vet201060 Posted May 23, 2010 Share Posted May 23, 2010 If a disabled vet is 50% adjustment disorder/depression will the spouse and children get the compensation? Thanks Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
HadIt.com Elder Pete53 Posted May 23, 2010 HadIt.com Elder Share Posted May 23, 2010 Larry: A reasonable probability of service-connected (SC) death exists if, based on a rating decision made during the Veteran’s lifetime, one or more of the following exists: service connection was granted for any chronic disease under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 service connection was granted for a condition affecting any vital organ, or the Veteran had at least one SC disease or disability evaluated at 50 percent or more disabling was rated 100 percent for an SC disease or disability, or was entitled to individual unemployability Generally, a person of unsound mind is incapable of forming intent, which is an essential element of willful misconduct. I have seen claims awarded for DIC after suicide Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
HadIt.com Elder LarryJ Posted May 23, 2010 HadIt.com Elder Share Posted May 23, 2010 Larry: A reasonable probability of service-connected (SC) death exists if, based on a rating decision made during the Veteran’s lifetime, one or more of the following exists: service connection was granted for any chronic disease under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 service connection was granted for a condition affecting any vital organ, or the Veteran had at least one SC disease or disability evaluated at 50 percent or more disabling was rated 100 percent for an SC disease or disability, or was entitled to individual unemployability Generally, a person of unsound mind is incapable of forming intent, which is an essential element of willful misconduct. That's interesting, Pete. I've never ran across this situation (and sincerely hope that I NEVER DO) but I figger that the way the VA denys perfectly legitimate claims that this "grey area" (whether the person was of sound mind, which of course, it can be argued that they obviously WERE NOT, or they would not have committed suicide), that this "grey area" would give the VA the opportunity to deny the claim on the grounds of willful misconduct. Regardless, let's us not have any of our folks here "testing the system". PLEASE. If you feel that you need to know whether your family will be "taken care of" or whether they will "be better off" with you gone..........then PLEASE, PLEASE call the suicide hot line, go to the VA, go to the nearest hospital, call your pastor, reach out, do something, but make sure you do not leave your loved ones to have to deal with the VA, for, that's worse than anything I could imagine, especially after having had to deal with your suicide. Something I wouldn't wish on my worst enemy, and especially not my loved ones. (of course, I don't HAVE any enemys...........I don't allow it!). ;) Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
HadIt.com Elder Philip Rogers Posted May 23, 2010 HadIt.com Elder Share Posted May 23, 2010 vet201060 - $1154, plus any COLA's, a month for life or until they remarry. There is some additional if there are minor children. pr How much is DIC a month? How long does it last? Thanks for the info. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
HadIt.com Elder Philip Rogers Posted May 23, 2010 HadIt.com Elder Share Posted May 23, 2010 The VA doesn't consider suicide "willful misconduct", due to the reason Pete53 stated. pr Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
carlie Posted May 23, 2010 Share Posted May 23, 2010 Here's a 2009 BVA Case that provides a clear cut answer and the reasons why. http://www4.va.gov/vetapp09/files3/0920020.txt Citation Nr: 0920020 Decision Date: 05/29/09 Archive Date: 06/08/09 DOCKET NO. 06-18 602 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in New Orleans, Louisiana THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for the Veteran's cause of death. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Michael Holincheck, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from September 1942 to August 1945. The appellant is the Veteran's surviving spouse. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a March 2005 decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in New Orleans, Louisiana. Please note this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900© (2008). 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(a)(2) (West 2002). FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran served on active duty from September 1942 until he committed suicide on August [redacted], 1945. 2. The Veteran's suicide was not due to willful misconduct and was in the line of duty. 3. The appellant was married to the Veteran at the time of his death. 4. The appellant remarried in November 1945. 5. The appellant previously sought entitlement to Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) benefits on behalf of her and the Veteran's child, born in September 1945. The claim was denied in November 1947. The appellant was not eligible for such benefits at that time. 6. The appellant's second husband died in December 2004. 7. The appellant's claim for DIC benefits is an original claim for such benefits on her behalf. CONCLUSION OF LAW A service-connected disability caused or contributed substantially or materially to the cause of the veteran's death. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 103, 105, 1110, 1112, 1310 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1, 3.50, 3.55, 3.301, 3.302, 3.303, 3.304, 3.312 (2008). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION I. Background The Veteran served on active duty from September 1942 until his death on August [redacted], 1945. The Veteran committed suicide at that time by shooting himself. An official investigation report from that time reflects that the Veteran had gone absent without leave (AWOL) from his command for 55 minutes on August 17, 1945. He was later arrested that same day by the shore patrol (SP) in a nearby city. He was returned to his command for confinement pending captain's mast (nonjudicial punishment or NJP). The Veteran was on a work detail, as a prisoner, on August [redacted], 1945. He was being transported in a truck with another prisoner and a guard. The Veteran took the sidearm from the guard and escaped from the truck. He eventually committed suicide by shooting himself with the sidearm. The Navy investigating officer determined that there was no reason for the Veteran to commit suicide. The same investigating officer cited to several Navy regulations for the purpose of showing that the act of suicide itself overcomes the normal presumption of sanity. Further the Navy Department presumption that no sane man would take their life without reasonable or adequate motive was not controverted in this case. The investigating officer concluded that the Veteran's death was not the result of his own misconduct and was in the line of duty. The commanding officer of the unit prepared an endorsement to the investigation report to the Secretary of the Navy in August 1945. The facts were restated essentially as in the original report. The endorsement noted that there was no evidence of motive for suicide. Further, the Veteran's death was not the result of a violation of law or Navy regulations and was not caused by the intent, fault, negligence, or inefficiency of any person in the Naval Service. Finally, the commanding officer concluded that the death of the Veteran was not the result of his own misconduct and was in the line of duty. The Office of the Judge Advocate General for the Navy endorsed the report in November 1945. The endorsement said that the death was not the result of the Veteran's own willful misconduct and that a determination of line of duty by the Navy Department was not necessary in this case. A final endorsement sending the report to the Bureau of Personnel (BuPERS) was added in December 1945. The Veteran's personnel records show that he initiated an allotment to pay premiums for National Service Life Insurance (NSLI) in October 1942. He named his mother as the principal beneficiary. VA received a notice from the Veteran requesting that his allotment be stopped in May 1945. The form noted the reason for the request was that the Veteran was a general court-martial prisoner. The Veteran made a second application for a NSLI policy on August 3, 1945. He listed the appellant as his principal beneficiary. The application also included a physical examination that was conducted at Camp Peary, Virginia, in July 1945. No psychiatric symptoms were noted and the Veteran did not report any prior history of nervous problems. A NSLI certificate was issued to show an insurance policy was in effect from August 3, 1945. It was signed in February 1946. VA wrote to the Navy Department to find out whether the Veteran was discharged from service in September 1945. The request asked for the report of offense, findings, and sentence of the court-martial. A response was received that the Veteran was returned to duty. A second response was received that informed of the Veteran's death in February 1946. VA wrote to the appellant to assist her in submitting a claim for NSLI benefits in April 1946. VA also wrote to the appellant in May 1946. She was informed that she may be entitled to a pension in addition to any insurance benefits. The appellant submitted her claim for the NSLI benefits in May 1946. The appellant also submitted a claim for DIC/pension benefits in June 1946. The appellant informed VA that she had remarried in November 1945 and that the claim was on behalf of the child born of the marriage between her and the Veteran in September 1945. The appellant was asked to provide a copy of her certificate of marriage. The appellant provided a copy that showed her and the Veteran were married in October 1944. Concurrent to the above actions, VA had also contacted the Navy to obtain information about the Veteran's service, to include his duty stations, advancements, reductions, and a history of all disciplinary actions. The Navy provided a transcript of the Veteran's service that listed his duty assignments, his advancements and his reductions in pay grade in August 1946. The Navy also provided a summary of the Veteran's disciplinary actions in September 1957. The list included: - August 22, 1943. A deck court-martial for being absent over leave (AOL) from 1730 August 14, 1943, to August 16, 1943. The Veteran was tried on August 18, 1943, and the charge proved by plea. The sentence was to perform extra punitive duties (EPD) for a period of one month and a fine of $10 per month for three months. The convening authority mitigated the punishment to perform EPD for two months and a loss of pay of $10 for one month. January 17, 1945. A captain's mast for attempting to smuggle mail out of the brig. The Veteran was sentenced to three days of solitary confinement on bread and water. January 25, 1945. An erroneous mark of desertion was removed from the Veteran's record. It was noted that he was tried and convicted on a charge of AOL and not desertion. February 27, 1945. A deck court-martial for using disrespectful language to a superior officer and wearing other than regulation uniform of said rating. The charges were proved by plea. The Veteran was sentenced to confinement for five days and to forfeit $10 a month for two months. The convening authority approved the sentence on February 27, 1945. March 31, 1945. The Veteran was declared a straggler as he had been AWOL since 1300 on March 30, 1945. The evidence of record does not record a disposition for any punitive action that may have been taken in regard to the last AWOL status in March 1945. The Board notes that the issue of the Veteran being a prisoner as a result of a general court-martial was noted at the time his NSLI premium was stopped in May 1945. The Board further notes that a query to the Navy shows that the Veteran was restored to duty. There is no evidence of record that informs as to any general court-martial proceeding as in the charges, date of trial, or disposition. It is not clear from the evidence of record then whether the Veteran was a prisoner pending a trial or as the result of a conviction and sentencing in May 1945. Clearly, if the Veteran was convicted of any offense(s) at a general court-martial no discharge was awarded as punishment as he was restored to duty. The Board also notes that the transcript of the Veteran's service does record his advancements and reductions in pay grade. He entered service as an apprentice seaman in September 1942. He was advanced to seaman second class in November 1942. He was later advanced to seaman first class in May 1944. The Veteran was reduced to seaman apprentice on May 4, 1945. He was then advanced to seaman second class on August 4, 1945, approximately two weeks prior to his death. It is reasonable to conclude that the reductions in pay grade would be the result of disciplinary action. The reduction in May 1945 was notable in that the Veteran was reduced two pay grades; however, he was advanced back to seaman second class within three months. The evidence of record shows that the Veteran was pending a captain's mast, or NJP, at the time of his death. The RO issued an administrative decision in October 1947. The decision was that the Veteran's cause of death was not service-connected because it was due to his own willful misconduct. The decision noted the circumstances of the Veteran's death as detailed in the investigating officer's report. It was noted that the Veteran's service treatment records (STRs) were negative for any indication of mental unsoundness. The following paragraphs contained the rationale of the decision: The Navy Department held that death was not due to misconduct on the theory of presumption of insanity indulged in by the Department. Since the question of insanity is one of fact for pension purposes, and in the absence of any evidence thereof, it is held that death was not incurred in line of duty. It is pertinent to state that the deceased's previous record of offenses and sentences was extensive. In the opinion of this Board, pending disciplinary action could have motivated the deceased to attempt to escape. VA administrative decision of October 22, 1947. VA denied the DIC claim submitted by the appellant on behalf of her and the Veteran's child in November 1947. The basis for the denial was that the Veteran's death was considered not to be in the line of duty and due to his own willful misconduct. The appellant's representative at the time queried the RO on the status of the claim for the child's DIC benefits in April 1949. The RO responded that same month that the claim had been denied and notice of the denial had been provided in November 1947. It was noted that the appeal period had expired and there was no evidence of an appeal having been submitted. Associated with the claims folder is a favorable ruling by VA to award a special NSLI dividend to the Veteran's child in December 1950. The several claims forms and information gathered in conjunction with the application for the dividend clearly denote the appellant as the Veteran's remarried widow and the custodian of the child. The Chief VA attorney in Shreveport, Louisiana, wrote to the Chief, Dependents & Beneficiaries claims division in December 1954. The letter inquired whether the Veteran's minor child was entitled to any death benefits. The claims division office replied that same month and informed that a prior claim for benefits was disallowed in October 1947. The basis for the denial was that the Veteran's death was not incurred in the line of duty and was due to his own willful misconduct. The appellant submitted her claim for DIC benefits in January 2005. She noted the Veteran's date of death in service and that she had received his life insurance benefits. She also said she had remarried shortly after the Veteran's death and did not ever recall submitting a claim for DIC benefits. She also reported the death of her second husband in December 2004. The RO denied her claim in March 2005. The basis for the denial was that the previous administrative determination held that the Veteran's death was not in the line of duty and was the result of willful misconduct. The appellant disagreed with the decision in April 2005. She noted that the Navy had concluded the Veteran's death was in the line of duty and not due to misconduct. The RO wrote to the appellant to provide her with the notice required under the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA) in August 2005. The RO advised that the "appellant's" claim was previously denied in November 1947. The letter explained the Navy's determination was based on a presumption of insanity and VA found no evidence of mental unsoundness. The letter also advised the appellant that she was required to submit evidence that the Veteran's mental unsoundness was due to service and that there was no reasonable adequate motive for suicide shown by the evidence. Finally, the letter noted that, in the prior determination, VA found that impending disciplinary action could have foreseeably served as an adequate motive for suicide. The RO issued a statement of the case (SOC) in May 2006. The SOC restated the basic elements of the circumstances of the Veteran's death and the findings by the Navy. The SOC went on to state "[t]he [V]eteran had been in trouble most of his term of service and at the time of his death knew he was facing a dishonorable discharge." The SOC further explained: Our determination is that the Navy find[ings] are patently inconsistent with the requirements of laws administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs. Requirements as to line of duty are not met if at the time the injury was suffered or disease contracted the veteran was confined under a sentence of a court-martial involving an unremitted dishonorable discharge. VA SOC dated May 9, 2006. The paragraph appears to be an incomplete summary of and citation to the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(m) (2008). The appellant perfected her appeal in May 2006. She noted the inconsistency of the RO's assessment and that the RO was engaging in speculation as to any type of separation/discharge that may have been involved, if one was at all. Further, the appellant cited to the regulatory definitions for line of duty and willful misconduct and argued that both definitions supported her claim for benefits. II. Analysis A. Status as Surviving Spouse A surviving spouse is eligible to receive DIC payments. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1310 (West 2002). To be recognized as the veteran's surviving spouse for the purpose of establishing entitlement to VA death benefits, the appellant must be a person of the opposite sex whose marriage to the veteran meets the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(j) and who was the spouse of the veteran at the time of the veteran's death and: (1) who lived with the veteran continuously from the date of marriage to the date of the veteran's death except where there was a separation which was due to the misconduct of, or procured by, the veteran without the fault of the spouse; and (2) except as provided in 38 C.F.R. § 3.55, has not remarried or has not since the death of the veteran and after September 19, 1962, lived with another person of the opposite sex and held himself or herself out openly to the public to be the spouse of such other person. 38 U.S.C.A. § 101(3) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.50 (2008). At the outset it is noted that the appellant was married to the Veteran at the time of his death. This was proven both by the Veteran's submission of insurance forms naming her as his spouse and the marriage license submitted by the appellant. They were married in October 1944 and were married until the Veteran's death on August [redacted], 1945. The evidence supports that theirs was a valid marriage under the laws of Louisiana. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(j) (2008). The appellant remarried following the Veteran's death; nevertheless, she is considered the surviving spouse of the Veteran for the current claim due to the termination of her subsequent marriage by death. 38 C.F.R. § 3.55(a)(3). Indeed, 38 C.F.R. § 3.55(a)(3) provides that (on or after October 1, 1998) remarriage of a surviving spouse terminated by death, divorce, or annulment, will not bar the furnishing of dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC), unless the Secretary determines that the divorce or annulment was secured through fraud or collusion. In the instant case, the appellant was married to the Veteran at the time of his death in August 1945. She remarried in November 1945. Her second marriage was terminated by the death of her second husband after October 1, 1998, and thus she may be considered the "surviving spouse" of the veteran for DIC purposes under 38 C.F.R. § 3.55(a)(3). The RO has not questioned the fact of the death of the appellant's second husband. The RO initially denied the appellant's claim based on the prior administrative decision of October 1947 and the determination that the Veteran's death was not in the line of duty and was due to his own willful misconduct. This aspect will discussed further infra. The RO later wrote to the appellant in August 2005 and told her that her prior claim had been denied in November 1947. The latter statement is not correct. The appellant has not previously submitted a claim for DIC benefits for herself. She notified VA of her remarriage in November 1945 in 1946. She was not a surviving spouse of the Veteran at the time she submitted the claim for DIC benefits on behalf of her and the Veteran's child in 1946. Thus, she was not eligible for any DIC benefits in her own right. Further, the 1947 denial notice to the appellant clearly addressed the claim as being filed on behalf of the child. VA also acknowledged the status of the prior claim as being on behalf of the child in the response to the appellant's representative in April 1949. The same acknowledgement was made in the response to the VA Chief attorney in Shreveport in December 1954. The appellant regained her status as a surviving spouse upon the death of her second husband in December 2004. Moreover she had never submitted a previous claim for DIC benefits for herself. Thus, the current claim represents an initial claim on her part for DIC benefits as the surviving spouse of the Veteran. Line of Duty/Willful Misconduct According to applicable laws and regulations, service connection for the cause of a veteran's death requires evidence that a service-connected disability was the principal or contributory cause of death. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1310; 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(a) (2008). For a service-connected disability to be the principal cause of death, it must singularly or jointly with some other condition be the immediate or underlying cause of death, or be etiologically related thereto. 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(b). For a service- connected disability to be a contributory cause of death, it must be shown that it contributed substantially or materially, combined to cause death, or aided or lent assistance to the production of death. 38 C.F.R. § 3.312©. The law provides that service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West. 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2008). An injury or disease incurred during active military service is deemed to have been incurred in the line of duty and not the result of a veteran's own misconduct, unless the injury or disease was a result of the person's own willful misconduct or abuse of alcohol or drugs. 38 U.S.C.A. § 105(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.301 (2008). See Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 241, 244 (1992) (38 U.S.C.A. § 105(a) creates a presumption that an injury or disease is incurred in the line of duty that must be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence); see also Thomas v. Nicholson, 423 F.3d 1279, 1284- 85 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Preponderance of the evidence was the proper evidentiary standard necessary to rebut a § 105(a) presumption of service connection for injuries that occurred during active duty). A service department finding that injury, disease, or death occurred in line of duty will be binding on VA unless it is patently inconsistent with the requirements of laws administered by VA. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(m) (2008). Requirements as to line of duty are not met if, at the time the injury was suffered or disease contracted, the Veteran was avoiding duty by desertion, or was AWOL which materially interfered with the performance of military duty; confined under a sentence of court-martial involving an remitted dishonorable discharge; or confined under sentence of a civil court for a felony as determined by the laws of the jurisdiction where the person was convicted by such court. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(m)(1)-(3). Willful misconduct means an act involving conscious wrongdoing or known prohibited action (malum in se or malum prohibitum). It involves deliberate or intentional wrongdoing with knowledge of or wanton and reckless disregard of its probable consequences. Mere technical violation of police regulations or ordinances will not per se constitute willful misconduct. Willful misconduct will not be determinative unless it is the proximate cause of the injury, disease, or death. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(n) (2008); see also Daniels v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 348, 350 (1996). In order for suicide to constitute willful misconduct, the act of self-destruction must be intentional. A person of unsound mind is incapable of forming an intent (mens rea, or guilty mind, which is an essential element of crime or willful misconduct). It is a constant requirement for a favorable action that the precipitating mental unsoundness be service connected. 38 C.F.R. § 3.302(a) (2008). Whether a person, at the time of suicide, was so unsound mentally that he or she did not realize the consequences of such an act, or was unable to resist such impulse is a question to be determined in each individual case, based on all available lay and medical evidence pertaining to his or her mental condition at the time of suicide. The act of suicide or a bona fide attempt is considered to be evidence of mental unsoundness; therefore, where no reasonable adequate motive for suicide is shown by the evidence, the act will be considered to have resulted from mental unsoundness. A reasonable adequate motive for suicide may be established by affirmative evidence showing circumstances which could lead a rational person to self-destruction. 38 C.F.R. § 3.302(b) (2008). Affirmative evidence is necessary to justify reversal of service department findings of mental unsoundness where VA criteria do not otherwise warrant contrary findings. In all instances any reasonable doubt should be resolved favorably to support a finding of service connection. 38 C.F.R. § 3.302© (2008). As this is an appellate review of an original claim, the Board will review the underlying administrative decision relied on by the RO as it is the basis for the current denial. The decision is flawed in several respects. Most importantly, it dismisses, without adequate explanation, the determinations made by the Navy as to line of duty and willful misconduct. The original decision from 1947, and adopted by the most recent denial in March 2005, simply says VA must make its own determination as to mental unsoundness. Such a declaration stands in violation of current law and regulation. VA is bound by service department findings unless they are patently inconsistent with the requirements of laws administered by VA. The Veteran was not AWOL at the time of his death. He was not confined under sentence of a court-martial, he was in custody pending NJP at a captain's mast. Nor was the Veteran confined for any civil court sentence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(m). The 1947 decision speculated that pending disciplinary action could have motivated the Veteran to commit suicide. As stated this was speculation. Moreover, the Veteran was pending NJP for a minor infraction. It is not reasonable to conclude that such a minor level of punishment, for a minor offense, would serve as motivation for suicide, even considering the prior disciplinary actions. Further, the May 2006 SOC reasons and bases go beyond speculation by stating as fact that the Veteran was facing a dishonorable discharge at the time of his death. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record to support that conclusion. There is no evidence of any type of record to show that any court- martial proceeding was pending or even anticipated. The line of duty/misconduct investigation clearly states that the Veteran was pending NJP at the time of his death. There was no mention of any pending dishonorable discharge that was pending as a result of any prior disciplinary action. The SOC conclusion of the Veteran facing a dishonorable discharge at the time of his death is not supported by the evidence. Upon review of all of the evidence of record the Board concludes that the appellant has standing as a surviving spouse. The Board also concludes that the Veteran was suffering from mental unsoundness at the time of his death. There is no affirmative evidence of record to show circumstances that would lead a rational person to commit suicide. The Veteran's mental unsoundness was service- connected as it occurred during his active military service. There is no reasonable doubt to be resolved in this case. The Veteran's mental unsoundness led directly to his committing suicide. For reasons previously discussed, the facts and circumstances of the Veteran's death are not such as to be patently inconsistent with the requirements of laws administered by VA. Accordingly, the Veteran's death was in the line of duty and not due to his willful misconduct. His death was, and is, service-connected. The appellant's claim for entitlement to service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death is granted. As provided for by the VCAA, VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2008). In this case, the Board is granting in full the benefit sought on appeal. Accordingly, assuming, without deciding, that any error was committed with respect to either the duty to notify or the duty to assist, such error was harmless and will not be further discussed. ORDER Entitlement to service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death is granted. ____________________________________________ S. S. TOTH Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Berta Posted May 24, 2010 Share Posted May 24, 2010 (edited) Suicide is considered by VA to be willful misconduct unless the veteran was insane at time of the suicide. Or the death could be rated "as if" service connected under Section 1151 due to a medication error or side affect that the spouse could prove caused suicidal ideation enough for the veteran to act on those thoughts. I posted the regs here on Suicide before (maybe they are in DIC forum) and have had experience with claims for DIC under these conditions above.A good friend of mine who committed suicide 4 years ago (Vietnam Veteran) had planned this carefully.He had done extensive volunteer work in the community for years,had no known mental health problems = per the wife although he told me he had PTSD-no medical records -per the wife- and it would have been almost impossible for his suicide to have been declared an act of an unsound mind. The manner of death even showed clear intent over a sudden irrational act. Anyone thinking that their spouse will get DIC if they commit suicide is projecting 'intent' and this would be considered willful misconduct by the VA if they found that out. The VA has excellent information on the signs of suicidal ideation-inmportant for all of us to know: http://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/suicide_prevention/ and also anyone who needs to talk to someone if they have these feelings should call the suicide hot line at 1-800-273-8255 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting 1-800-273-8255 end_of_the_skype_highlighting. They have a staff who deals entirely with veteran;'s issues and their base is near where I live - at the Canandaigua VA.This Program has helped many many veterans and their family members. I suggest that anyone who gets a call from anyone who is talking of harming themselves to urge them to call the Suicide hot line- or get their caller ID number and then call 911 and direct them to the caller. Or try to contact the state police via the internet in their locale- while you are talking to them by phone. Edited May 24, 2010 by Berta Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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vet201060
If a disabled vet is 50% adjustment disorder/depression will the spouse and children get the compensation? Thanks
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