-at-non-va-facilities/
However, (and I have no idea of knowing whether or not you would likely succeed) Im unsure of why you seem to be so adamant against getting an increase in disability compensation.
When I buy stuff, say at Kroger, or pay bills, I have never had anyone say, "Wait! Is this money from disability compensation, or did you earn it working at a regular job?" Not once. Thus, if you did get an increase, likely you would have no trouble paying this with the increase compensation.
However, there are many false rumors out there that suggest if you apply for an increase, the VA will reduce your benefits instead.
That rumor is false but I do hear people tell Veterans that a lot. There are strict rules VA has to reduce you and, NOT ONE of those rules have anything to do with applying for an increase.
Yes, the VA can reduce your benefits, but generally only when your condition has "actually improved" under ordinary conditions of life.
Unless you contacted the VA within 72 hours of your medical treatment, you may not be eligible for reimbursement, or at least that is how I read the link, I posted above. Here are SOME of the rules the VA must comply with in order to reduce your compensation benefits:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/38/3.344
Picked By
Lemuel, -
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Post in What is the DIC timeline?
broncovet posted an answer to a question,
Good question.
Maybe I can clear it up.
The spouse is eligible for DIC if you die of a SC condition OR any condition if you are P and T for 10 years or more. (my paraphrase).
More here:
Source:
https://www.va.gov/disability/dependency-indemnity-compensation/
NOTE: TO PROVE CAUSE OF DEATH WILL LIKELY REQUIRE AN AUTOPSY. This means if you die of a SC condtion, your spouse would need to do an autopsy to prove cause of death to be from a SC condtiond. If you were P and T for 10 full years, then the cause of death may not matter so much.Picked By
Lemuel, -
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Question
Berta
Extraordinary- and maybe a big push for all of you who do such meticulous medical research for your claims and associate it well to your evidence:
from email from Ray B Davis-
Dear Readers,
The Federal Appeals Court has ruled that "Lay Evidence" can be used
to make a diagnosis of a medical condition in a veterans claim. The
VA and the Veterans Court have ruled in the past that Lay evidence
could not make a medical diagnosis.
From the Court case (copied in it's entirety below my name)
"(1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition,(4)
4 Sometimes the layperson will be competent to identify the condition
where the condition is simple, for example a broken leg, and
sometimes not, for example, a form of cancer.
(2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis,
or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later
diagnosis by a medical professional. Contrary to the Veterans' Court,
the relevance of lay evidence is not limited to the third situation,
but extends to the first two as well."
While the lay evidence presenting testimony will have to be believed,
and will need some knowledge of medical conditions by observing the
veteran; if you VA claim was denied because of lay evidence you may
wish to reopen the claim and cite this case.
Your Editor,
Ray B Davis, Jr
VALaw.org
http://www.valaw.org
--FED CASE ---
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2007-7029
ALVA JANDREAU,
Claimant-Appellant,
v.
R. JAMES NICHOLSON, Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
Respondent-Appellee.
Ronald L. Smith, Disabled American Veterans, of Washington, DC,
argued for claimant-appellant. With him on brief was Zachary M. Stolz.
Leslie Cayer Ohta, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington,
DC, argued for respondent-appellee. With her on the brief were Peter
D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; Jeanne E. Davidson, Director;
and Mark A. Melnick, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief were
Michael J. Timinski, Deputy Assistant General Counsel; and Y. Ken
Lee, Attorney, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of
Washington, DC.
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
Chief Judge William P. Greene, Jr.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2007-7029
ALVA JANDREAU,
Claimant-Appellant,
v.
R. JAMES NICHOLSON, Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
Respondent-Appellee.
___________________________
DECIDED: July 3, 2007
___________________________
Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, and BRYSON and DYK, Circuit Judges.
DYK, Circuit Judge.
Alva Jandreau ("Jandreau") appeals the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ("Veterans' Court"). That court
affirmed an earlier decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals
("Board") that denied service connection for residuals of a right-
shoulder dislocation. We reject appellant's argument that the
evidentiary standard should be relaxed, but hold that the Veterans'
Court improperly held that lay evidence cannot be used to establish a
medical diagnosis. We remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
BACKGROUND
Jandreau served honorably in the U.S. Army from May 1957 to May 1959.
In
May 1997, Jandreau filed a claim with the Veterans Administration
("VA") for residuals of a right shoulder injury. He asserted that the
injury to his shoulder had occurred during basic training at Fort
Dix, when he had dislocated his shoulder and had been treated for his
injury on the base. The VA attempted to obtain Jandreau's service
medical records, but was unable to do so because those records had
been destroyed in a 1973 fire at the National Personnel Records
Center in St. Louis.
In an effort to provide the necessary evidence as support for his
claim of service connection despite the destruction of the records,
Jandreau submitted a number of documents to the VA. He submitted a
statement from a fellow serviceman, Frederick Burnham, averring: "I
remember Alva [Jandreau] being in great pain after dislocating his
shoulder while in training."1 J.A. at 35. Jandreau also submitted
multiple medical reports, detailing medical examinations conducted in
2000. Those reports stated that Jandreau suffered pain, arthritis and
rotator cuff impingement in his right shoulder. In particular, one
report by Dr. Timothy Snell, M.D., assesses Jandreau's condition
as "[r]ight shoulder pain, most likely sequelae of his dislocation of
the shoulder." Id. at 7. Jandreau also submitted a radiology report
indicating a history of right-shoulder dislocation and pain and
documents indicating treatment for that condition.
The VA denied service connection because "no medical evidence was
received showing continuity of treatment for the right shoulder since
discharge from military service." J.A. at 78. Jandreau appealed to
the Board, which issued its decision on May
1 The VA specifically allows veterans to introduce into evidence
statements of fellow service members when records were destroyed in
the 1973 fire. See Veterans Benefits Administration Adjudication
Procedures Manual M21-1MR, part III, subpart iii, ch. 2, § E.27.b
(2005), available at http://www.warms.vba.va.gov/admin21/
m21_1/mr/part3/subptiii/ch02/ch02_sece.doc, page 2-E-5.
2007-7029 2
27, 2004. The Board denied service connection for Jandreau's injury,
reasoning that Dr. Snell's report merely recorded Jandreau's
assertion that he had suffered a dislocation but did not diagnose a
dislocation when it occurred. The Board stated that "the Board is not
required to accept evidence that is simply information recorded by a
medical examiner, unenhanced by medical opinion." J.A. at 13. It
further concluded that "[m]edical diagnosis and causation involve
questions that are beyond the range of common experience and common
knowledge, and require the special knowledge and experience of a
trained physician." Id. The Board rejected the testimony of both
Jandreau and his fellow serviceman, because "[w]hile the veteran and
his buddy are arguably competent to present evidence concerning the
occurrence of an injury, they are not competent to present evidence
to establish the etiology of a current disability." Id. The Board
thus found that "there is no competent evidence on file linking the
veteran's current right shoulder disabilities to service or to any
incident therein." Id.
Jandreau appealed to the Veterans' Court, which affirmed the Board's
decision. The court concluded that the Board did not err in rejecting
lay evidence that Jandreau suffered a dislocation during service
and "did not err in discounting Dr. Snell's medical opinion because
it was premised on a fact that Mr. Jandreau was not competent to
establish—that he had dislocated his shoulder during service."
Jandreau v. Nicholson, No. 04-1254, slip op. at *3 (Vet. App. Aug.
24, 2006). The court held that "[w]here the determinative issue
involves either medical etiology or a medical diagnosis, competent
medical evidence is required; however, lay assertions of
symptomatology or injury may suffice where the determinative issue is
not medical in nature." Id. Thus the court held that "whether
[Jandreau] experienced a dislocation of his shoulder requires a
medical
2007-7029 3
diagnosis." Id.
Jandreau timely appealed the decision of the Veterans' Court to this
court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). Cromer
v. Nicholson, 455 F.3d 1346, 134-49 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
DISCUSSION
I
On appeal Jandreau first argues that the destruction of records while
in the government's custody should result in a relaxed evidentiary
standard for veterans. We reject this argument.
The statute provides that "a claimant has the responsibility to
present and support a claim for [VA] benefits." 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a).
In our decision in Cromer, 455 F.3d 1346, we considered and rejected
the argument that service connection should be presumed when a
veteran's medical records are destroyed while in the government's
custody. 455 F.3d at 1350-51. In Cromer, the medical records were
destroyed in the same 1973 fire at the National Personnel Records
Center that resulted in the presumed destruction of Jandreau's
records. See id. at 1347. We reasoned that the veteran has the
evidentiary burden of establishing his claim in veterans' benefits
cases and that Congress and the VA have specifically shifted that
burden in particular cases, but have not done so here. Id. at 1350-
51. We further noted that the VA has eased the evidentiary burden on
veterans whose records were lost in the 1973 fire, but has not
provided for an adverse presumption of service connection. Id. at
1351. 2
2 See Veterans Benefits Administration Adjudication Procedures Manual
M21-1MR, part III, subpart iii, ch. 2, § E.27.b (2005), available at
http://www.warms.vba.va.gov/admin21/m21_1/...tiii/ch02/ch02_
sece.doc,
2007-7029 4
Jandreau on appeal does not deny that our decision in Cromer is
controlling on the issue of burden shifting, but asserts that his
claim is different because he asserts only that his burden of proof
should be "somewhat relaxed." Reply Br. at 1. To the extent Jandreau
seeks a modification of his burden of proof, we see no material
difference between his argument and the argument we rejected in
Cromer. To the extent that Jandreau seeks to invoke traditional
evidentiary adverse inference rules, we find those rules to be
inapplicable, even if we were to agree that they apply in the context
of VA proceedings. The general rules of evidence law create an
adverse inference when evidence has been destroyed and "(1) . . . the
party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve
it at the time it was destroyed; (2) . . . the records were destroyed
with a culpable state of mind; and (3) . . . the destroyed evidence
was relevant to the party's claim or defense such that a reasonable
trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or
defense." Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d
99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted); see also 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 168 (2007); 2 Kenneth S.
Brown, McCormick On Evidence § 264 (6th ed. 2006). The burden is on
the party seeking to use the evidence to show the existence of each
criterion. Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 107. There is no claim
here that the records were willfully or recklessly destroyed. While
some circuits have held that a showing that a party was negligent in
page 2-E-5 (listing alternate documents, such as statements from
service medical personnel, statements of fellow service members,
letters, photographs or prescription records, state or local accident
and police reports, that the veteran can provide to substitute for
documents destroyed in the 1973 fire).
2007-7029 5
the destruction of records creates an adverse inference,3 we need not
decide whether that is the correct rule because Jandreau conceded at
oral argument that there was no evidence of government negligence
leading to the destruction of the records.
II
Jandreau's second argument on appeal is that the Veterans' Court
erred in holding that that lay evidence is insufficient "where the
determinative issue involves either medical etiology or a medical
diagnosis," and that accordingly, "whether [Jandreau] experienced a
dislocation of his shoulder requires a medical diagnosis." Jandreau,
No. 04-1254, slip op. at *3. We agree. The holding of the Veterans'
Court is inconsistent with our decision in Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006), which was decided shortly before the
decision of the Veterans' Court in this case.
Buchanan involved a situation where the veteran claimed service
connection resulting from schizophrenia that allegedly began during
his service. The veteran sought to establish service connection by
submitting affidavits of relatives and his commanding officer
testifying that his symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia first
manifested themselves during service, as well as a medical opinion
from 2001, almost twenty years after the conclusion of his service,
that stated that his symptoms first
3 See Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 108; Rogers v. T.J. Samson
Cmty. Hosp., 276 F.3d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 2002). Other circuits have
held mere negligence insufficient to apply an adverse presumption.
See, e.g., Aramburu v. The Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir.
1997); Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929, 931 (11th Cir. 1997); Brewer
v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995); Vick
v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975); see
also Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., 306 F.3d 806, 824
(9th Cir. 2002); Jackson v. Harvard University, 900 F.2d 464, 469
(1st Cir. 1990).
2007-7029 6
appeared during service. Id. at 1333. The Board determined that lay
evidence without confirmatory documentary evidence cannot be
credible, and the Veterans' Court affirmed. Id. at 1337. We reversed,
holding that numerous veterans' statutes and regulations require
consideration of lay evidence. Id. at 1334-35; see also 38 U.S.C. §§
1154(a), 5107(; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(a), 3.307(B). In other words we
found that the statute makes clear that, in the veterans' context,
traditional requirements for admissibility have been relaxed. See 38
U.S.C. § 5107(B) ("The Secretary shall consider all . . . lay and
medical evidence of record in a case . . . with respect to
benefits."). We concluded that "lay evidence is one type of evidence
that must be considered" and that "competent lay evidence can be
sufficient in and of itself." Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1335. We noted
that the Board retains discretion to make credibility determinations
and otherwise weigh the evidence submitted, including lay evidence.
Id. at 1336-37. The rule announced in Buchanan is particularly
important when veterans' service medical records have been destroyed.
Unless lay evidence were allowed, it would be virtually impossible
for a veteran to establish his claim to service connection in light
of the destruction of the service medical records.
Under Buchanan the conclusion of the Veterans' Court that "competent
medical evidence is required . . . [when] the determinative issue
involves either medical etiology or a medical diagnosis" is too
broad. Jandreau, No. 04-1254, slip op. at *3. Lay evidence can be
competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when
(1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition,4 (2)
the layperson is
4 Sometimes the layperson will be competent to identify the condition
where the condition is simple, for example a broken leg, and
sometimes not, for example, a form of cancer.
2007-7029 7
2007-7029 8
reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony
describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a
medical professional. Contrary to the Veterans' Court, the relevance
of lay evidence is not limited to the third situation, but extends to
the first two as well. Whether lay evidence is competent and
sufficient in a particular case is a fact issue to be addressed by
the Board rather than a legal issue to be addressed by the Veterans'
Court. We do not reach the question whether in the present case the
lay evidence is competent and sufficient to establish shoulder
dislocation, a matter beyond our jurisdiction. We remand to the
Veterans' Court so that it may remand to the Board for further
consideration under the correct legal standard.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision below is
REVERSED AND REMANDED
COSTS
No costs.
---end---
http://www.valaw.
GRADUATE ! Nov 2nd 2007 American Military University !
When thousands of Americans faced annihilation in the 1800s Chief
Osceola's response to his people, the Seminoles, was
simply "They(the US Army)have guns, but so do we."
Sameo to us -They (VA) have 38 CFR ,38 USC, and M21-1- but so do we.
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